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Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) aids the development of risk-informed safety 
codes and standards which are employed to reduce risk in a variety of complex 
technologies, such as hydrogen systems. Currently, the lack of reliability data limits 
the use of QRAs for fueling stations equipped with bulk liquid hydrogen storage 
systems. In turn, this hinders the ability to develop the necessary rigorous safety codes 
and standards to allow worldwide deployment of these stations. Prognostics and Health 
Management (PHM) and the analysis of condition-monitoring data emerge as an 
alternative to support risk assessment methods. Through the QRA-based analysis of a 
liquid hydrogen storage system, the core elements for the design of a data-driven PHM 
framework are addressed from a risk perspective. This work focuses on identifying the 
data collection requirements to strengthen current risk analyses and enable data-driven 
 
 
approaches to improve the safety and risk assessment of a liquid hydrogen fueling 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Limited availability of hydrogen fueling stations represents an important barrier for 
the increase in Fuel Cell Electric Vehicles’ (FCEVs) deployment [1], [2]. Access to 
hydrogen-based fuel is restricted in urban areas due to the requirements established in 
pertinent Safety Codes and Standards (SCS) that ensure that new technologies maintain 
acceptable risk levels. As hydrogen technologies are developed and deployed, continuous 
efforts have been invested into increasing the safety of hydrogen infrastructure, as well as 
incorporating scientific, risk-informed requirements into the development of 
corresponding SCS [3]. 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) frameworks provide a systematic and 
science-based foundation for the design and implementation of SCS. These frameworks 
have been used in key hydrogen SCS including multiple aspects of both the U.S. National 
Fire Protection Association NFPA 2 code for gaseous hydrogen (GH2) stations [4] and the 
international standard ISO 19880-1 [5]. However, to date, most QRA efforts have focused 
on GH2 systems and storage, while liquid hydrogen (LH2) risks have been less explored 
[6]. 
The limited availability of reliability and safety data for LH2 systems represents a 
barrier to fully employ risk-informed tools, such as QRA [7]. As stated by the U.S. 
Department of Energy’s Fuel Cell Technologies Office (FCTO), new approaches for data 
generation, collection, and analysis are critical to close safety and reliability knowledge 
gaps regarding hydrogen infrastructure [2]. This work seeks to explore the suitability of 
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new methods for data collection and analysis, with a specific focus on LH2 storage systems 
for on-site equipment at fueling stations. 
Recent trends in Prognosis and Health Management (PHM) research have focused 
on proactive asset management, as well as operation and maintenance scheduling 
optimization in complex systems based on the use of sensor and condition-monitoring data 
[8], [9]. Given the wide variety of PHM applications in complex engineering systems, these 
frameworks could provide valuable tools for expanding available risk and reliability 
analysis for hydrogen systems. In particular, while risk analysis generally consists of the 
identification and management of system-level risks, PHM could enable the study of the 
operational conditions which lead to the development of the identified risk scenarios. 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a context for the development of a PHM 
framework in hydrogen systems. This study is carried out through the analysis of a general 
design for a liquid hydrogen-based fueling station. Traditional QRA approaches are 
utilized to determine the system’s operation and failure logic, as well as identifying critical 
failure modes and risk scenarios. Current data collection requirements are discussed from 
a QRA and PHM perspective. A conceptual design of a PHM framework is developed to 
illustrate the potential of incorporating new risk-informed mitigations based on QRA and 
PHM into existing SCS. Ultimately, this could lead to both safer hydrogen systems and 
less restrictive codes and standards requirements. 
1.1. Context and Motivation 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) has identified that the cost reduction of the 
installation, operation, and maintenance of hydrogen fueling station as critical to the 
deployment of FCEV. Particularly, safety requirements have been identified as some of the 
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costliest elements in hydrogen stations [10]. In the U.S., the main organization devoted to 
the development of SCS addressing the risks and effects of fire-related hazards is the 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) [11]. The NFPA 2 Hydrogen Technologies 
Code is the principal code that guides the design and implementation of hydrogen-related 
infrastructure [4]. During each revision cycle, this code is updated based on new 
developing technologies, methodologies, data sets, and good practices identified within the 
industry. A key aspect of the code has been the use of QRA to risk-inform various 
requirements, e.g., the separation distances [12], indoor refueling provisions [13] and 
performance-based compliance options [14] for GH2 stations. Similarly, QRA has been 
used for the corresponding international standard ISO 19980-1 referring to GH2 stations 
[15]. 
In contrast, there is limited research available to support risk-informed mitigation 
measures in LH2 storage systems. The use of LH2 presents advantages over GH2 in terms 
of storage volume, as it is significantly more energetically dense than its gaseous 
counterpart. LH2 storage systems must also consider unique risks related to damages and 
injuries caused by unsafe releases of liquid hydrogen at cryogenic temperatures (-243°C) 
[7]. However, the behavior of LH2 releases and dispersion is not well known and limits the 
widespread use of the fuel. 
QRAs are used to identify and prioritize which risks need to be reduced to reach 
the accepted levels and to develop specific provisions of NFPA 2 and ISO 19880-1 [4]. The 
use of QRA also allows a comprehensive assessment of alternative risk mitigation 
measures tailored to specific station designs. In [7], Moradi & Groth highlight challenges 
and research gaps present in risk and reliability analysis of hydrogen systems. Lack of 
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cohesive databases of hydrogen-specific degradation, failure, and accident data is 
recognized as one of the biggest hindrances to credible QRAs. A systematic collection of 
various data types such as the ones described in Figure 1-1 [7] is needed to overcome this 
limitation. The use of contextual information enriches the risk assessment of relevant 
hazards, adding to a systematic analysis of the system’s configuration, event frequency, 
and accident scenario consequence. This allows a more realistic portrayal of the risks 
present in the system, both structural and contextual-wise. 
 
Standards for hydrogen fueling stations have been developed mostly based on 
modern integrated risk assessment techniques which consider three core elements 1) 
different contexts and infrastructure involved, 2) the probability of system failures, leaks, 
and ignition, and 3) the physical behavior of hydrogen releases, accumulation, and 
combustion. The Hydrogen Risk Assessment Model (HyRAM) is a compendium QRA tool 
containing both probabilistic information and deterministic models to simulate GH2 
releases, thermal and pressure effects of resulting deflagrations, detonations, and jet fires 
 
Figure 1-1: Types of data needed to perform QRA for a hydrogen system. Moradi and Groth (2019). 
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[16]. HyRAM calculates risk metrics based on the structural description of the system and 
other contextual information, such as the presence of people on the premises, aiding and 
accelerating the process of risk analysis. Initial versions of HyRAM were gas-specific 
[17]–[19]. Recently, the HyRAM tool was expanded to include deterministic physical 
models of LH2 behavior [20]. However, HyRAM 3.0 still needs new probabilistic data and 
models for hazards and failure scenarios specific to LH2 systems. Given the current 
limitations of public hydrogen failure data, the continued use of GH2-based data in risk 
assessments for future stations with LH2 storage might lead to unrepresentative risk values, 
inadequate prevention and mitigation measures, and undesirable new accident scenarios. 
Consequently, there is a clear need for new probabilistic data to represent the new 
conditions present in LH2 systems. In addition, there is an opportunity to explore how new 
data types and techniques used in other areas of reliability engineering can be further used 
within hydrogen codes and standards development. 
Recent advances in Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM) and Prognosis and 
Health Management (PHM) may have benefits for hydrogen QRA. PHM is an important 
component in modern engineering systems, in which algorithms are designed and used to 
detect anomalies, diagnose faults, and predict future states of the system. These methods 
diverge from traditional probability theory-based reliability analysis to model the life cycle 
of the studied system, enabling real-time health assessment under its actual operating 
conditions [21]. PHM is an extension of CBM decision-making frameworks, combining 
various research disciplines, computational methods, and data sources to enable a system’s 
health-state prognosis. In the past decades, there has been a proliferation of different 
approaches for this purpose, in part driven by the development of Machine Learning (ML) 
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and Deep Learning (DL) applications for data analysis. These data-driven approaches have 
made data collection and analytics within diagnostic technologies essential components 
and high-priority research topics [22]. Figure 1-2 shows the number of journal publications 
referring to PHM applications in the last decade [23]. 
 
Applications in engineering systems frequently focus on estimating the Remaining 
Useful Life (RUL) of a component or a system. This, to opportunely schedule maintenance 
activities with minimum impact on the system’s availability and reduce operational costs. 
Common applications explore mechanical and electrical failure phenomena, such as 
lithium-ion battery degradation [23] and crack propagation [24]. Up to date, PHM research 
related to hydrogen has focused solely on fuel cells [25]. 
1.2. Objectives & Approach 
The purpose of this research is to explore the suitability of new methods from 
reliability engineering to enhance risk assessment and safety codes and standards for LH2 
storage systems. This includes identifying existing data sources, conducting QRA on a 
 
Figure 1-2: Number of journal publications on PHM in Web of Science. Meng and Li (2019). 
7 
 
generic station, and creating a risk-informed conceptual PHM framework for an LH2 on-
site storage system. 
To achieve this, the research involves three main objectives: 
1. Identify hazards and risk scenarios for a generic design and site layout for a 
hydrogen fueling station equipped with bulk LH2 storage for use in QRA and 
reliability modeling. 
2. Apply QRA methods to the selected design to determine and model risk scenarios 
and associated data requirements for credible risk assessments of LH2 storage 
systems. 
3. Identify condition-monitoring data sources and design the concept of a PHM-based 
framework for safety and risk assessment of a LH2 storage system. 
The development of this thesis has been organized under three tasks contributing 
to the conceptual development of a PHM algorithm for a LH2-based fueling station system. 
These are graphically represented in Figure 1-3 and described as follows. 
1.2.1. Task 1: LH2 Storage System Risk Scenario Identification 
Task 1 refers to the hydrogen station design selection, familiarization, analysis, and 
risk scenario identification for unsafe hydrogen releases. To select the system’s layout, 
meetings were conducted with external experts in hydrogen station designs. Several 
teleconferences were held with external partners from private industry and U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) national labs to identify important elements of designs for 
use in this research. Relevant documentation of hydrogen fueling station designs were 
reviewed and considered for the generic layout design. After the selection of the bulk LH2 
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storage system as the subsystem of interest, a qualitative risk screening was conducted 
through a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). The LH2 storage system was 
decomposed into functional sections and through a probability and severity classification, 
the failure modes and resulting scenarios which represent the highest risk in the system 
were identified. 
1.2.2. Task 2: Failure Data Collection and Quantification in LH2 Systems 
Task 2 refers to the reliability quantification of the selected LH2 station design. This 
task aims to characterize data availability and requirements for risk and reliability 
assessments of LH2 systems. First, the work is focused on identifying the available data 
sources related to frequency analysis in QRAs for LH2 systems. Through a literature survey 
of relevant QRAs developed in the hydrogen context, common logic-modeling tools and 
databases are identified. Following this, the design’s reliability quantification is addressed. 
The modeling of the system’s failure logic is carried out through Event Sequence Diagrams 
(ESD) developed for the high-risk scenarios identified through the FMEA process, and 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) are utilized to determine the frequency of LH2 releases. 
Considering the current data limitations, future data collection tasks are proposed. 
1.2.3. Task 3: LH2 Storage PHM Framework Concept Design 
Task 3 refers to an early development of the PHM framework oriented towards risk 
assessment applications in LH2 systems. For this, based on relevant literature and 
applications in similar engineering systems, condition-monitoring data sources for PHM 
frameworks in LH2 systems are identified and documented. An outline of the design stages 
of a data-driven framework is described in terms of data requirements, possible techniques, 
and integration schemes. Methods are proposed to integrate PHM tools to risk analysis 
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processes for these systems, i.e., what engineering decisions can be informed through these 
tools. 
 
1.3. Thesis Outline 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the 
background of this work, including a review of related published literature encompassing 
risk assessments in hydrogen systems and an overview of PHM frameworks. Chapter 3 
presents the development of Task 1, based on the analysis of failure modes identified in a 
LH2 storage system. Chapter 4 presents the main results of Task 2, focusing on the 
discussion on the data requirements to improve QRA. Chapter 5 presents the conceptual 
development of the PHM framework described in Task 3 based on related published 
literature and case studies. Chapter 6 concludes this thesis with a summary and discussion 
of the completed work, the limitations of the presented analysis, and suggestions regarding 
future work.  
 




Chapter 2. Background and Literature Review 
In this chapter a review of three relevant topics for the development of the thesis 
are presented. The first is a technical background on hydrogen fueling stations, including 
important regulating aspects of SCS. The second topic consists of a technical background 
overview of QRA frameworks and a literature review of QRAs applied to hydrogen 
systems. Finally, the third topic covered in this chapter is an overview of PHM frameworks, 
including approaches and current challenges. 
2.1. Hydrogen Fueling Stations 
Hydrogen fueling stations are a critical distribution infrastructure for the 
deployment and market participation of hydrogen-powered vehicles, both FCEV and 
hydrogen internal combustion engine vehicles (HICE) [1]. Hydrogen station designs vary 
depending mainly on storage type and capacity, as well as the source of hydrogen. In terms 
of infrastructure, major differences are found whether hydrogen is obtained on-site or 
delivered to the site [26]. The main components that can be found in a hydrogen fueling 
station are shown in Figure 2-1. A generic hydrogen station can be characterized through 
the following elements: 
• The source of hydrogen fuel can vary whether it is produced on-site or off-site and 
then delivered to the fueling site through pipelines, road or rail tanker, or ships. 
This can occur for both gaseous and liquid hydrogen. 
• Hydrogen storage units, such as bulk liquid hydrogen reservoir tanks (if delivered 
as liquid), bulk low-pressure hydrogen storage tanks (if delivered as a compressed 
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gas or after conversion of liquid to gas), and high-pressure cascade GH2 hydrogen 
storage tanks (at dispensing pressures). 
• A compressor stage or air booster for high-pressure storage of compressed 
hydrogen, typically to above 35 or 70 MPa (350-700 bar). 
• Heat exchangers operating for both the controlled evaporation of liquid hydrogen 
prior to the compressor stage and the cooling of hydrogen gas during fueling. 
• Dispensers for filling on-board high-pressure hydrogen tanks on FCEV, usually 
with 35 or 70 MPa (350-700 bar) nozzles. This allows drivers of FCEV to refuel 
their tanks in about the same time as for gasoline vehicles, that is, in three to five 
minutes. 
• A control system that allows the controlled flow of hydrogen through the liquid and 
gaseous phases of the system. This includes emergency shut-off systems and 
hydrogen gas detection systems. 
 
 




By 2013 there were 224 operating hydrogen fueling stations distributed in twenty-
eight countries: 43% located in North and South America, 34% in Europe, and 23% in 
Asia. The countries which led in number of hydrogen stations were the USA, Japan, 
Germany, and South Korea. Around 49% of the stations produced hydrogen on-site, while 
26% had the fuel delivered from off-site production sites [1]. According to the U.S DOE’s 
Alternative Fuels Data Center (AFDC), there are currently fifty-one operational retail 
stations in the country [27]. 
2.1.1. Hydrogen Safety Codes and Standards 
SCS are developed and used to ensure and promote safety, functionality, efficiency, 
reproducibility, and comparability in both design and operation for a wide variety of 
engineered systems. For systems whose operation exposes users and neighboring facilities 
to certain hazards, permitting processes require the demonstration that the proposed 
designs meet safety requirements, frequently relying on SCS as evidence of compliance 
and safety [28]. In the U.S., The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), Compressed Gas Association (CGA), 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), among others, are commonly used to 
guide and permit hydrogen infrastructure designs. 
Risk acceptance criteria vary between SCS and the methods each code uses to 
estimate and obtain risk values. These also vary depending on contextual information 
particular to each station or based on determined performance criteria (such as the NFPA 
2). Currently, SCS for hydrogen facilities specify that these designs should include certain 
safety features, comply with material requirements, and maintain specific maintenance, 
operational, and site characteristics. One important requirement is for minimum separation 
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distances. These safety distances are defined as the minimum setback distances from 
neighboring infrastructure from hydrogen systems and usually depend on the amount of 
hydrogen stored or used in the location and its likelihood of resulting in a hazardous 
condition. However, these requirements are based on generic designs and may not apply to 
other stations, as risks and mitigation measures inherently depend on hazards specific to a 
station’s location, design, and operation. A significant step towards modernizing and 
developing comprehensive SCS is the inclusion of risk-related concepts [6]. For instance, 
the ISO 19880-1 Hydrogen Fueling Station and Vehicle Interface Technical Specification 
(2016) establishes the individual risk limit of 10−6𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟−1 for vulnerable external 
populations to the hydrogen fueling stations, while this value reduces to 10−4𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟−1 for 
hydrogen fueling station workers [5]. For this reason, it is important to develop and 
harmonize the technical bases for risk mitigation measures. These could then be applied 
without relying on expert opinion for their application in specific designs which differ from 
those described in the SCS [6], [12]. 
2.1.1.1. NFPA 2 Hydrogen Technologies Code 
In 2006, the NFPA created the Technical Committee on Hydrogen Technology to 
develop a comprehensive document establishing the requirements for hydrogen 
technologies. The NFPA 2 [4] code addressed aspects of hydrogen storage, use, and 
handling, and it is built upon existing NFPA codes (e.g. NFPA 52, NFPA 55 and NFPA 
853). With each revision of the standards, efforts have led to the incorporation of hydrogen-
specific requirements for both GH2 and LH2 systems. 
The NFPA 2 code contains definitions and descriptions of general fire safety and 
hydrogen requirements, as well as specific standards for fueling facilities, generation 
14 
 
systems, fuel cell power applications, combustion applications, laboratory operations, and 
parking and repair garages, among others. Compliance with the code can be obtained under 
two different options: prescriptive-based or performance-based. For the latter, the code 
allows the calculation of safety measures, such as separation distances, based on 
performance criteria. This safety-oriented design is based on the hydrogen station’s 
performance in the case of a select number of risk scenarios. The minimum design 
scenarios that must be considered for permitting process are presented in Table 2-1. As 
stated in the NFPA 2 code [4]: “Each design scenario used in the performance-based 
design proposal shall be translated into input data specifications, as appropriate for the 
calculation method or model”. A description of required performance criteria from the 
NFPA 2 code is presented in Table 2-2. It should be noted that none of the scenarios nor 
criteria explicitly refer to risks present in LH2-based fueling station. 
 
Table 2-1: NFPA 2 Performance-Based Option Required Design Scenarios. 
Design Scenario Description [NFPA 2: 5.4 Section] 
Fire Scenario 
Performance-based building design for life safety affecting the egress 
system shall be in accordance with this code and the requirements of the 
adopted building code.  
Explosion Scenario 1 Hydrogen pressure vessel burst scenario shall be the prevention or mitigation of a ruptured hydrogen pressure vessel. 
Explosion Scenario 2 
Hydrogen deflagration shall be the deflagration of a hydrogen-air or 
hydrogen-oxidant mixture within an enclosure such as a room or within 
large process equipment containing hydrogen. 
Explosion Scenario 3 
Hydrogen detonation shall be the detonation of a hydrogen-air or 
hydrogen-oxidant mixture within an enclosure such as a room or process 
vessel or within piping containing hydrogen 
Hazardous Material 
Scenario 1 Unauthorized release of hazardous materials from a single control area. 
Hazardous Material 
Scenario 2 
Exposure fire on a location where hazardous materials are stored, used, 
handled, or dispensed. 
Hazardous Material 
Scenario 3 
Application of an external factor to the hazardous material that is likely to 
result in a fire, explosion, toxic release, or other unsafe condition. 
Hazardous Material 
Scenario 4 






An important concept for compliance under the performance-based option is 
equivalency, under which risk mitigation measures not considered explicitly in the NFPA 
2 are incorporated into permitting hydrogen fueling station designs. Equivalency is defined 
in NFPA 2 Section 1.5 as: “Nothing in the NFPA 2 code is intended to prevent the use of 
systems, methods, or devices of equivalent or superior quality, strength, fire resistance, 
effectiveness, durability, and safety over those prescribed by this code. Technical 
documentation shall be submitted to the AHJ2 to demonstrate equivalency. The system, 
method, or device shall be approved for the intended purpose by the AHJ”[4]. 
                                                 
2 AHJ is defined as an organization, office, or individual responsible for enforcing the requirements of a code 
or standard, or for approving equipment, materials, an installation, or a procedure [4]. 
Table 2-2: NFPA 2 Performance-Based Option Criteria Requirements.  
Criteria Type Description [NFPA 2: 5.2 Section] 
Fire Conditions No occupant who is not intimate with ignition shall be exposed to instantaneous or cumulative untenable conditions. 
Explosion 
Conditions 
The facility design shall provide an acceptable level of safety for occupants 
and for individuals immediately adjacent to the property from the effects of 
unintentional detonation or deflagration. 
Hazardous Materials 
Exposure 
The facility design shall provide an acceptable level of safety for occupants 
and for individuals immediately adjacent to the property from the effects of 
an unauthorized release of hazardous materials or the unintentional reaction 
of hazardous materials to cryogenic hydrogen or precooled hydrogen at the 
dispenser is established for this analysis. 




Means shall be provided to evacuate, relocate, or defend in place occupants 
not intimate with ignition for sufficient time so that they are not exposed to 





Buildings shall be designed and constructed to reasonably prevent structural 
failure under fire conditions for sufficient time to enable fire fighters and 




Buildings shall be designed and constructed to reasonably prevent structural 




In 2014 the NFPA 2 and NFPA 55 Technical Committees established a task group 
to develop separation distances for bulk LH2 storage based on a risk-informed methodology 
parallel to the process used in the previous update of the gaseous requirements. A QRA 
procedure was used to evaluate the risk from unintended releases of hydrogen to identify 
and quantify scenarios, risk contributors, and potential accident prevention and mitigation 
strategies for risk reduction under acceptable levels [6]. NFPA 2 code utilizes risk insights 
obtained from QRA combined with deterministic analysis of accident scenarios, frequency 
of leakage events, and use of safety factors to account for uncertainties in data, methods, 
and scope of the risk evaluation. 
The most recent edition of the NFPA 2 Hydrogen Technologies Code (2020 
Edition) incorporates the results of a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study developed 
for a generic hydrogen station with an LH2 storage system. This design is based on previous 
work of the CGA P-28 Risk Management Plan Guidance Document for Bulk Liquid 
Hydrogen Systems [29]. This document contained a representative HAZOP which 
identified various situations where deviations from normal operating parameters could 
potentially have hazardous consequences. Event likelihood and hazard severity classes 
were utilized to determine the risk associated with the identified scenarios. Nine possible 
high-risk failure scenarios were identified to present the highest risk levels, and three of 
these occur during normal operating conditions of the hydrogen fueling station. These are 
presented in Table 2-3. It was stated that for further quantification of the presented risks, 
characterizing pooling and evaporation effects are fundamental steps to effectively model 
the required safety distances. The complete QRA procedure used for LH2 systems is 
currently pending the development of physical models to analyze the consequences 
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referring to jet and plume behavior (COLDPLUME), as well as multiphase network flow 
(NETFLOW) under Sandia National Labs. 
 
Additional to the material and procedural requirements for hydrogen fueling station 
designs, there also are requirements for hydrogen monitoring systems. In NFPA 2 these 
refer to gas detectors set to detect gas at a limit lower than the 4 vol % lower hydrogen 
flammable limit. The location and number of sensors required depend on the design and 
must ensure effective hydrogen detection. No other sensors are explicitly mentioned in the 
code regarding their use as risk mitigation or failure detection measures. This represents a 
major gap to transition towards comprehensive risk-informed standards and proactive 
health management in hydrogen systems. 
2.1.1.2. CGA Standards for Hydrogen Systems 
The CGA is a member and an accredited standard developer of the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI) [30]. Codes related to hydrogen technology focus on 
Table 2-3: NFPA 2 Critical HAZOP Scenarios during normal system operation. 
HAZOP 
Number HAZOP Description 




2.1 High pressure because of 
leak in inner vessel allowing 
hydrogen into the vacuum 
area. 
Characterize flow out of casing 
vent. Modeling results of 
hydrogen 
concentration plume 
and heat flux from 
subsequent fire will 
be used for all other 
separation distance 
exposure because 
this is the highest 
risk priority during 
normal operations. 
4.15 Loss of containment from 
pipe leading from tank to 
vaporizer or vaporizer itself 
caused by thermal cycles or 
ice falling from vaporizers. 
Characterize temperature and 
concentrations from the releases 
to the air. Model is needed to 
characterize pooling and 
evaporation effects. 
6.15 Misdirected flow caused by 
operator error resulting in 
large low-level release of 
cold gaseous hydrogen 
through bottom drain valve 
of vent stack during normal 
tank venting process. 
Quantify gas flow through drain 
vent and vent stack. 
Characterize temperature and 
concentrations from the releases 
to the air. Model is needed to 





guidelines and standards for shipping, storage, and filling systems used in hydrogen fuel 
technologies. Some of the relevant codes are briefly described in this section concerning 
possible condition-monitoring data and risk scenario identification. 
The H-5 Standard for Bulk Hydrogen Supply Systems contains minimum 
requirements for location and equipment selection, installation, startup, maintenance, and 
the removal of bulk hydrogen supply systems. This document covers both GH2 and LH2 
bulk systems, as well as discussing health hazards and safety considerations [31]. 
Regarding monitoring and maintenance activities, the CGA H-5 standard recommends the 
temperature monitoring in the intermediate section and discharge line of the cryogenic 
pump. Cavitation can be identified through motor current amperage sensors or temperature 
sensing devices on the pump discharge line. Additionally, maintenance and inspection 
activities should be performed annually. This includes inspection for physical damage, leak 
tightness, ground system integrity, vent system operation, equipment identification, 
warning signs, operator information and training records, scheduled maintenance and retest 
records, alarm operation and other safety-related features. Finally, scheduled maintenance 
and retest activities shall be formally documented, and records shall be maintained for a 
minimum of three years. 
The H-3 Standard for Cryogenic Hydrogen Storage contains the suggested 
minimum design and performance requirements for shop-fabricated, vacuum-insulated 
cryogenic tanks intended for above ground storage of LH2. These standards apply to LH2 
storage tanks with maximum allowable working pressures (MAWP) up to 1210 kPa (175 
psi). Tanks less than 3785 L (1,000 gal) gross volume or greater than 94,600 L (25,000 gal) 
gross volume and all transportable containers are excluded. Tanks outside these pressure 
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and volume constraints may also meet the requirements of this standard when agreed upon 
by the purchaser/manufacturer and the AHJ [32]. Regarding monitoring and testing 
procedures, the CGA H-3 standard recommends that in vacuum-insulated vessels, absolute 
pressure measurements in annular space should be continuously monitored. Identification 
criteria of loss of vacuum also includes monitoring temperature difference between the 
outer jacket and ambient temperature, inner vessel pressure, condensation of ice on the 
outer vessel, and unusual venting indicated by frost or condensate on the vent stack. 
Further, external piping should be installed together with instrumentation rated for warm 
and cold operation, and special considerations should be taken to account for hidden 
failures of these. Finally, vacuum integrity testing should include warm and cold vacuum 
retention test. Temperature and vacuum pressure should be recorded at least twice daily for 
seventy-two hours and compared to the fluctuations accepted by the specific design. 
These standards recommend specific monitoring, testing and maintenance policies 
highly relevant for the operation of LH2 systems. This includes the use of pressure, 
temperature, and current amperage to detect anomalous behavior in the main components 
of these systems. Hence, stations designed considering these guidelines are expected to 
have access to this kind of monitoring data and thus, could explore the use of data-driven 
models for safety and reliability management. When combined with the maintenance 
records, these data sources can potentially be used to reduce the number of unscheduled 
maintenance events. 
2.2. Quantitative Risk Assessment 
A Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is a valuable tool for determining the risk 
of the use, handling, transport, and storage of dangerous substances. QRAs are used to 
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demonstrate the risk caused by an activity and to provide the competent authorities with 
relevant information to enable decisions on the acceptability of risk related to 
developments on-site, or around the establishment or transport route [33]. 
QRA frameworks consists of several stages including hazard scenario identification 
and development, frequency data quantification and consequence modeling, leading to risk 
characterization. For the results of a QRA to be integrated into a decision-making process, 
these need to be verifiable, reproducible, and comparable. In the context of dangerous 
substances, the information recollection needed to develop a complete QRA varies from 
technical information such as scenario and event probabilities, release, dispersion and harm 
models for hazard exposure to policy and decision-making procedures. A brief technical 
description of risk concepts and modeling procedures are provided in this section. 
2.2.1. Risk Technical Background 
Traditional risk assessment techniques have been used to assess hydrogen 
infrastructure safety. To adequately frame the context of this project a brief definition of 
risk and reliability-related terms is presented [34]. 
Risk analysis formally involves three stages: assessment, management, and 
communication. The risk assessment stage is a process used to identify and characterize 
risk in a system, involving the quantification of the likelihood of an event occurring and 
the severity of its consequences. Risk management involves the evaluation and control of 
each of the risk contributors identified. Finally, risk communication addresses how both 
risk assessment and management aspects are shared and discussed with the system’s 
stakeholders and the public. The assessment stage is conceptually addressed in this thesis. 
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Risk is formally characterized by a set of hazard exposure scenarios (𝑖𝑖), 
consequences associated with each scenario (𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖), and the probability of occurrence of these 
consequences (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖). A common expression used to calculate risk therefore is: 




which represents the total risk contributed by each of the 𝑛𝑛 hazard exposure scenarios 
identified in the system under study. A hazard or accident scenario may be a single or a 
combination of hazardous events, defined as an unplanned event or sequence of events 
which start with an initiating event that result in undesirable consequences [35]. 
To identify and describe hazardous scenarios, techniques such as Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) are used. On the 
one hand, FMEA is an inductive technique for reliability analysis which can be used in 
both the design and implementation stages of a system or a project. It aims to describe the 
inherent causes that lead to a system failure, determine the consequences of said failures 
and the methods to detect and minimize the occurrences of hazardous events. On the other 
hand, HAZOP studies analyze the significance of hazardous situations associated with a 
process or activity. This methodology uses qualitative techniques to pinpoint weakness in 
the design and operation of facilities that could lead to accidents [35]. 
The probability of occurrence of an event can be expressed as a frequency over a 
duration of time. Initiating events, in the context of engineered systems, generally refer to 
the failure of a component, given an internal malfunction, external accident, or a 
combination of both. Reliability refers to the probability that a component or system can 
perform its intended function at a given prescribed time. Through the mathematical 
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background of probability and statistics theories, data-based prognostic tasks and 
maintenance-scheduling procedures are performed. Frequentist approaches can be applied 
when there is sufficient historical data related to failure or maintenance events to determine 
the time-to-failure of a system or component. Statistical data analysis procedures allow the 
use of parametric or non-parametric models to determine the occurrence of future events. 
Bayesian approaches allow the analysis of systems and situations which have few recorded 
data to support prognostics tasks. The techniques derived from Bayesian probability theory 
allow the combination of different data sources in parametric models, as well as updating 
these models based on new information. 
To determine the frequency of occurrence of an event, the operational logic of the 
system and the physical or operational barriers which protect against hazard exposures 
must be considered. Logic-modeling tools such as Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA) are used for this purpose. ETAs are an inductive process that provides 
a systematic method of recording the accident sequences between the initiating events and 
subsequent events that can result in hazards exposure. Events can be ordered by 
chronological or causal order, and the sequence is characterized by the probability of 
occurrence of each event [35]. Event Sequence Diagrams (ESDs) are graphical, logically 
equivalent tools which aid the formal development of Event Trees (ETs). These diagrams 
are used to represent a sequence of pivotal events stemming from a common initiating 
event and leading to different end-states. The quantification of ETs and ESDs allow the 
estimation of each outcome’s frequency based on the initiating event’s frequency. 
Given the complexity of an initiating or pivotal event, FTAs can be used to obtain 
their probability of occurrence. This is a deductive process that provides a method to 
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identify the cause or combination of causes that can lead to the top event and quantify the 
probability of this event’s occurrence. The smallest set of event combinations that lead to 
the top failure event is called minimal cut-set. Based on component reliability data, the 
failure probability of a system can be determined and used to characterize an initiating or 
intermediate event in ETAs and ESDs. 
2.2.2. General QRA Framework 
The general main steps of a QRA framework are presented in Figure 2-2 [33]. This 
process begins with defining the scope of the analysis, in this case, oriented towards 
verifying the code-compliance of a design. Then, the system under study must be described 
in depth, clearly defining components, system boundaries, and functional logic under 
normal operational conditions. 
 
Based on the technical knowledge of this type of system, the potential hazards must 
be identified and characterized. Exposure to hazards is caused by a sequence of incidents 
 




which begin with an initiating event and then develop into particular accident scenarios. 
These accident scenarios are represented through logic-modeling tools regarding the 
likelihood of occurrence (frequencies and probabilities) and the consequence of hazard 
exposure (simulation, experimental or empirical models). To fully characterize these 
hazards and each risk-contributing factor, various types of data are needed to quantify the 
logic models as discussed in Figure 1-1. The end-value of risk associated with the defined 
system must then be compared to thresholds given by formal SCS or societal guidelines. 
Sensibility and uncertainty analysis are employed to construct robust risk assessments. If 
the resulting risk is deemed not tolerable, the system’s design, prevention and mitigation 
barriers must be modified to reduce the effect of the most prominent risk contributor, and 
then re-evaluated. 
Risk assessment and mitigation procedures often require the participation of groups 
of experts and access to detailed technical information. However, the QRA framework is 
adaptable to the level of complexity required. For an initial screening, qualitative 
techniques such as FMEA and HAZOP are used to help identify potential safety hazards 
and determine necessary prevention and mitigation features. Following the high-risk event 
identification and scenario development, either quantitative or qualitative severity and 
probability classifications are employed to characterize risk. Frequently, tools such as ETA 
and FTA are used to model the failure logic of the system and correlation harm models are 
employed to determine the expected damage from hazard exposure. This categorization of 
risk can be communicated through risk matrices, a useful method to prioritize which 
hazardous scenarios need to be addressed to comply with the acceptance criteria. The 
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scenarios which represent the highest risk levels can be further quantified in depth to 
further develop full QRAs to aid design and permitting-related decision-making. 
2.3. Risk Assessments of Hydrogen Systems 
From a safety and risk assessment perspective, hydrogen systems are of particular 
interest given the intrinsic hazard related to the stored substance and resulting release 
conditions under failure scenarios. Location options for hydrogen fueling stations are 
limited in urban areas due to the minimum separation distances required between hydrogen 
storage systems and various components that represent risk hazards. These safety distances 
are required to maintain an acceptable level of risk associated with the use, storage, and 
handling of this alternative fuel. Hydrogen hazards caused by undesired GH2 releases 
include leakage, fire, deflagration, and explosion [36]. The main hazard associated with 
GH2 infrastructure is the uncontrolled accumulation in confined spaces that allow delayed 
ignition events [37]. In contrast, stations with LH2 systems have the most serious potential 
failures due to factors such as collisions, overfilling tanks, and pressure relief valve venting 
[38]. Storage tanks, pipelines, pumps and dispensers are faced with pressure and thermal 
cyclical stresses which can lead to hydrogen releases in either liquid or gaseous states [39]. 
The use of LH2 must also consider hazards related to unsafe releases of cryogenic liquid 
hydrogen, leading to either GH2-related risks or to cryogenic temperature-induced damages 
[40]. 
In the past few years, a growing number of works regarding hydrogen system safety 
have been published, pushed by the development of new technologies and the growing 
pressure to fin viable alternatives to decarbonize energy and transport sectors. FMEA and 
HAZOP studies are frequent tools used to complement and enrich QRA procedures in 
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hydrogen station designs [14], [41]–[44]. Generally, major hazards are described, as well 
as modifications in the design implemented to reduce the overall risk. However, most of 
these works are based on risk assessments developed over a decade ago, as are the first 
approaches to risk-inform hydrogen SCS. Therefore, a literature review covering relevant 
QRA applications developed for hydrogen systems is presented in this section. Finally, the 
effort to build user-friendly software tools and facilitate the use of risk assessment 
methodologies have led to the development of tools such as Sandia National Laboratory’s 
HyRAM discussed in Section 2.3.1. 
2.3.1. QRA-based Hydrogen Risk Assessment Model Software 
The HyRAM tool was developed in Sandia National Laboratories with the purpose 
of aiding decision-makers in the hydrogen community as well as enabling access to current 
models and frameworks necessary for fast and efficient QRA in hydrogen systems [16]. 
The graphical representation of this QRA framework developed for HyRAM is presented 
in Figure 2-3. 
This flexible platform allows the estimation of the number and type of hydrogen 
release events per year depending on the specific design of a hydrogen fueling station while 
also enabling fast physics-based analysis of hydrogen releases [16]. In the latest version 
released in September 2020, the HyRAM tool has incorporated LH2 properties, release and 
dispersion models, as well as updated the available leak frequency values [20]. HyRAM 
was initially developed based on gaseous-specific hydrogen data [16]. Based on hydrogen 
behavior and harm models, as well as leak event probability distributions for different 
components found in generic hydrogen fueling station designs, this framework can be used 
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to characterize the main risk scenarios expected following an unintended GH2 release 
shown in Figure 2-4. 
 
The transitions between events following a GH2 release are characterized by 
probabilities of detection and isolation, immediate or delayed ignition, and whether thermal 
or pressure effects dominate the specific scenario. A description and the values used to 
 




quantify these frequency and probability-related events are presented in Annex D.1. The 
three main scenarios which represent the highest consequences are described in Table 2-4 
[45]. Each of these scenarios have been modeled with experimentally-validated thermal 
and pressure effects expressions to obtain valuable risk metrics in terms of personnel 
injuries, fatalities, and infrastructure damage consequences. 
 
 
Several publications in recent years related to risk assessment in hydrogen systems 
have utilized either the leakage frequency database or the physics module provided by 
HyRAM. Together with the original publication describing this framework [16], LaFleur, 
Muna & Groth demonstrated its capacity to aid performance-based permitting of hydrogen 
fueling stations [14]. In this work, a methodology for assessing a hydrogen fueling station 
 
Figure 2-4: Event Sequence Diagram for GH2 releases in HyRAM 3.0. 
 
Table 2-4: Developed Risk Scenarios in HyRAM 3.0. 
Physical 
Consequences 
Pivotal Events Combustion Description Hazard 
Jet fire  Continuous release (i.e., 
until H2 supply is 
exhausted); immediate 
ignition 
A non-premixed turbulent flame, 
momentum driven. The speed of the 
combustion is roughly equal to the 










Rapid flame propagation in a 
confined area (detonations also 







design which does not comply with specific prescriptive separation distances is presented. 
As mentioned in Section 2.1.1.1, compliance through a performance-based design implies 
demonstrating equivalent risk values to those of designs required explicitly by the NFPA 2 
code. Baseline results for a code-compliant generic outdoor GH2-based fueling station 
show that HyRAM obtains acceptable risk values for all three scenarios, as expected. Thus, 
HyRAM software presents an opportunity to simplify QRA of hydrogen fueling stations 
for performance-based code compliance, delivering a flexible tool for designers and an 
additional verification tool for decision-makers. 
2.3.2. QRA Applications in Gaseous Hydrogen Stations 
An early work by Casamirra et al. [46] developed a safety analysis of the design of 
a high-pressure storage equipment in a GH2-based fueling station through the integrated 
use of FMEA, HAZOP and FTA techniques in 2009. Utilizing the risk and reliability tools 
mentioned, authors obtained a coherent risk analysis of the design based on industrial 
failure data. As the focus of this work was frequency analysis, consequences are addressed 
in a qualitative manner. An FMEA was conducted to screen for the most relevant failure 
modes, assigning a risk priority number (RPN) based on probability and severity classes. 
Following this analysis, a HAZOP for two top events was developed: hydrogen loss in the 
environment and overpressure of the storage vessel during the hydrogen filling phase. 
Finally, an FTA was carried out for the top event referring to the storage vessel 
overpressure. The fault tree for pressure excess is presented in Figure 2-5 as an example 
[46]. Further, minimal cut-sets identified in the system are analyzed and it was found that 
the events that caused the highest unavailability coincide with the elements previously 




Another relevant work is Kikukawa et al. in 2008 [47], who employed a 
combination of HAZOP, FMEA and physics-based consequence models for explosions 
and jet fires following a hydrogen leak. While most of the consequences were successfully 
estimated through available experimental data, probability data was addressed 
qualitatively. Hence, the risk assessment was carried out based on the matrix shown in 
Figure 2-6. This leads to the risk classification of ‘High’, ‘Medium’ and ‘Low’. As a result, 
safety measures were suggested to mitigate the identified hazards, including features not 
available in the market at the time, such as dispenser break-away devices and excess flow 
valves. 
 





LaChance et al. (2009) proposed to formally risk-inform the hydrogen fueling 
station permitting process based on the development of SCS which incorporate risk-
informed analysis to establish adequate safety measures [6]. In this context, QRA 
techniques are presented as robust methodologies to aid this process in identifying and 
quantifying risk scenarios and contributors, as well as potential prevention and mitigation 
strategies to reduce risk to acceptable levels. The authors argue this approach can aid AHJ 
in permitting non-standard facility designs facing important space limitations, such as in 
urban locations. As part of the U.S. DOE Fuel Cells & Infrastructure Technologies 
Program, LaChance proposed a QRA-based methodology to identify code requirements, 
specifically regarding minimum separation distances in a GH2 -based fueling station [28]. 
These works are examples of a combination of risk assessment tools based on the 
identification of possible failure modes present in the design, the development of the 
hazardous scenarios caused by these, the quantification of the frequency of these 
occurrences and finally, the ranking of their relative importance. Similar methodologies 
are presented in several works published in the following years, focused on developing 
more robust risk assessment procedures, aiding the development of adequate safety 
regulations, and applying these techniques to specific case studies. 
 




Recently, Gye et al. (2019) [42] conducted a QRA for an GH2-based fueling station 
in a highly populated and congested urban area in Seoul. This station is located next to a 
highway and shares the lot space with a liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) fueling station that 
operates with delivery from tube-trailers. From a HAZOP study, the risk scenarios chosen 
to be developed refer to a catastrophic rupture of the tube-trailer and dispenser leakage. 
Given the station’s setting, authors argue that the most relevant consequence is an 
explosion scenario. Consequences from heat flux and overpressure effects were estimated 
through The Purple Book [33], while frequency analysis was performed using the HyRAM 
software (See Section 2.3.1) as well as local wind behavior. Their analysis concluded that 
additional mitigation measures, including physical safety barriers and hydrogen leakage 
detection systems, are required to be implemented on the compressor and dispenser 
systems to reduce individual and societal risk levels. 
Another example is the research published by Tsunemi et al. (2019), in which three 
accident scenarios are analyzed in depth: hydrogen leakage events from dispenser external 
piping, and from the connection piping in the accumulator and compressor [43]. The 
leakage frequency and consequence effects are estimated from methods and sources similar 
to the previous works to obtain a spatial distribution of risk in the vicinity of these hazard 
sources. The novelty of this work is the inclusion of safety barrier failure estimation 
through the development of specific ETs, as shown in Figure 2-7 [43]. Authors argue that 
the risk reduction effect of these components may have been overestimated in previous 
works as their failure probabilities have not been incorporated explicitly. 
Similarly, Suzuki et al. (2020) [48] present a QRA for modern Japanese hydrogen 
fueling station, arguing local regulations were established over a decade ago and recent 
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technology advances could warrant future modifications. Specific leakage nodes are 
defined in a general design of GH2-based fueling station, including the delivery tube-trailer, 
compressor, piping, storage cylinders, and dispensers. HAZOP and FMEA are employed 
to determine credible hazards for each node. A piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID) 
of the design is presented, enabling a deeper analysis than most of the other published 
works described above. Frequency analysis is based on ETA, using HyRAM’s leak 
frequency and ignition probability data (See Section 2.3.1). However, the obtained risk 
contours reveal that unacceptable risk levels are present for personnel and customers inside 
the station. Further, jet fires were identified as the most significant risk contributor resulting 
from compressor and dispenser leakage events. Authors argue that unacceptable risk levels 
are obtained due to conservative assumptions, such as not including safety barriers (e.g., 
fire walls) in the analysis, as suggested by Tsunemi et al. [43]. 
 
Uncertainty analysis in QRAs, such as for values used for frequency of occurrence 
of the risk scenarios, is still a complex issue in hydrogen systems. For instance, in [49] the 
frequency analysis phase of the risk assessment is based on a hierarchical Bayesian model. 
 




An existing database including leak frequencies in diverse industries and hydrogen fueling 
stations was used to determine prior distributions for leakage events. Accident data 
collected from compressed natural gas stations in the U.S. and gasoline stations in Japan 
were used as evidence to update the specified priors. Thus, authors estimated the median 
of posterior leak frequency distribution to represent the accidents’ occurrence probability. 
Similarly, Kodoth et al. (2020) [50] compared Bayesian and frequentist methods to 
obtain leak frequency values in hydrogen systems. In [51], a Bayesian Network (BN) 
model was employed to developed a grid-based risk-screening method for accident 
scenarios in hydrogen fueling stations with the purpose of explicitly assessing the 
interaction between different risk factors. In contrast to many cited QRA procedures based 
on ETAs and FTAs which focus on mayor risk scenarios independently, BNs allow the 








Based on generic leakage frequencies and physics-based consequence models, 
spatial distributions of human loss and building damage risks were obtained for the entire 
area surrounding the station. Authors argue that the proposed method is a simple approach 
to obtain a transparent, explainable, and efficient risk-screening procedure compared to 
regular QRA. 
2.3.3. QRA Applications in Liquid Hydrogen Stations 
In the case of hydrogen fueling stations equipped with LH2 storage systems, risk-
related research has focused more on discovering, simulating, and quantifying the 
dispersion, accumulation, and ignition behavior of liquid releases rather than on reviewing 
the values used for leakage frequency analysis. Hydrogen as a liquid is stored at cryogenic 
temperatures (-273℃), which induces different thermal stresses on storage, piping, 
instrumentation, and process equipment than GH2-storage, which is stored at high pressure 
but at temperatures close to ambient conditions. In a regular GH2-based fueling station the 
only section regularly under significant thermal and pressure stresses is the dispensing 
system, given that precooling is needed to maintain low temperatures during vehicle 
fueling (-40°C). For LH2-based fueling stations, these potentially hazardous situations are 
found in the delivery, bulk storage, and processing stages prior to the vaporization stage at 
even more extreme conditions. Examples of LH2 release consequences these are frostbite, 
hypothermia, ice formation on vents and valves, air condensation and oxygen enrichment, 
moisture within storage due to inadequate purging, and damage to boil-off valves and 
release valves [40]. 
Although QRAs developed specifically for fueling stations with LH2 storage are 
fewer then the GH2 counterpart, the followed methodologies are similar in nature. For 
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example, Al-shanini, Ahmad and Khan (2014) [52] develop in-depth accident scenario 
analysis through barrier failure modeling. Various FTA and ETA are developed for a 
delivery LH2-based fueling station with intermediate high-pressure GH2 storage prior to 
the refueling facility. Failures related to technical, operational, human, management, and 
natural disasters aspects are considered based on frequency data retrieved from failures in 
other related industries (natural gas, chemical process, etc.). Lack of specific failure and 
consequence data have been a significant challenge for research related to LH2 systems, 
even when these studies are coupled to BN techniques [53]. 
In [54], Lowesmith, Hankinson and Chynoweth (2014) explored risks related to the 
liquefaction, storage, and transport of LH2 through an incident analysis and Hazard 
Identification (HAZID) procedures. Relevant findings from the incident analysis include 
that storage vessels (including fittings, valves, and reliefs) accounted for 36% of incidents 
detected in liquefaction and storage stages, followed by the vent system and pipework 
(28%); pumps, compressors, and vaporizers (15%); valves, connecting components, and 
fittings (15%); transfer lines and pipelines (13%); and finally, the liquefier and purifier 
(5%). These incidents were classified into categories, in which the leading cause was due 
to incorrect operational, procedural deficiency or poor maintenance (46%). Other major 
causes cited were design or construction failure and inadequate hazard assessment (31%) 
and equipment failure (21%). Consequence analysis produced the following breakdown, 
including overlapping events: no release (13%), accumulation or dispersion (36%), fire 
(23%), explosion (13%) and boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) (3%), 
leading to injury in 8% of the incidents, and non-trivial damage in 59% of the cases. When 
compared to the developed HAZID based on the incidents, although identified scenarios 
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and cases were similar, the most notable discrepancy surged from the fact that equipment 
failures were overestimated, and operational failures underestimated. Authors highlight the 
value of conducting a HAZID procedure to identify relevant risk scenarios but insist on the 
need to improve the tools available for full QRAs in LH2 systems, such as release models 
and quantitative large-scale experimental, failure frequency and ignition probability data. 
It is unusual to find completely developed QRAs and other risk analyses in 
published literature, as depending on the complexity of the system, hundreds or even 
thousands of hazards and risk scenarios may be developed. Despite the mentioned 
limitations, QRA-based frameworks are considered to be robust risk assessment 
methodologies and significant efforts have been invested into improving the quality of 
these tools, harmonizing international risk assessment procedures in hydrogen fueling 
stations, and developing SCS incorporating sound science and risk concepts [55]. 
2.4. Prognostics and Health Management 
Prognostics and Health Management (PHM) frameworks are a modern engineering 
approach designed to enable a system’s real-time health assessment based on its actual 
operating conditions [21]. This is a non-intrusive alternative for condition-based decision-
making in engineering systems. PHM combines various disciplines and data sources: 
sensor technology, physics of failure and degradation analysis, modern statistics, 
traditional reliability engineering, as well as novel applications of data-driven techniques. 
In the last two decades, data-driven health-monitoring techniques have gained significant 
popularity due to the widespread deployment of low-cost sensors, high connectivity, and 
improvements in computational processing power [56]. These are fundamental elements 
of what is known as the Internet of Things (IoT). As a consequence, it is expected that data-
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driven applications become even more widespread in the transition to the Industry 4.0 era 
[57]. The overview presented in this section serves as an introduction to the purpose and 
characteristics of PHM research for the hydrogen community. 
The premise of PHM frameworks to aid CBM decisions is the life-cycle cost 
reduction, as well as the improved reliability and safety of a system. During the last decade 
there has been significant advances in both the complexity and variability of applications. 
In this section, a literature review presents a brief description of some applications of PHM 
frameworks in other engineering systems. Given the wide variety of applications developed 
in different industries and research areas, a summary of related standards is also reviewed, 
as well as aspects of data collection fundamental to the design and implementation of these 
frameworks. Finally, examples of data-driven applications in other complex engineering 
systems are summarized and some challenges of these methods are highlighted. 
2.4.1. Introduction to Elemental PHM Concepts 
It is known that most engineering systems enter a deterioration stage at some point 
over their lifetime, subject to stresses from prolonged operation or environmental 
conditions. Failures may occur for multiple causes, and as the complexity of a system 
increases, characterizing failures and anomalies in the system based on traditional 
reliability approaches can become unfeasible. Early fault detection is an important step in 
improving the availability of any equipment or mechanism. This allows to take appropriate 
maintenance measures in order to prevent further degradation and unexpected component 
failure. In this context, research interests have shifted from time-to-failure probability-




The use of condition-monitoring data to build reliability models is known as CBM. 
The analysis of various sensor measurements, particularly signal analysis, have been used 
to perform anomaly and damage detection through the development of diagnostic models. 
These health assessment tools are then used to inform maintenance-related decisions for 
scheduling and aiding preventive maintenance, seeking to reduce overall costs and increase 
the perceived reliability of the system. Fault diagnostics can be achieved through various 
techniques, from simulation and model-based approaches to data-driven methods [22]. 
However, CBM frameworks are not designed to perform prediction tasks to determine the 
future behavior of a system’s state of health. The latter is known as prognostics and is a 
fundamental tool to increase the impact of maintenance-scheduling activities, transitioning 
from corrective actions (i.e., when there is already significant damage detected in the 
system) to proactive and preventive maintenance policies based on the system’s current 
operational state (i.e., performing maintenance actions before damage is detected). 
Prognostics is understood as a process entailing the ability to predict future damage, 
degradation paths and the RUL of a system. Formally, it is defined in the ISO 13381-1:2015 
Condition monitoring and diagnostics of machines — Prognostics — Part 1: General 
guidelines standard as: “an estimation of time-to-failure and risk for one or more existing 
and future failure modes” [58]. PHM frameworks rely either on physics-based, data-driven, 
or hybrid techniques to derive health indicators (HI) from the system’s performance. A 
summary of their main characteristics is presented in Table 2-5 [23]. The main differences 
lay in the availability of a physical model of the system which integrates information from 
operational conditions and, in contrast, the use of monitoring data to identify underlying 




Physics-based approaches are usually identified as being the more system-specific 
of the two, tackling well-described local phenomena such as crack propagation. However, 
as the complexity of the analyzed systems increase, the challenges to obtain precise 
physical models that describe the degradation under real industrial conditions have also 
increased [59]. On the other hand, data-driven approaches can be subdivided into 
traditional statistical model-based tools and AI-based tools. Figure 2-9 shows an overview 
of publications reviewed in 2018 that cover some of these techniques [24]. Here, statistical 
model-based methods refer to models such as auto-regression (AR), Wiener and Gamma 
processes, as well as Markov and Proportional Hazard (PH) models. AI-based approaches 
include well-known Machine Learning (ML) techniques, such as Support Vector Machine 
(SVM), Gaussian Process Regression (GPR), k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN), and Artificial 
Neural Networks (ANN). 
These algorithms bridge over to more complex and hierarchical structures known 
as Deep Learning (DL) models based on Deep Neural Networks (DNN). Many variants of 
DNN architectures have been derived and used for specific tasks, such as Auto-encoders 
(AE), Deep Belief Networks (DBN), Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN), Recurrent 
Neural Networks (RNN) and Long-Short Term-Memory cells (LSTM). Finally, hybrid 
approaches attempt to combine the knowledge of the system used in physics-based models 
Table 2-5: Comparison of approaches used in PHM Frameworks. 
Approaches Advantages Disadvantages 
Physics-
based 
Accurate description of degradation and 
failure behavior; do not require plenty of 
data. 
Hard to observe degradation directly; 
limited simulation of real 
environment conditions. 
Data-driven 
Not required to model degradation and 
failure behavior precisely; requires little 
domain knowledge. 
Reliance on system-specific relevant 
and quality data; low adaptation to 
new conditions. 




and the generalization capabilities of data-driven approaches. Frequently employed 
combinations of the mentioned statistical techniques include GPR, SVM and DNN, as well 
as Particle Filters (PF) and Kalman Filters (KF). 
 
At present, a variety of ML techniques exist, designed for specific purposes and 
datasets. Generally, these models are described as black boxes in which the outputs are 
calculated based on certain input data. The learning phase of a model is understood as the 
optimization of its parameters according to the data provided for the training process. These 
parameters must be adjusted to obtain the most accurate representation of the training data 
for the model to perform adequately when presented with new unseen data (i.e., obtain 
parameters to adequately represent outputs based on new input data). Depending on the 
selected ML/DL algorithm and its corresponding task, a model’s ability to provide reliable 
predictions will be affected by the architecture or hyperparameters selected beforehand, as 
well as the quality of the training data (e.g., number of samples, model architecture, 
optimization function and algorithm, among others). 
 




When applied to PHM, the selected data-driven applications differ based on the 
knowledge of the system’s true health state. On the one hand, if information is available 
relating the input data to the system’s health state, supervised models can be trained. On 
the other hand, if no previous knowledge of the system’s health state is available, 
unsupervised models can be trained to extract information hidden within the data’s 
structure [60]. Given these characteristics, unsupervised models have been widely applied 
for anomaly detection tasks. Detection of faulty behavior can be performed by comparing 
the data to thresholds which can be known beforehand (faults) or established through 
statistical analysis (anomalies). Another alternative is the construction of HI or key 
performance indexes (KPI) to represent the state of the system. 
In contrast, supervised methods require samples of known correlations between 
sensor measurements and system’s health states to train the models. For instance, these 
labeled samples can either represent HIs used to identify a specific failure mode through 
classification models or the evolution of the RUL at each time step of measurements 
through regression models [60]. Hence, the training of the models consists of an 
optimization process aimed at replicating known relationships between the model’s input 
and output data. Prognostic tasks are generally supervised tasks, where current conditions 
are used to predict future states of the system. As with diagnosis tasks, the system’s 
performance and health-state predictions can be developed based on specific HI and KPI. 
Several methods have been designed to label data either for diagnosis or prognosis tasks 
yet, these are frequently system-specific and based on expert knowledge. Some of these 
include data-driven unsupervised clustering methods, such as k-NN and AE models. 
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2.4.2. PHM Frameworks and Applications 
In many of the articles published in the last decade, authors discuss the necessary 
steps to design phases of data-driven PHM frameworks. While these vary between areas, 
systematic approaches to design applications have been discussed from an engineering 
perspective, including the logical, functional, and physical design of the system [61]. Most 
PHM frameworks define similar stages from data acquisition to decision-making. For 
instance, Figure 2-10 presents four distinct phases with subtasks corresponding to data 
acquisition, diagnostics and prognostics assessments, which are then followed by a health 
management decision-making support stage [62]. 
 
Data acquisition is an initial and essential step of PHM frameworks, encompassing 
both sensor and event data [63]. A complex engineering system yields operational 
information acquired through different sensor measurements, denoted as {𝑆𝑆}𝑖𝑖:1,…,𝑁𝑁. On the 
one hand, condition-monitoring data are measurements collected via a variety of installed 
sensors in components whose performance is linked to the overall system’s health state. 
On the other hand, event data include the information on maintenance actions (component 
replacement, repairs, etc.) taken during such events (failure, breakdown, installation, etc.) 
that have occurred in the system. 
 




Data acquisition is followed by a stage of data preprocessing of the raw sensor 
measurements and event data. These data cleaning and preprocessing stages should 
consider the system’s inherent characteristics, as common practices like outlier detection 
and removal can lead to unrepresentative datasets if no expert knowledge of the system is 
available [64]. This also applies to feature selection and extraction from sensor data, where 
statistical and signal processing techniques have been extensively used in predictive 
maintenance procedures, including those based on conventional ML models [65]. In this 
context, combined with the increased computational processing power developed, it was 
argued that DL algorithms possessing automatic feature extraction capabilities could be 
applied to analyze raw and minimally treated data [56]. 
Early and real-time anomaly detection are tasks that have benefited from the surge 
of data-driven CBM applications, aiming for more comprehensive and flexible tools. 
Traditional model-based anomaly and fault detection tools rely on given thresholds or the 
simulation of the system’s performance under real operational conditions. Yet, this limits 
the ability to capture unknown safety issues that are not explicitly defined by rule-based 
thresholds. Data-driven applications for anomaly detection aim to replace physics-based 
models for the simulation of the systems’ behavior by implicitly extracting it from sensor 
data under nominal and historic operating conditions. Therefore, anomalous behavior is 
identified when the observed behavior strays from the simulated expected behavior. For 
instance, in [66] a SVM regression (SVR) framework is implemented as a real-time safety 
monitoring tool in the context of commercial aircraft. Here, Lee et al. (2020) argue that, as 
in many industries, current aircraft monitoring methods depend on predefined and fixed 
thresholds to identify anomalous behavior. In this work, as system health metrics are not 
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directly available, performance anomalies are detected based on statistical deviations from 
predicted flight behavior based on in-flight data. Hence, a SVR decision boundary was 
formed under the assumption that anomalous behavior is caused by abnormal operational 
conditions or the degraded state of the system’s subcomponents. 
Despite the wide range of techniques and models developed for anomaly and fault 
detection, there are challenges in system diagnostics which have not been overcome yet. 
Insensitivity to different operational conditions, false alarms and high uncertainty present 
in real-time processing have been identified as some of the more pressing issues [22]. Both 
physics-based and data-driven techniques have limited applicability in complex systems, 
as there are too many assumptions, complex processes, and relationships between 
components to be simulated or replicated accurately. System-specific knowledge and data 
characterizing healthy, degraded, and failed states are required to enable and validate an 
adequate health assessment and prognostics of the system. Linking maintenance events to 
previous operating conditions and anomalous behavior recorded is the basis for both 
health-state diagnostics and prognostics tasks. These tasks are implemented to inform 
engineering decision-making to increase system safety and operation reliability [67]. A 
variety of models are available for fault diagnosis, including popular ML and DL 
algorithms such as SVM, RF, AE, DBN, and CNN. On the other hand, RNN and LSTM 
models have been consistently used for prognostics tasks [56]. 
Finally, the decision-making stage for planning and executing maintenance 
measures is included. Few published research papers address the implementation of the 
decision-making phase. As stated in [65], predictive maintenance studies can be divided 
into prognostics and maintenance optimizations. The latter is frequently performed over 
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“known” degradation behavior and prognostics results; hence maintenance decisions are 
dealt separately and often are system-specific. In this work, Nguyen and Medjaher (2019) 
[65] present a two-stage framework to schedule maintenance operations in a simulated 
system shown in Figure 2-11. Based on the C-MAPSS dataset (discussed in Section 5.2.2), 
an LSTM model was used to predict the RUL of turbofan engines from simulated sensor 
run-to-failure data. Given the estimated RUL, the framework classified whether the system 
would fail before or after a certain time-window defined by the operation planner, hence 
enabling maintenance and repair logistic decisions based on prognostic information. 
Although this work considers limited assumptions such as simulated data and perfect 
repairs, it demonstrates the framework’s ability to obtain lower costs than regular periodic 
maintenance schemes [65]. 
 
2.4.3. Challenges in Data-Driven PHM Applications 
Many PHM applications at the component level struggle with issues such as 
optimum sensor selection and localization, feature extraction, framework integration and 
uncertainty quantification. These issues are only amplified when considering system-level 
applications. A review of data-driven techniques applied to PHM frameworks conducted 
in [68] highlighted some of the following challenges: 
• Data scarcity in the industrial context: Significant historical data is needed to 
construct robust models. The main drawback of data-driven models is that their 
 




performance strongly relies on the amount and quality of data in the training process 
[25]. 
• Black-box model selection: The role of feature extraction stages was significantly 
reduced with the growing popularity of DL models. Yet, the reduced transparency 
and explicability of the model’s decisions coupled to the lack of public datasets for 
model validation is a hindrance to their applicability in real complex systems [69]. 
• Real-time integration to maintenance decision-making: Few studies have assessed 
the operation of PHM frameworks. A critical aspect of data-driven models is to be 
representative of the system its applied to, i.e., periodic retraining of the model can 
avoid erroneous health assessments even when the operational conditions of the 
system have changed. 
The challenges summarized above should be considered when designing and 




Chapter 3. LH2 Storage System Risk Scenario Identification 
The layout of a hydrogen station can vary significantly depending on the available 
space and components present in the system. Hence, the most prominent risks and required 
safeguards will vary according to the code-compliant design’s particular design. For 
research purposes it was necessary to have a baseline, generic design to carry out the risk 
scenario screening process. This chapter presents the description of the selected LH2 
storage system design and is followed by the identification of its most relevant failure 
modes through an FMEA process. 
3.1. Methodology 
This section refers to the methodology followed to determine the generic LH2 
storage system to be analyzed and the initial risk screening through an FMEA process. It 
should be noted that this corresponds to a high-level analysis, as the studied system 
corresponds to a preliminary design for hydrogen stations equipped for liquid delivery and 
with both bulk LH2 and GH2 storage systems [70]. 
3.1.1. LH2 Storage System Design Selection 
For the development of this work, the selection of the specific system to be analyzed 
was conducted through the discussions held with hydrogen experts. The meetings held with 
external hydrogen partners involved several teleconferences with representatives from the 
private hydrogen station sector, as well as from the H2@SCALE project occurring at U.S. 
DOE National Laboratories Sandia and NREL. These meetings with external partners 
focused on the design of the hydrogen fueling station and LH2 storage system. As described 
in Section 2.1, the basic design of a hydrogen station generally consists of delivery, storage, 
compression, and dispensing sections. Based on a theoretical station design equipped for 
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LH2 delivery and storage discussed in the context of the H2@SCALE project, details such 
as fueling capacity, component characteristics, and basic layout are documented to enable 
an initial risk screening. This documentation focused on the functioning logic of the LH2 
storage system, including relevant connecting elements located between the main 
components of this subsystem. 
3.1.2. Analysis of Hydrogen Failure Scenarios 
To analyze the selected LH2 bulk storage system design, a review of typical risk 
scenarios in these systems was conducted. This includes a revision of user-reported 
database portals such as H2 Lessons Learned and Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents 
Database (HIAD). Given the predominant participation of GH2 stations in the hydrogen 
fueling market, scarce information is available of operating systems with LH2 bulk storage. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in Section 2.1.1.1, the latest version of the NFPA 2 code 
included a HAZOP study on LH2 bulk storage stations. The main results in this stage are 
summarized to provide necessary context for the risk screening of the selected design. 
3.1.3. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
FMEA is an inductive technique for reliability analysis which can be used in both 
the design and implementation stages of a system or a project. It aims to describe the 
inherent causes that lead to a system failure, determine the consequences of said failures 
and the methods to detect and minimize the occurrences of hazardous events. A criticality 
rating can be assigned to each identified failure mode, based on their probability and 
consequence severity classification. Naturally, the procedure and specific classifications 
vary with the studied system and the author’s field, for which it is usual that FMEAs are 
developed by a team of experts with different backgrounds. 
50 
 
The objectives of FMEA applied to a system’s or product’s design process are 
summarized as a) identifying and ranking failure modes accordingly to their effect on the 
system’s performance and thus establish a priorities for design improvements; b) 
identifying design actions to eliminate potential failure modes or reduce the occurrence of 
the respective failures; and c) document the rationale behind product design changes and 
provide future reference for analyzing field concerns, evaluating new design changes, and 
developing advanced designs [71]. 
The main outline describing an FMEA should consist of the following steps: 
1. Define the system decomposition level to be analyzed. Identify internal and 
interface system functions, restraints, and develop failure definitions. 
2. Construct a block diagram of the system, depending on the desired level of 
decomposition. 
3. Identify all potential item failure modes and define their effects on the immediate 
function or item, on the system, and on the mission to be performed. 
4. Evaluate each failure mode in terms of the worst potential consequence and assign 
a severity classification category. 
5. Identify failure detection methods and compensating provisions for each failure 
mode. 
6. Identify corrective designs or other actions required to eliminate the failure or 
control the risk. 
7. Document the analysis and identification of the problems that could not be 
corrected by design. 
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Generally, FMEAs are carried out between a group of experts. This design FMEA 
has been mostly developed based on previous literature and the analysis of the generic 
station design. A review of the NFPA 2 and CGA codes, The Purple Book, OREDA and 
HyRAM documentation have enriched this FMEA process, addressed in Section 4.2. For 
the purpose of this project, only steps 1-5 are addressed. 
The identified failure modes are then characterized by the estimated severity of 
resulting consequences and the relative likelihood of their occurrence to obtain a 
representative risk level. A simplified risk matrix, as the one presented in Table 3-1 is used 
to rank the most relevant failure modes and risk scenarios identified in the selected LH2 
storage system design. This matrix consists of three levels of severity classes (minor, 
moderate, and critical) and three probability classes (low, medium, and high). This leads 
to a three-level risk ranking: high (H), moderate (M), and low (L). 
 
 
3.2. Hydrogen Fueling Station Generic Design 
The Hydrogen Fueling Infrastructure Research and Station Technology 
(H2@SCALE) is a project initiated by the U.S. DOE and executed by Sandia National 
Laboratories (SNL) and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). This project 
addresses the research and development (R&D) barriers towards the deployment of 
hydrogen fueling infrastructure in urban areas. This ongoing project is based on generic 
Table 3-1: Simplified Risk Matrix. 
Severity Class 
Probability Class 
Low Medium High 
Minor L L M 
Moderate L M H 




designs for which the P&IDs are available for analysis [70]. The generic design selected is 
based primarily on these documents, which served as an initial step in characterizing the 
LH2 storage system’s components for further analysis. As the documentation available is 
focused on estimating the layout of different station designs compliant with the NFPA 2 
(2020 Ed.), technical details of specific supporting and connecting elements (i.e., valves, 
piping, emergency systems, etc.) are not included. 
The station design has the following general characteristics, regarding its location 
and main components. It is a stand-alone hydrogen fueling station located in an urban area, 
in a lot that also contains a convenience store. The corresponding code-compliant layout is 
shown in Figure 3-1 [70]. This station’s design equipped for LH2 delivery and storage 
considers a lot size of 52x38 m (170x125 ft.), with a total area of 1,974 m2 (21,250 ft2). It 
should be noted that non-hydrogen related components contribute significantly to the 
station’s footprint, particularly parking and traffic flow (Figure 3-1b). LH2 is delivered 
through trailer trucks to the liquid storage tank, the latter acting as a hydrogen reservoir for 
the rest of the system. 
A centrifugal cryogenic pump is used to transport LH2 from the liquid storage 
towards the evaporator previous to the compression stage. After the compression stage, 
gaseous hydrogen is stored in a pressure cascade configuration. From the cascade system, 
hydrogen is cooled through a chiller system and dispensed under active demands. Minor 
components include temperature and pressure sensors located at relevant points in the 
system, valves such as motor-operated valves, gate valves, and check valves. The 
configuration of the hydrogen storage, compression, and cooling components is shown 
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schematically in Figure 3-1c. These are kept in the open to minimize the potential risk of 
hydrogen accumulation should the system leak. 
 
This station’s documentation is divided into five subsystems, not including the 
delivery stage: liquid storage, compression stage, gaseous cascade storage, cooling system, 
and dispensers. A schematic adaptation of the full station’s layout is presented in Figure 
3-2, in which the liquid storage subsystem is highlighted. It must be noted that the cascade 
GH2 units are connected to a vent system to address pressure-adjusting and unexpected 
releases in a safe manner. A list of the station’s subsystems is presented in Table 3-2, while 
technical details of the components are detailed in Table 3-3. A description of the main 





(a) Aerial view of station layout (b) Layout demonstrating tube-trailer path  
 
(c) Schematic layout hydrogen storage, compression, and cooling components. 









Figure 3-2: Schematic of LH2-based fueling station design. 
Table 3-2: H2@SCALE hydrogen fueling station subsystem description. 
Subsystem Function Main 
Components 


















- - Compression 
Compression Compression of 
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3.2.1. Bulk LH2 Storage System 
A simplified representation of the main components of the system is shown in 
Figure 3-3. The bulk liquid storage system of the station is composed of a double-walled 
storage tank with an estimated capacity of 800 kg of LH2 assuming a density of 70.8 g/L 
at 0.6 MPa (88.2 psi). This gives an LH2 volume of 11,299 L (2,985 gal.) stored within a 
bulk cryogenic storage tank with a net capacity of 11,470 L (3,030 gal.), a diameter of 2.18 
m (7.2 ft), and a height of 5.8 m (19 ft). This tank is equipped with temperature and pressure 
sensors as well as a pressure relief valve (PSV) and a maintenance valve (HV-1). The 
piping on the outlet of the bulk storage tank is assumed to have an outer diameter (OD) of 
25.40 mm (1 in.) and inner diameter (ID) of 14.27 mm (0.562 in.). The generic pressure 
rating selected is of 137.9 MPa (43,000 psi). 
The liquid bulk storage tank is connected through double-walled piping to a 16-kW 
centrifugal cryogenic pump (CNL) that feeds the LH2 to an ambient air evaporator (EV) 
Table 3-3: H2@SCALE hydrogen fueling station components description. 
Components Capacity Coupled To Number System 












25 kg/hr.  480V-60kW motor, air 
blown coolers, centrifugal 
pump 
1 Compression 
Air Compressor - Air dryer 1 Compression 
Chillers 25.2 kW, 94.4 MPa  Aluminum cooling block 
(1330 kg) 
4 Cooling 
Gas Cylinders MAWP 95 MPa 
(13780 psig), 60 kg/hr. 
outlet flow rate. 
10 cascade units, each 










with a 25kg/hr. rated mass flow rate. This is regulated by an air-operated motorized valve 
located prior to the cryogenic pump, which is controlled by the process air system (ZZO-
Air). In the evaporator, liquid hydrogen is heated at ambient air temperature and 
transformed into gas. From the evaporator, the GH2 flows towards the compressor 
subsystem and can be closed by a gate valve for safety and maintenance purposes (HV-2). 
The storage subsystem counts with a dedicated IR thermal flame detector and alarm 
system. 
 
3.2.2. Compression and Cooling Subsystem 
From an intermediate gas storage system after the evaporation process, the 
hydrogen gas must be compressed from 0.6 MPa to 94.4 MPa to be delivered to the cascade 
storage and dispensing system. This subsystem is primarily composed of the multi-stage 
compressor (102 kW, 25 kg/hr. capacity, 480 V-60 kW motor-driven) and the numerous 
air-actuated valves acting as pressure regulators. The air compressor and the cooling 
system (four units of 25.2 kW, 94.4 MPa capacity) are also included in this section. 
 




3.2.3. Gas Cascade Storage 
The storage of GH2 for dispensing purposes is stored in a cascade pressure system. 
Thus, when gas is dispensed, the flow is taken from the lower-pressure vessels and 
sequentially increasing until the FCEV’s tank is filled. There are ten cascade units, each 
with five pressure vessels (C) with a pressure ratio of 1:1:3 from high to low pressures. 
The default pressures are set to 33.0 MPa, 61.3 MPa, and 80.2 MPa, respectively. The gas 
cylinders have a MAWP of 95.0 MPa (13,780 psig). A recirculation system towards the 
compressor allows the pressure regulation in the distribution network in the station. Each 
unit of them is equipped with air-actuated valves, pressure indicators and transmitters, as 
well as hand valves and two-way pressure relief valves. A total of 630 kg of GH2 is stored 
in the cascade storage, with an estimated output flow of 60 kg/hr. towards the dispensing 
system. 
3.2.4. Dispenser Subsystem 
The dispensing subsystem counts with four fueling positions for delivering gaseous 
hydrogen at 70 MPa at -40°C through high-pressure, break-away nozzles. These units have 
an internal control system and user interface which regulates the fueling phase (WUN-902 
FV/Controls Internal 120V, 15A). These are connected to heat exchangers each consisting 
of 1,330 kg aluminum cooling blocks (heat exchangers, HX) for temperature control. 
For details on all stages and additional details of the storage system, refer to 
Appendix C original P&IDs for the main subsystems including LH2 bulk storage, 
compression, GH2 cascade storage, and dispensing elements are attached. 
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3.3. Survey of Available Scenario Data Sources 
To develop a credible FMEA of the LH2 storage system, a survey of identified risk 
scenarios in hydrogen fueling stations was conducted. It must be noted that public datasets 
recording hydrogen-related incidents are available for scenario development analysis. 
However, given the higher number of stations equipped with bulk GH2 storage rather than 
LH2, scarce information has been collected referring to the latter. Instead, a HAZOP study 
developed for a generic station with bulk LH2 is presented as a base for the FMEA 
conducted. These are described in the following sections. 
3.3.1. Hydrogen Risk Scenario Data Sources 
HIAD is an international systematic data collecting initiative on hydrogen-related 
undesired events [72], [73]. The main purpose of this database is to assist stakeholders in 
a better understanding of hydrogen events to facilitate the safe introduction of hydrogen 
technologies and applications for a more sustainable development in Europe. HIAD was 
developed within the EC-funded Network of Excellency HySafe project under the 
coordination of Det Norske Veritas and the European Commission Joint Research Centre 
(JRC) EU Science Hub. 
On the other hand, H2 Lessons Learned is a database-driven website intended to 
facilitate the sharing of lessons learned from hydrogen-related incidents [74]. This is part 
of the Hydrogen Tools Portal developed by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
through support from the U.S. DOE EERE. The goal of this Portal is to support 
implementation of the practices and procedures that will ensure safety in the handling and 
use of hydrogen in a variety of fuel cell applications. Both these public, online databases 
are a significant input for analysis of failure modes, causes, and risk mitigations measures. 
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Yet, these depend on the quality of the incident’s reports, mostly referring to general 
descriptions and lacking in-depth quantitative analysis of these failures. 
The California Energy Commission (CEC) has identified 153 relevant failure 
modes at hydrogen delivery stations, including those using LH2 and compressed GH2, and 
at on-site hydrogen production stations [75]. Out of these designs, stations with LH2 
delivery are identified as having the most serious consequences due to factors such as 
external accidents and collisions, overfilling tanks, and relief valve venting [1], [38]. 
3.3.2. Liquid Hydrogen Risk Scenarios 
The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Process Safety 
Management (PSM) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Risk 
Management Program (RMP) establish safety requirements for certain types of U.S. 
industrial gas facilities. The P-28 OSHA Process Safety Management and EPA Risk 
Management Plan Guidance Document for Bulk Liquid Hydrogen Systems is intended to 
provide information that is required to meet safety and risk mitigation requirements [29]. 
A typical system HAZOP in a generic bulk LH2 system, as well as the hazard assessment 
for release scenarios typical of the standard hydrogen station tanks used in the gas industry 
are provided to guide the design and implementation of code-conforming systems. 
A typical hydrogen system is described, including a storage tank, flow controls, 
vaporizers, low temperature protection, and other safety systems. For the development of 
the HAZOP deviation matrix, hazards of the process, previous incidents, engineering and 
administrative controls, consequences of failure of controls, general human factors and 
facility-sitting items were considered for the analysis organized with the following 
classification: Node #1: Delivery trailer, hose, and fill line to storage vessel; Node #2: 
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Storage tank; Node #3: Pressure build-up circuit and economizer; Node #4: Hydrogen line 
– liquid through vaporizer to the customer; Node #5: Hydrogen pump; Node #6: Vent 
stacks; and Node #7: General items. For the RMP development purposes, off-site 
consequences must be addressed, including a worst-case release scenario as well as 
alternative-release scenarios. The worst-case scenario for a LH2 tank is modeled as a 
catastrophic release in which the entirety of the tank content is instantaneously released to 
the atmosphere, forming an explosive cloud that detonates. Alternative-release scenarios 
refer to other less catastrophic events which are more likely to occur, such as the ones 
stated in Table 3-4 [29]. 
 
Of these, the most likely scenario to have off-site consequences is the process 
piping failure resulting in LH2 release at grade. This kind of incident may be caused by a 
mechanical failure, corrosion, failure of a piping component (such as a joint or valve), or 
Table 3-4: P-28 Alternative-release scenarios. 
Alternative-release scenario Conclusions 
1 Transfer hose release due to splits or sudden hose uncoupling. 
The likelihood of sudden hose uncoupling due to 
inadvertent movement of the liquid hydrogen trailer 
during the off-loading process is minimized by the trailer 
tow-away protection. Hose splits would result in a liquid 
release at grade. The flow rate for such a release generally 
would be less than that for a process piping failure since 
the flow is limited by the trailer pressure and trailer pump 
(if used).  
2 
Process piping releases from 
failures at flanges, joints, welds, 
valves, and valve seals, and 
drains or bleeds. 
A release from a gaseous piping failure would be less 
severe than from a liquid line of the same size. Failure of 
a liquid line would result in a liquid hydrogen spill at 
grade.  
3 
Process vessel or pump releases 
due to cracks, seal failure, or 
drain/bleed/plug failure.  
Likely to be small flow releases with no offsite impact.  
4 Vessel overfilling and spill, or over-pressurization and venting  
Releases through a well-designed vent stack. Not 
expected to have any offsite impact. 
5 
Shipping container mishandling 
and breakage or puncturing 
leading to a spill. 
A trailer (shipping container) failure would be no worse 
than the worst case for a single stationary container of the 
same size. Other failures associated with the trailer would 




impacted by a vehicle, among other events. Table 3-5 [29] presents the consequence 
classification criteria used for the HAZOP analysis. These consequences classification 
assume all safety and protection measures have failed, thus, reference the worst-case 
scenarios. Some of the most relevant anomalous system variations are summarized in Table 
3-6 regarding the liquid storage tank and Table 3-7 for the cryogenic pump. 
 
Table 3-5: Range of effects on employees, the public, and the environment.  
Release Size Description of effect on persons and the environment 
Small 
A release that could potentially cause injury, adverse health effects, or death to 
personnel in the immediate vicinity of the release with little or no likelihood of 
environmental damage. 
Medium 
A release that could potentially cause injury, adverse health effects, or death to 
personnel throughout the unit/process that is under review; or localized acute 
environmental impact within the facility that could require special operations. 
Large 
A release that could potentially cause injury, adverse health effects, or death to 
people (both employees, and the public) either throughout the facility or 
outside the facility, or widespread acute environmental impact either within or 
outside the facility that could require special operations. 
 
Table 3-6: P-28 HAZOP Consequences in Node #2.  
# Deviation Caused by Consequences 
2.1 High pressure 
Loss of vacuum 
PRDs opening or possible rupture of inner or outer 
vessel resulting in hydrogen release with possible 







2.4 High temperature 
External fire or 
hydrogen leak 
and fire 
Possible loss of vacuum with functioning of the relief 
system, hydrogen release, and possible fire/explosion, 
equipment damage, and personal injury. 
Loss of vacuum 
Functioning of the relief system, hydrogen release, and 





(outer vessel or 
external lines) 
Hydrogen leak 
from the inner 
vessel into the 
vacuum space 
Escalating leak can result in inner vessel failure with 
hydrogen release, possible fire/explosion, equipment 
damage, and personal injury. Casing failure.  
2.16 Loss of containment 
External 
impacts 
Hydrogen release, and possible fire/explosion, 
equipment damage, and personal injury. 
Natural 
disasters PRD functions. Hydrogen release, and possible 





Other failures regarding the delivery system, pressure build-up circuit, vaporizer, 
and other general failures can be found in A-Table 1. No large consequence scenarios were 
identified in the vent stacks. Following this analysis, several safety measures were 
introduced and suggested to counter the identified hazards. Safeguards related to the 
storage unit and the cryogenic pump are presented in Table 3-8, including ones referring 
to storage tank material selection, design considerations, and vacuum-insulated layer 
pressure monitoring. Other relevant safeguards developed for the other system’s nodes are 
presented in A-Table 2. 
 
Table 3-7: P-28 HAZOP Consequences in Node #5.  
# Deviation Caused by Consequences 
5.1 High pressure 
Pump dead-headed 
Pump or line rupture with hydrogen release, 
possible fire/explosion, equipment damage, 
and personal injury. PRD functions. 
Operator error- improper 
valve sequences (closes 
valve downstream of 
pump) 
5.16 Loss of containment 
External fire  Hydrogen release, and possible 
fire/explosion, equipment damage, and 
personal injury. External impacts 
 
Table 3-8: P-28 Safeguards for large range consequence scenarios in Nodes #2-#5.  
# Deviation Safeguards 
2.1 High pressure 
Mechanical integrity program. 
PRD vent system has a dedicated 
tank connection. 
Rupture disks provide redundant 
protection again relief valve 
failure. 
2.4 High temperature 
Inner vessel relief valves are sized 
for this condition. 
Proper material of construction of 
outer vessel. 
Fusible links. 
Fire-rated isolation valves.  
Proper tank sitting in accordance 
with NFPA 55. 
Equipment designs to recognize 
codes. 
Insulation of tank legs over 18 in 
high. 
Mechanical integrity program. 
Properly designed PRD vent 
system. 
2.5 Low temperature  Vacuum space pressure gauge. Mechanical integrity program. 
2.16 Loss of containment 
Proper tank sitting in accordance 
with NFPA 55. Foundation design. 
5.1 High pressure Operating procedures. Properly labeled lines and valves. 
Properly designed PRD vent 
system. 
5.16 Loss of containment 
Proper tank sitting in accordance 




3.4. Results of FMEA for LH2 Storage System 
The FMEA presented is used as an exploratory assessment of failure modes present 
in the LH2 storage system related to the effect of cryogenic temperatures, thermal and 
pressure cycling. As discussed in Section 2.3, several FMEA have been previously 
developed for hydrogen fueling stations, although most of these are focused on risks related 
to GH2 release. This section contains the documentation of the FMEA and resulting 
insights regarding the design of the LH2 storage system in the context of risk analysis. 
3.4.1. FMEA System Decomposition 
A functional description of the main components of this system are available in 
Table 3-9. The main component in the liquid storage system is the double-walled 800 kg 
liquid storage tank. Therefore, special attention must be brought to the risk mitigation 
components of this item, such as the pressure relief valve (PSV) system, including pressure 
and temperature sensors. Following the storage tank, both the cryogenic pump (CNL) and 
the ambient-pressure evaporator (EV) play a fundamental role in the transport and phase 
transformation of the hydrogen fuel. Hence, connecting elements such as the double-walled 
piping, and valves are also considered. The supply of process air and electricity are 
considered external to the system. 
 




Name Functional Description Components Involved 
1 Storage Storage of liquid hydrogen under safe pressure levels. 
PI, PT, PSV, HV-1, 
Tank 
2 Control Controlled transport of liquid hydrogen from storage to process components. FV, ZI, ZSO, ZSC, ZZO 
3 Process Pressure, temperature, and phase control of hydrogen fuel towards the station.  CNL, HV-2, EV 




The fully decomposed layout of the LH2 storage system and identified subsystems 
is presented in Figure 3-4 and Table 3-10. System boundaries are defined concerning the 
storage tank onwards to the distribution network towards the evaporator. This does not 
include the fuel delivery process, emergency fire cabinet operation or the supply of external 
elements such as process air or electricity. 
 
For the LH2 subsystem any major failure can potentially result in the unintended 
release of hydrogen. However, a distinction should be made between liquid and gaseous 
releases of hydrogen as these can lead to different failure scenarios with varying severity 
classifications. Unintended LH2 release will be primarily caused by leakage or rupture of 
components such as: storage tank, piping, valves, pump, and evaporator. Large ruptures 
will result in LH2 releases at cryogenic temperatures. The effect of these releases over 
 






























infrastructure, instrumentation, and humans is yet to be completely quantified, as well as 
possible pooling and subsequent evaporation and ignition risks [76]. 
 
Small ruptures will likely lead to limited LH2 release and subsequent evaporation. 
If the release rate is low, the GH2 will most likely disperse. It is unclear how the conditions 
under which the LH2 is released, and at which rate, affects the evaporation rate. In this case, 
the probability of the event ‘liquid hydrogen evaporating into gaseous state’ will be 
required to assess known ignition and explosion risks related to GH2 releases. No explicit 
information on failure detection methods is available other than the Fire & Gas cabinets 
shown in Appendix C. It is assumed that detection leads to a system shutdown based on 
shut-off valve operation (HV). 
Table 3-10: LH2 Storage Decomposition Functional Description. 
Component 
Code 
Nomenclature Component Name Function 
1.1 Tank Liquid storage tank Storage of liquid hydrogen. 
1.2 PI Pressure Indicator Indicates pressure inside tank. 
1.3 PT Pressure Transmitter Transmission of pressure sensor reading to control system.  
1.4 PSV Pressure Release Valve 
Controlled releases of gaseous 
hydrogen from tank in case of high 
pressure (>1MPa).  
1.5 HV-1 Block and bleed ball valve 
Block flow and bleed off remaining 
gaseous hydrogen.  
2.1 FV Air operated valve Flow control of hydrogen 
2.2 ZZO Position actuator Controls operation of FV 
2.3 ZI Position Indicator Indicates position of FV  
2.4 ZSO Switch position open Indicates open position of FV  
2.5 ZSC Switch position closed Indicates closed position of FV  
2.6 Air Air Process air supply 
3.1 CNL Cryogenic Pump Transport of liquid hydrogen  
3.2 HV-2 Isolation Hand Valve Isolates flow to system downstream  
3.3 EV Ambient air evaporator Liquid to gas phase transformation  




3.4.2. Results: FMEA Risk Scenario Identification 
As specific data on stations with LH2 storage systems is limited, a qualitative 
estimation of even probabilities was used to assess the risk of the identified failure modes. 
Considering the LH2 storage system studied, the most relevant release scenarios refer to 
releases from either a rupture of the storage tank or to releases from process piping 
connecting elements, process vessel or pump releases, and vessel overfilling and spill, or 
over-pressurization and venting (See Table 3-4). Of these, the scenario most likely leading 
to severe consequences is process piping failure, particularly in LH2 lines. In [29] it is also 
assumed that releases from process vessels or pumps will likely lead to small flow releases 
with no off-site impact. Yet, these still represent causes which affect the overall availability 
of hydrogen fueling stations as discussed in Section 4.2.1. 
Hydrogen releases from the storage tank and piping lines represent possible high-
risk scenarios due to the number of locations at which these can occur, especially at 
connecting elements (valves, fittings, and seals). However, safety measures should also 
focus on process equipment, such as the cryogenic pump and the evaporator heat 
exchanger, as these components are exposed to thermal cycling and could be a major source 
of leaked hydrogen. The main failure modes for critical subsystems identified in the system 
are as follows: 
• Storage tank and piping: Main failure mode includes loss of containment in either 
the inner or outer jacket due to overpressure and fatigue wear. Also, connecting 
elements are under thermal degradation failure modes. Specific safety measures 
exist to counter these failures, mainly material and maintenance requirements, 
although specific LH2 leakage frequency data is unavailable. 
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• Pressure relief devices and air-actuated valves: Considered failure modes refer to 
failures to operate or to close under demand. It must be noted that the operation of 
these elements depends on instrumentation and control systems which may fail by 
exposure to cryogenic temperatures, although these effects remain unquantified. 
• Cryogenic pump and evaporator: These elements are potential sources of hydrogen 
leakage. The effect of failures in connecting elements, fittings, and seals are similar 
to those expected from the storage and piping components. However, failures due 
to thermal or pressure cycles stresses could also lead to abnormal pressure 
conditions in the piping lines in the vicinity of the pump or releases of a 
liquid/gaseous mixture from the evaporator. It must be noted that specific LH2 
leakage frequency data is unavailable. 
The identified failure modes particularly affected by LH2 are summarized in Table 
3-11 regarding the storage tank, Table 3-12 regarding the valve and control system and 
Table 3-13 regarding the process equipment. These tables present the identified failure 
mode and cause and the failure mode model. Based on the risk matrix presented in Table 
3-1, the corresponding risk level (R) is obtained: Low (L), Medium (M) and High (H). In 
these components, the following high-risk failure modes were identified: 
1. Malfunction of the pressure relief valve system due to cryogenic temperatures. 
2. Operation failure at prescribed time of the air-operated valve. 
3. Rupture due to collision or external accident of the evaporator. 




1. Storage tank rupture due to an external accident or collision. 
2. Failure of the outer wall of the storage tank due to external fire. 
3. Premature operation of the air-operated valve. 
4. Leakage from cryogenic pump due to seal failure or installation error. 
5. Premature operation of the cryogenic pump due to controller failure. 
6. Leakage from fittings and connecting piping in the evaporator. 
 
Table 3-11: Storage subsystem identified liquid hydrogen-related failure modes. 
Item Failure Cause 
Failure 













Minor Medium L 
Evaporation rate is 
required to assess 
liquid/gaseous 






caused by the 
operational 
environment 
Critical Low M 
Failure of 
outer tank 




caused by the 
operational 
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Critical Low M 















caused by the 
operational 
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caused by the 
operational 
environment 
Critical High H 









The complete list of failure modes identified in the storage design are presented 
from A-Table 37 to A-Table 47. Here, failure modes which are particularly affected by 




Table 3-12: Control subsystem identified liquid hydrogen-related failure modes. 
Item Failure Cause 
Failure 












Minor Medium L 
Evaporation rate is 






operation Critical Low M 
Evaporation rate is 









Critical High H 
Evaporation rate is 




Table 3-13: Process subsystem identified liquid hydrogen-related failure modes. 




pump due to 
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Failure to meet 
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Evaporation rate 
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functional 
specifications 
Moderate Medium M 
Rupture due 
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operational 
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3.4.3. Discussion of Identified Risk Scenarios 
This following analysis is based on the reviewed literature regarding storage 
components and the effect of hydrogen on surrounding infrastructure. It should be noted 
that the three high-risk failure modes identified can lead to unintended release of hydrogen 
in both liquid and gaseous forms, depending on conditions of the release. However, the 
evaporation rate is required to assess the transition between liquid/gaseous release 
scenarios. Further, risks related to leakage and rupture of the storage tank and cryogenic 
pump are considered less probable than in components which have not been specifically 
designed for cryogenic temperatures (evaporator, instrumentation, etc.). 
Regarding the storage tank, these double-walled cryogenic vessels are constructed 
with a vacuum jacket which serves as an additional safety barrier for leaks and ruptures. 
Also, hydrogen has a low adiabatic expansion energy at cryogenic temperatures [77]. This 
would imply that in the case of leakage or tank rupture, immediate ignition of the release 
hydrogen at cryogenic temperatures is unlikely. However, the low temperatures can 
damage adjacent valves or pressure relief devices which have not been designed for 
operating under cryogenic conditions [7]. Additionally, leakage and ruptures have varying 
consequences whether there is a loss of insulation prior to the leakage. In this scenario, loss 
of insulation would result in the vaporization of the hydrogen and the development on the 
GH2 release events [41]. On the contrary, if the leakage or rupture compromises both 
barriers instantly, LH2 will be released. 
Double-walled vacuum-insulated pipes are also used in the sections in contact with 
LH2 at low temperatures. As the volume of hydrogen transported is minor in comparison 
to the storage tank, only risks related to leakage through the outer wall are considered. At 
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low temperatures, effects other than hydrogen embrittlement must be considered. 
Examples of these are the change of mechanical characteristics, thermal expansion and 
contractions phenomena and brittleness [78]. The likelihood of leakage events due to stress 
cycling and exposure to low temperatures during operation have not been quantified. Thus, 
additional safety measures regarding instrumentation, valves, pump, and evaporator should 
be considered in the future. For this reason, special attention should focus on the evaporator 
given the amount of hydrogen fuel stored within (hence a high severity class). The initial 
design on the station does not include the dimensions of this component, nor it is specified 
which special safety measures it counts with to counter the effect of both the GH2 
(embrittlement) or the thermal cycling due to the LH2 entering at cryogenic temperatures. 
These failure modes identified serve as a basis for the use of failure logic-modeling 
tools in the QRA context, as well as the resulting data collection priorities presented in 
Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 4. Quantitative Risk Analysis of LH2 Storage System 
Hydrogen infrastructure is susceptible to hazards caused by undesired hydrogen 
releases, both in liquid and gaseous states. The cause, frequency, and consequences of 
hydrogen releases have been studied in the context of risk assessment and mitigation, 
leading to safer designs. In this chapter, the high-risk scenarios identified in the LH2 storage 
system are developed and the structural reliability of the system is assessed. Based on the 
analysis of hydrogen-related risk and reliability databases, it is determined that there is 
insufficient data to support the quantification of a full risk assessment in LH2 systems. 
Thus, the analysis is carried out semi-quantitatively based on generic industry data and 
supported by the review of previous work which address hydrogen LH2 infrastructure. The 
work developed includes ESDs and FTAs built for the most severe risk scenarios identified 
and initiating leak events. Finally, recommendations regarding frequency data 
requirements to enable the full development of these tools are discussed. 
4.1. Methodology 
The following section refers to the methodology followed to analyze the generic 
LH2 storage system defined in Section 3.2. Insights derived from the developed FMEA and 
risk scenario identification shed light on the current frequency data requirements, as well 
as considerations for future risk assessments and advanced reliability tool incorporation to 
the analysis of LH2 storage systems. 
4.1.1. Review of Hydrogen-related Reliability Data 
A comprehensive and representative frequency database is needed to support the 
development of credible QRAs. As reviewed in Section 2.3, hydrogen risks are 
characterized by component leak frequencies. A review of publicly available hydrogen 
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accident and leak frequency databases is required to identify useful sources and 
information gaps regarding LH2 risks. This review includes safety and maintenance reports 
from currently operating hydrogen fueling stations in the U.S. and from generic industry 
failure databases. 
4.1.2. Event Sequence Diagrams and Fault Trees 
Logic-modeling techniques such as ESDs are employed to develop the high-risk 
scenarios identified. These tools are graphical representations of specific series of events 
which may lead to an accident. In this work, ESDs are developed for the high-risk scenarios 
identified through the FMEA and risk-ranking process. These are based on the ESDs 
developed for GH2 releases defined in the HyRAM software (addressed in Section 2.3.1 
and Appendix D.1. ) and adapted to include LH2 releases, which ultimately can also lead 
to the GH2 accident scenarios. The construction of the ESDs is aimed at identifying current 
data gaps to quantify LH2 release scenarios. 
4.1.3. Fault Tree Analysis 
An FTA is carried out on the LH2 storage system designed. This incorporates 
hydrogen-specific and generic industrial failure data from dedicated sources discussed in 
Section 4.2. Once the fault tree’s minimal cut-sets are known, the reliability or the 
unavailability can be calculated through the quantification of these minimal cut-sets. By 
incorporating failure rates and frequencies, the storage subsystem’s overall unreliability is 
estimated through the use of Trilith software [79]. Finally, the relative importance of each 
cut-set of component failures is analyzed and ranked. A relevant result to this analysis is 
the identification of which component failures should be further studied or monitored, with 
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the purpose of preventing unexpected failures in the system and reducing unexpected 
downtime of the stations. 
4.2. Survey of Available Frequency and Reliability Data Sources 
Data collection and analysis are fundamental components of risk and reliability 
assessments. The need for comprehensive databases regarding multiple aspects of 
hydrogen systems is still a remaining challenge, in particular for LH2 technologies [7]. In 
this section, available hydrogen failure data for traditional reliability frameworks is 
discussed to frame the development and quantification of the risk scenarios identified. 
4.2.1. Hydrogen Frequency Data Sources 
Reliability, safety, and performance data collection from operational hydrogen 
fueling stations is a valuable initiative to characterize in-situ behavior of component 
failures. The quantification and analysis of the availability of station components and 
fueling capability is fundamental to understand the current state of technology deployed. 
Through the “Hydrogen Station Component Validation” Project developed by NREL [80], 
[81] in cooperation with the CEC, industrial data collaborators deliver periodic 
performance safety and incidents reports. Internal processing and analysis lead to the 
preparation of Composite data Products (CDPs) [82], in which data is aggregated across 
multiple systems, sites, and teams. This, with the objective of publishing useful information 
without revealing proprietary data of said data providers and collaborators. These include 
stations funders, station providers, and other organizations who participate in the hydrogen 




The main data types reported in NREL’s CDPs cover energy, reliability, safety, 
performance, cost, deployment, and utilization aspects of the stations. The data collection 
tool consists of a template for reporting data from hydrogen infrastructure and is divided 
into reports covering all stations and only retail stations. Given the nature of both types of 
stations, there are some inconsistencies regarding the level of detail collected from the 
maintenance and safety reports. Fuel log records, safety and leaks checks, and maintenance 
events are recorded, enabling the estimation of time between fueling events and overall 
unavailability of the retail stations. 
Maintenance events are dominated by failures at dispenser subsystems. Safety 
reports by equipment indicate that dispensers (including hose and nozzle) present the 
highest number of leakage events, as shown in Figure 4-1 for retail stations in 2019 and in 
Figure 4-2 for all stations in 2018 [80]. Further, failures at the compressor and chiller 
components are also significant. Pipes, fittings, and valves, as well as sensors and storage 
are also mentioned in the reports. GH2 releases with no accumulation and equipment 
malfunction are the events most often described. Additionally, NREL has determined key 
measurement locations for leak rates in dispenser cabinets and compressor systems. In 
dispenser cabinets, leaks are typically small and slow, occurring through valves. They may 
occur over a relatively long period of time and can go unnoticed for a significant time. In 
compressor systems leaks frequently develop from seal failures and can result in larger and 
shorter leaks compared to the dispenser systems [83]. 
This type of information is crucial to develop station- and component-level 
reliability models, enabling the prediction of type and duration of maintenance events. 
However, as information is recollected through manual reporting tasks, the quality of the 
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data can vary significantly from station to station. In particular, safety and maintenance 
events are estimated to be the most under-reported section, limiting the utility for scenario 
development or consequence data. Figure 4-3 presents a breakdown of these maintenance 
and safety incident reports by primary factors, equipment involved, and event descriptions. 
Based on these reports, the most frequent cause of station or dispenser unavailability is 
inadequate or non-working equipment, the most common being the fueling hoses, and most 
likely leading to minor GH2 leakage events. It must be noted that there is a significant 
number of events with an undefined cause (Figure 4-3a). Similar information is presented 




(a) Maintenance hours: Total 22,807 hours 
and 77% unscheduled. 
(b) Maintenance events: Total 10,074 events 
and 65% unscheduled. 
Figure 4-1: Maintenance by Known Equipment in Retail Stations. NREL (2019). 
 
 
(c) Maintenance hours: Total 23,907 hours 
and 58% unscheduled. 
(d) Maintenance events: Total 7,913 events and 
57% unscheduled. 






(a) By Primary Factor  
 
(b) By Equipment Involved 
 
(c) By Event Description 






(a) By Primary Factor  
 
(b) By Equipment Involved 
 
(c) By Event Description 




Further, information collected from maintenance records allows the breakdown of 
failed parts per component for some of the most relevant elements of the system. An 
example is shown in Figure 4-5 for the compressor from information gathered in retail 
stations. 
 
However, it should be noted that the majority of the reported maintenance events 
fall under the category ‘undefined’. For this reason, the initial reliability models developed 
for hydrogen fueling stations refer to general failures and as a function of either number of 
fills or amount of hydrogen dispensed. Figure 4-6 presents the determined failure rate by 
number of fills based on the historic collected data. 
Overall, documented failure frequency and probability data specific to hydrogen 
systems is limited, given the low number of stations deployed worldwide and the sensitive 
nature of failure or maintenance-related information [48]. More so, is failure and 
 




degradation data related to the effect of cryogenic temperatures on the system’s 
components for risk assessment purposes, as the number of operational LH2-based stations 
is significantly lower than their gaseous counterpart [80]. Given the limited availability of 
reliable failure frequency data specific to hydrogen infrastructure, many works have 
utilized generic industrial data, reduced records from accidents in hydrogen systems, and 
incorporated Bayesian analysis to address the uncertainties these estimations carry. 
 
4.2.2. Data Sources from Other Industries 
Documented frequency failure data is scarce, limiting the development of credible 
QRAs for hydrogen fueling station permitting processes. Thus, analysis must rely on up-
to-date industrial failure data and adapted to on-site conditions through Bayesian 
approaches as discussed in Section 2.3.2. During the development of the HyApproval 
project under the European Integrated Hydrogen Project (EIHP2), a survey of reliability 
 





data sources relevant to hydrogen systems was conducted [84]. Aimed at the publication 
of a standardized Handbook for Approval of Hydrogen Refueling Stations [85], the project 
determined that documented failure data in hydrogen systems were limited. Thus, they 
concluded that QRA and reliability analysis were to be conducted relying on up-to-date 
failure data from similar industries. The Identification and Review of Databases for 
Reliability Data [86] reported several data sources pertinent to hydrogen systems. Some of 
the most current versions of the reliability data sources are described below: 
• The Offshore Reliability Data Handbook, OREDA Handbook (2015), 6th edition – 
Volume I. The intention of the handbook is to provide both quantitative and 
qualitative information as a basis for Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, and 
Safety (RAMS) analyses [87]. 
• The ‘Purple Book’: Guideline for Quantitative Risk Assessment in the Netherlands 
(2001) [33]. This handbook contains failure frequency data for general industrial 
components, denominated as ‘Loss of Containment’ (LOC). 
• SINTEF PDS Data Handbook: Reliability Data for Safety Instrumented Systems 
(2013). Data dossiers for field devices (detectors, transmitters, valves, etc.) and 
control logic (electronics) are presented [88]. 
• RMQSI – Nonelectric Parts Reliability Data (2016) Quanterion. This publication 
provides historical reliability data on a wide variety of part types [89]. 
• SwedPower: T-Book, Reliability Data of Components in Nordic Nuclear Power 
Plants (2005). Data collection of Swedish nuclear power plants the Finnish 
company TVO [90]. 
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• Concawe: Western European Cross-country oil pipelines, 30-year performance 
statistics, report no. 2/02 (2002) [91]. 
Based on the assessment presented in [86], OREDA has been considered the most 
relevant database as it is based on data from the oil and gas industry. Regarding safety-
related equipment, the SINTEF PDS is considered as an important database, also based on 
data from the oil and gas industry. The T-book has been mostly used for reliability analysis 
of electrical equipment, as this is not covered in depth by the previous sources. Concawe 
is also recommended for pipeline reliability. 
In both OREDA and The Purple Book, hydrogen-specific and cryogenic-related 
failure probabilities remain unquantified. Yet, these failure probabilities and frequencies 
can still be incorporated for risk quantification using a Bayesian approach. Both sources 
contain information from similar fluids and represent the most robust starting point for 
further analyses. 
4.3. Results of QRA for LH2 Risk Scenarios 
This section consists of the documentation regarding the main results derived from 
applying risk and failure logic-modeling tools used in QRAs to the selected LH2 storage 
system. Firstly, the high-risk scenarios identified through the FMEA process are developed 
and described through separate ESDs, considering they could have significantly different 
frequencies of occurrence. Secondly, based on an analysis of generic industrial data from 
the OREDA database and The Purple Book, an estimate of the storage system unreliability 
is obtained, as well as a ranking of the cut-sets leading to unexpected LH2 releases. 
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4.3.1. Event Sequence Diagrams for High-Risk Scenarios 
The identified high-risk failure modes described in Section 4.2.2 can potentially 
lead to unintended release of hydrogen in both liquid and gaseous forms. Hence, there is a 
need to identify and describe risk scenarios related to LH2 releases. These risk scenarios 
are developed below. However, the complexity of the new scenarios depends on physics 
and probability data not yet fully developed. This section is divided in a discussion 
regarding the ESD events probabilities of occurrence and the construction of separate ESDs 
for each high-risk scenario identified. 
4.3.1.1. ESD Transition Probabilities 
The proposed ESDs models are based on HyRAM’s ESD for GH2 releases, 
however an updated ESD should incorporate a prior event of LH2 release. A general draft 
of this ESD concept is presented in Figure 4-7. A summary of the GH2 and LH2 events 
represented in this diagram are found in Table 4-1 and Table 4-2. 
The release of LH2 may lead to either GH2 or LH2 specific risks, such as the ones 
described in Appendix D.1.  as well as scenarios unique to cryogenic liquid releases such 
as pooling and the formation of a cryogenic plume. Both these events should be described 
in depth and supported with experimental data as a method to quantify potential damages 
caused by these prior or in combination with GH2-related scenarios. Further, there is a need 
for more scientific information on how system operational conditions (e.g., pressure and 
temperature) affect the release behavior of liquid hydrogen. These could potentially affect 
the likelihood and consequences of immediate and delayed ignition and thus the overall 







Figure 4-7: Proposed Event Sequence Diagram for LH2 releases. 
Table 4-1: ESD General Release Event Description. To be continued. 
ESD Event Data Type Source Notes 
Component leak 
frequencies for GH2 
Release frequencies 
obtained for 
components per leak 
size.  
HyRAM See D.1.  
GH2 Release Detection 
Constant Probability 




Value HyRAM See D.1.  
GH2 Delayed Ignition 
leading to Explosion 
Constant Probability 
Value HyRAM See D.1.  
GH2 Unignited Release 
Constant Probability 






4.3.1.2. ESD Construction 
In this context, conceptual ETAs are proposed for the three high-level risks 
identified through the FMEA shown in Table 4-3. These are qualitative in nature and 
further argument the need for specific LH2 leak frequency data to adequately characterize 
different form of LH2 releases and relevant consequences. 
 
Table 4-2: ESD General Release Event Description. Continued. 
ESD Event Data Type Source Notes 
Component leak 
frequencies for LH2 
Release frequencies 
obtained for 
components per leak 
size. 
N/A 
Component reliability data 
describing failure modes that lead 
to LH2 releases could also be 
used. 
LH2 Release Detection 
Constant Probability 
Value N/A 
A priori the same value for GH2 
detection and isolation could be 






Possible dependency on physics-
based model.  
LH2 Delayed 




Possible dependency on physics-
based model. 
LH2 Delayed 




Possible dependency on physics-
based model. 
 
Table 4-3: Identified liquid hydrogen-related high-risk failure modes. 
Item Failure Modes and Causes Failure Mode Model Notes 
Pressure Relief 
Valve 




caused by the 
operational 
environment 
Loss of insulation 
would cause 
evaporation before 
effective leakage; hence 
risk is related to GH2 
Air operated valve Operation failure Failure to operate at prescribed time 
Evaporation rate is 
required to assess 
liquid/gaseous release 
scenario 
Evaporator Rupture due to collision or accident 
Failure conditions 
caused by the 
operational 
environment 
Evaporation rate is 






In the case of “High-risk scenario 1 - Malfunction due to cryogenic temperatures 
of the pressure relief valve system” presented in Figure 4-8, it appears evident that if the 
increase of pressure within the storage tanks leads to leakage or burst of the inner tank, the 
loss of thermal insulation and subsequent evaporation would directly lead into the already 
determined ESDs regarding GH2 releases. This scenario is considered more likely than a 
burst of the outer tank due to the expansion of the evaporating hydrogen (which would lead 
to a mixed release) or a complete burst of the storage tank (inner and outer walls) due to 
overpressure based on the cited literature [7], [41], [77]. 
 
Figure 4-9 presents the developed sequence for “High-risk scenario 2 - Operation 
failure at prescribed time of the air-operated valve”. Here, the scenario caused by the 
repeated malfunction of the air-operated valve could lead to a reduced flow towards the 
cryogenic pump. This, as the valve’s normal position is closed, pressurized air opens the 
valve in “active” state, and it has a return spring mechanism for return to normal state. 
 




Failure to close of the FV valve may cause pressure issues upstream, however other 
control mechanism may interact to reduce associated risks. Failure to open, on the other 
hand, may result in pressure issues upstream (regulated with the pressure relief valve, refer 
to high-risk scenario 1) and potential damage to the cryogenic pump’s operation. This 
scenario refers to the latter risk, where if early failure detection procedures are 
implemented, pump seal degradation or more serious pump degradation scenarios (i.e., 
cavitation) could be avoided. If the disruption of normal operation of the pump continuous 
unnoticed it may be damaged and LH2 leakage may occur. The consequence of this depends 
on the magnitude of the leakage, as small leakages, could lead to the already described GH2 
release scenarios. For greater leakages (plume) or other conditions which lead to delayed 
evaporation (pooling), ignition probabilities have not been quantified, yet could lead to jet 
fires, flash fires, or explosions, additional to the potential damage of other infrastructure 
due to cryogenic temperatures. 
 
Figure 4-9: High risk scenario 2 - Operation failure of the air-operated valve.  
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In the case of “High-risk scenario 3 - Rupture due to collision or external accident 
of the evaporator”, the development is similar to the high-risk scenario 2. However, as 
shown in Figure 4-10, in this case that leakages lead to evaporated GH2 ignition, if LH2 
still remains in the evaporator, the resulting ignition of mixed hydrogen may result in 
consequences not contemplated by the implemented harm models. 
 
4.3.2. Fault Trees for LH2 Release Initiating Event 
An FTA is carried out with the purpose of determining a general initiating event 
frequency for LH2 release in the system described in Figure 4-7. This section is divided 
into a discussion of failure data (i.e., probabilities and rates) to support the FTA, the 
construction of the fault tree based on the most prominent failure modes identified in the 
literature, followed by the evaluation and analysis of the model. 
 
Figure 4-10: High risk scenario 3 - Rupture of the evaporator. 
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4.3.2.1. FTA Failure Probabilities 
Failure mode taxonomies and leak frequency data are based on OREDA and The 
Purple Book failure and leak frequency data, yielding an initial estimation of the LH2 
storage system’s reliability. Both these inputs are valuable for FMEA and FTA analysis, 
primarily, as a method to prioritize failure modes to monitor in the system. OREDA holds 
a collection of failure data, failure modes, and failure mechanisms recorded for specific 
components in engineering systems. This includes data regarding pumps, electric motor, 
valves, instrumentation input devices, heat exchangers, and process vessels, among others. 
Each equipment type is described as a function of their subcomponents and corresponding 
maintainable items. Each failure mode is associated to the most probable combination of a 
maintainable item and failure mechanism. A list of relative contributions of each 
maintainable item and failure mechanisms to the total failure rate is presented decomposed 
for each failure mode. A detailed analysis of the OREDA data and the relative importance 
of failure modes of the main LH2 storage systems was carried out in Appendix D.2. , cross-
referencing with the identified risk scenarios previously developed. Table 4-4 presents the 
failure modes selected as relevant for the analysis of the LH2 storage system. 
 
The Purple Book reports ‘Loss of Containment’ (LOC) event frequencies for 
various components and installation configurations. These LOC frequencies refer to 
random events under normal operational conditions for various pressure and atmospheric 
tanks, pipelines, pumps, heat exchangers, and pressure relief devices models. Leakage 
Table 4-4: Relevant Failure Modes from OREDA database. 
FM Description FM Description  
AOL Abnormal output - low FTF Fail to function on demand 
ELP External leakage - process medium NOO No output 
ELU External leakage - utility medium STD Structural deficiency 




events are further classified by their type and severity, e.g., instantaneous release of 
complete inventory or continuous release from specific hole diameters. It also allows to 
characterize external accidents leading to LOC events by modifying reported frequencies 
by a factor of 5 × 10−6 𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟−1. Failure frequencies reported in The Purple Book are more 
general in nature, except for LOC events in storage tanks (See Appendix D.3. ). For this 
reason, OREDA data is used to represent specific failures from failure modes identified 
through the FMEA procedure, while LOC data is used to represent “random failures”, i.e.: 
caused by external events. 
4.3.2.2. FTA Construction 
An FTA was carried out for the top event “Major Liquid Hydrogen Leakage” in the 
storage system and supported by the recollected failure data. Each event in the FTA 
corresponds to a component failure based on the reported data from OREDA and The 
Purple Book. The worst-case scenario is considered for both event development and failure 
rate data selected. Failure modes and mechanisms were ranked in order of relative 
importance according to each component to identify relevant information. Corresponding 
values are summarized in Table 4-5 for OREDA and in Table 4-6 for The Purple Book. It 
is important to note that the available data is generic and does not account for cryogenic 
temperatures or thermal cycling effects. In the case of OREDA data, calendar time is 
utilized to characterize most failure rates, with the exception of the pump, as passive leak 
events are only caused by abnormal operation (i.e., vibration-induced degradation). The 
following paragraphs describe the modeled failure logic of the system and each identified 





External accidents leading to release of hydrogen: This section of the event tree 
refers to leakage events caused by external accidents such as collisions in storage tank and 
evaporator (LOC). Both these can result in large amounts of released hydrogen, depending 
on the size of the rupture. 
Large leakage events due to multiple component failures: This section of the event 
tree corresponds to releases caused by degraded component operation. First, in regard to 








Mode Mean SD n/t Time 
CNL 
Centrifugal 
Pump in Cooling 
Systems 
Critical VIB 2.84 2.01 2.84 † 
Degraded ELP 7.68 3.44 7.68 † 
FV Valves, Shut-off, Ball Critical ELU 24.74 24.74 24.74 * 
HV-2 Valves, Shut-off, Gate All modes All 4.03 5.7 - * 
ZI-ZZO Input Devices, General 
Critical FTF 1.73 2.11 0.29 * 
Degraded AOL 0.65 1.02 0.07 * 
EV Heat Exchanger 
Critical ELP 1.3 0.94 1.33 * 
Critical STD 2.2 2.15 2.67 * 
Piping  Vessels 
Critical  ELP 2.86 3.73 2.98 * 




Devices (CLU) Incipient FTF 5.21 5.76 5.7 * 
Emergency 
Alarm System 
Fire & Gas 
detectors (F&G) 
Critical FTF 1.02 1.83 1.22 * 
Critical NOO 0.63 1.11 0.69 * 
Note: All failure rates are given in (10−6 hrs.). Time: Operational (†), Calendar (*).  




















G1 5 × 10−5 5.5 × 10−5 6.28 × 10−9 




the cryogenic pump, the event of vibration-induced structural degradation (VIB) combined 
with air-valve and the isolation shut-off valve instrumentation (AOL) and control unit 
failure (CLU-FTF) is considered. Abnormal pressure conditions can be created 
downstream or upstream due to the air-controlled valve (FV) and the isolation valve (HV-
2) failing closed, respectively. Coupled to vibration-induced degradation, repeated 
occurrences of these failures can lead to leakage events in the pump’s connecting elements 
(fittings and seals), assuming structural integrity of the pump’s casing. The detailed model 
of this section of the fault tree is shown in Figure 4-12. 
 
In the case of the evaporator, structural deficiency (STD) combined with pump, air-
valve, and isolation shut-off valve instrumentation (AOL) and control unit (FTF) failures 
 
Figure 4-11: Fault Tree Developed for LH2 Leakage Top Events. 
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are considered. Similar to the situation described for the pump, abnormal pressure 
conditions can be created downstream due to the isolation valve (HV-2) failing closed or 
upstream to the cryogenic pump failing to stop operation (CLU-FTF) while the air-operated 
valve (FV) has failed open (CLU-FTF). Repeated occurrences of these failures can lead to 
leakage events in the evaporator’s connecting elements (fittings and seals) or casing. The 
latter could lead to a release of liquid/gaseous hydrogen mixture, as discussed in the 
previous section. The detailed model of this section of the fault tree is shown in Figure 
4-13. 
 
In relation to the piping sections, a combination of failure modes leading to 
structural deficiency (STD) combined with pump, air-valve, and shut-off valve control unit 
failure (CLU-FTF) is considered. Similar to previously described leakage events, abnormal 
pressure conditions can lead to leakage events in the piping’s connecting elements (fittings 
 
Figure 4-12: Fault Tree Developed Event 2: Pump Leakage Events.  
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and seals) or significant structural damage leading to leakage events. The detailed model 
of this section of the fault tree is shown in Figure 4-14. 
 
 
Undetected leakages in various components: This section of the event tree 
corresponds to random releases of hydrogen in the system, hence, component reliability 
 
Figure 4-13: Fault Tree Developed Event 3: Evaporator Leakage Events.   
 
Figure 4-14: Fault Tree Developed Event 4: Piping Leakage Events.   
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related to leakage failure modes (ELU, ELP) is considered. Here, a difference must be 
made between the elements which contain the LH2 during operation (such as the piping 
sections, cryogenic pump, and the evaporator) and those who interact with it under demand 
(mainly, the air-controlled valve). These leakage failures only lead to the risk of hazardous 
exposure if these are not detected by the Fire & Gas detectors in the emergency systems 
(FTF) or fail to shut down the system due to reading failures (NOO). Hydrogen sensors are 
frequently relied on to determine if a leak has occurred in the system, and further discussion 
is needed regarding unrevealed leaks and inspection policies [92]. The detailed model of 
this section of the fault tree is shown in Figure 4-15. 
 
As the worst-case scenario is considered, these events are considered both to 
contribute separately to the overall failure of the system. The full tree shown in A-Figure 
18. The nomenclature used to identify each of the events in the fault tree are described in 
Table 4-7 and Table 4-8, together with the related failure mode identified. 
 
Figure 4-15: Fault Tree Developed Events 4-5 Undetected Random Leaks.   
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From this FTA’s structure, it can be observed that the most repeated failure events 
are related to failures of the air-operated valve (FV), leading to abnormal pressure 
conditions in the piping lines, stressing connecting elements in components. However, it 
should be noted that under real operational conditions, this is expected to lead to hazardous 
situations after repeated occurrences or in combination with other degradation factors (such 
as vibration-induced material fatigue). 
 
Table 4-7: Event Tree Nomenclature. To be Continued. 
Event Number Event Name Related Failure Modes Nomenclature 
1 External accident 
1.1 Tank rupture LOC TK-EXT  
1.2 Evap. rupture LOC EV-EXT  
2 Leakage events in cryogenic pump 
2.1.1.1 FV control system failure FTF CLU-FTF  
2.1.1.2 Instrument failure leads to no signal FTF IN-FTF 
2.1.1.3 
Instrument failure 
leads to abnormal 
reading 
AOL IN-AOL 
2.1.2 Hand valve fails closed FTF HV-FTF 
2.2 Vibration-induced failure VIB CNL-VIB 
3 Leakage events in evaporator 
3.1.1.1 FV control system failure FTF CLU-FTF 
3.1.1.2 Instrument failure leads to no signal FTF IN-FTF 
3.1.1.3 
Instrument failure 
leads to abnormal 
reading 
AOL IN-AOL 
3.1.2 Hand valve fails closed FTF HV-FTF 
3.1.3 Pumps fails to stop FTF CNL-FTF 





4.3.2.3. FTA Evaluation 
To quantify the developed fault tree based on OREDA and The Purple Book 
databases, it must be noted that both sources consider constant failure rates. Although this 
is a strong assumption, it can be expected that a component’s failure rate to remain constant 
over its useful life. Further, given that the failure rates 𝜆𝜆 reported are assumed to be constant 
over the components’ lifetime, the probability that a component fails within 𝑇𝑇 units of time 
can be expressed as: 
 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑇𝑇) = 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡; 𝜆𝜆) = 1− 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆  (2) 
The Trilith software was used to quantify the developed FTA and obtain an initial 
estimation of unreliability of the system. Trilith allows a simple and straightforward 
construction and quantification of fault trees, in which the probability of the events 
presented in Table 4-9 were used as input based on the mean values reported for failure 
Table 4-8: Event Tree Nomenclature. Continued. 
Event Number Event Name Related Failure Modes Nomenclature 
4 Leakage events in piping 
4.1.1 FV control system failure FTF CLU-FTF 
4.1.2 Hand valve fails closed FTF HV-FTF 
4.1.3 Pumps fails to stop FTF CNL-FTF 
4.2 Structural deficiency in piping STD PIP-STD 
5 Releases caused by random events  PIP-STD 
5.1.1 F&G failure to function  FTF FG-FTF 
5.1.2 F&G no signal NOO FG-NOO 
5.2.1 Air-operated valve leak ELU FV-LEAK 
5.2.2 Hand valve leak ELU HV-LEAK 
5.2.3 Piping connection leak ELP PIP-LEAK 
5.2.4 Evaporator connection leak ELP EV-LEAK 




rates. It should be noted that these are the instantaneous values for the probability of failure 
of each component, which in this case are represented by exponential distributions (i.e., 
constant failure rate). The calculated unreliability of the overall system and the relative 
contribution of each minimal cut-set is presented in Table 4-10. This estimation yields an 
instantaneous unreliability 𝑄𝑄(𝑡𝑡) = 1.12 × 10−5 𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟−1 which over the course of a year (𝑡𝑡 =
8760 ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟. ) amounts to a 0.1042 probability of failure of the overall system. This is 
equivalent to a failure occurring roughly each 5.6 weeks. The loss of structural integrity 
along the piping lines (PIP-STD) is identified as the most significant cut-set, accounting 
for 53.04% of the estimated unreliability. 
 
This is followed by leakage in the pump (CNL-VIB) and in the evaporator (EV-
STD) caused by vibration-induced vibration and loss of structural integrity, respectively. 
Table 4-9: Probability of Failure Events, Trilith Nomenclature. 
Component Failure Mode Probability (t, hours) Trilith Nomenclature 
CNL 
FTF 5.21E-06 CNL-FTF 
ELP 7.68E-06 CNL-LEAK 
VIB 3.07E-06 CNL-VIB 
EV 
LOC 6.28E-09 EV-EXT 
ELP 1.30E-06 EV-LEAK 
STD 2.20E-06 EV-STD 
F&G 
FTF 1.02E-06 FG-FTF 
NOO 6.30E-07 FG-NOO 
FV 
FTF 5.21E-06 CLU-FTF 
ELU 2.47E-05 FV-LEAK 
HV-2 
FTF 5.21E-06 HV-FTF 
ELU 4.03E-06 HV-LEAK 
ZI-ZZO 
AOL 6.50E-07 IN-AOL 
FTF 1.73E-06 IN-FTF 
Piping 
ELP 2.86E-06 PIP-LEAK 
STD 5.96E-06 PIP-STD 
Tank LOC 1.20E-09 TK-EXT 





It should be noted that these events represent 99.93% of probable failures within a year and 
the downtime of these events could potentially be reduced significantly by introducing 
adequate monitoring systems and maintenance policies. This effect can be seen by 
analyzing the ‘Random releases’ branch in Figure 4-11 where it was considered that 
leakage events could be detected by the Fire & Gas detectors. Thus, a failure could only 
occur if the leakages were undetected due to detector failures, such as failure function 
(FTF) or no signal outputted (NOO). The corresponding probability of failures related to 
the cut-sets in this branch are lower by several orders of magnitude (10−3 −
10−5 𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟−1) when compared to unmonitored components (see cut-sets #7-8, #10-12, #14-
18 in Table 4-10). 
 
Table 4-10: Ranking of Minimal Cut-sets by Estimated Unreliability. 
Ranking Minimal Cut Unreliability (t, hrs.) Unreliability (1 yr.) Relative % 
1 PIP-STD 5.96E-06 5.09E-02 53.04% 
2 CNL-VIB 3.07E-06 2.65E-02 27.32% 
3 EV-STD 2.20E-06 1.91E-02 19.58% 
4 EV-EXT 6.34E-09 5.50E-05 0.06% 
5 TK-EXT 1.02E-09 1.05E-05 0.01% 
6 HV-FTF, CLU-FTF 2.71E-11 1.99E-03 0.00% 
7 FG-FTF, FV-LEAK 2.52E-11 1.73E-03 0.00% 
8 FG-NOO, FV-LEAK 1.56E-11 1.07E-03 0.00% 
9 HV-FTF, IN-FTF 9.01E-12 6.71E-04 0.00% 
10 FG-FTF, CNL-LEAK 7.83E-12 5.79E-04 0.00% 
11 FG-NOO, CNL-LEAK 4.88E-12 3.58E-04 0.00% 
12 FG-FTF, HV-LEAK 4.11E-12 3.09E-04 0.00% 
13 HV-FTF, IN-AOL 3.39E-12 2.53E-04 0.00% 
14 FG-FTF, PIP-LEAK 2.92E-12 2.20E-04 0.00% 
15 FG-NOO, HV-LEAK 2.54E-12 1.91E-04 0.00% 
16 FG-NOO, PIP-LEAK 1.08E-12 1.36E-04 0.00% 
17 FG-FTF, EV-LEAK 1.33E-12 1.01E-04 0.00% 
18 FG-NOO, EV-LEAK 8.19E-13 6.23E-05 0.00% 




However, there are important limitations in this analysis. For instance, events 
referring to external accidents and resulting LOC events in the storage tank (TK-EXT) and 
the evaporator (EV-EXT) assume that the frequency of external accidents involving these 
components is 1 per year. Given specific station data, the relative importance of these 
failures could increase and warrant either the development of physics-based release models 
from ruptured components or increased required safety barriers surrounding these 
components. 
Additionally, the selected databases did not provide sufficient information for 
failure events related to the control and instrumentation systems which repeatedly appeared 
in the FTA construction. Overall failure rates might be underestimated, as the exposure to 
cryogenic temperatures is not accounted for and could reasonably lead to shorter equipment 
lifespans, particularly in connecting elements present in various components. This aspect 
is further discussed in the following section. 
4.4. Discussion and Identified QRA Data Requirements 
A first step toward characterizing LH2 system-related risk scenarios is the 
identification of relevant failure modes. One means for doing this is through a FMEA, a 
useful qualitative technique that can be used as a fundamental step in the development of 
QRAs for hydrogen fueling stations. The QRA analysis primarily refers to risks presented 
by the liquid hydrogen aspect of LH2 systems. In the previous chapter, an FMEA process 
was applied to a generic LH2 storage design to 1) identify liquid hydrogen-related failure 
modes and 2) qualitatively assess probability and severity classes. Based on this analysis, 
the failure scenarios which represent the highest risk of LH2 releases are: 
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a) Malfunction due to cryogenic temperatures of the pressure relief valve system in 
the liquid storage tank. 
b) Failure of the air-operated valve between the storage tank and the cryogenic pump. 
c) Rupture of the evaporator due to collision or external accident. 
These three high-risk failure modes can lead to unintended release of GH2 and LH2, 
depending on the pressure and temperature conditions of the release. To further extend the 
work, ESDs and FTAs of a the LH2 storage system were developed and frequency data 
requirements which will enable QRA on these systems were identified. For instance, 
leakage and failure rates in different components are fundamental to properly assess risk. 
While the ESD facilitates the discussion of the sequence of events which lead to specific 
hazardous scenarios, it also highlights the need to update the transition probabilities 
between liquid-gaseous events. On the other hand, the FTA enables an initial estimation of 
the system’s unreliability, as well as a structural analysis of its operation and failure. 
Although several limitations are present in the failure probability quantification process, it 
has allowed the identification of potential improvements in the design with the inclusion 
of monitoring systems dedicated to detecting vibration- and abnormal pressure- induced 
structural damage in the pump, evaporator, and piping lines. 
As stated previously, HyRAM is currently incorporating LH2 consequence models 
into the risk assessment framework based on ESDs. For this, both the frequency of leakage 
events and the consequence of the LH2 release must be considered. In Section 1.1, the data 
requirements to carry out QRAs for hydrogen systems were discussed. These include 
valuable contextual information regarding the system, which combined with adequate 
consequence models and representative accident frequency data, can aid the accurate 
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estimation of risks present in the system. An updated conceptual diagram of the needed 
data in LH2 systems is presented in Figure 4-16. 
 
Based on the high-risk scenarios identified in the previous section, the following 
aspects must be considered: 
• Physics models describing the effect of evaporation rates on ignition probabilities. 
Similar to the quantified probability transitioning between jet flame and explosion 
scenarios caused by GH2 releases, the probability of a leak to display either 
evaporation, pooling, or cryogenic plume release behavior in LH2 releases is 
relevant to these scenarios. Additionally, their respective ignition probabilities are 
fundamental for risk assessment procedures, and whether consequence analysis 
should distinguish different severity classes depending on the gaseous/liquid 
proportion of releases hydrogen. 
 
Figure 4-16: Types of data needed to perform QRA for a liquid hydrogen system. Adapted from Moradi 




• Component leak frequencies under cryogenic temperatures (particularly in 
components which have not been described previously in the GH2 context such as 
cryogenic pumps and evaporators). Component reliability analysis is still an 
underdeveloped task regarding hydrogen infrastructure despite the potential 
application towards failure event frequency quantification and maintenance 
scheduling. Traditional reliability data includes time-logs of failure events, ideally 
classified regarding the failure modes present in the system. Expansions of this 
framework include the statistical estimation of reliability models developed in data-
intensive industry for reliability-centered maintenance scheme designs. An 
alternative approach to transitioning from generic reliability data is based on 
Bayesian updating procedures as previously mentioned. 
As it has been discussed, advances in physics-based hydrogen release, dispersion, 
ignition and overpressure consequence and harm models have allowed improving QRA 
procedures to justify performance-based hydrogen fueling station design permitting. 
Frequency and probability data, on the other hand, has focused on leakage failures 
estimated from generic industrial data and the limited hydrogen-specific data. Yet, little 
attention has been brought to the occurrence of releases from non-leak failure mechanisms 
[93]. To properly address the new LH2-related scenarios, additional studies and data 
collection methods should refer to: 
a) Monitoring the effects of pressure and temperature cycling in liquid hydrogen 
storage tanks and related piping on failure probabilities. This is also a fundamental 




b) The likelihood and direct consequences of cryogenic liquid hydrogen releases. 
Depending on the location of the leak and operational conditions present during the 
release, this may result in hydrogen accumulation, evaporation, and the 
development of risk scenarios associated with gaseous hydrogen ignition. 
c) The indirect consequence of cryogenic liquid hydrogen releases on infrastructure 
and instrumentation reliability. Low temperature of the leaked fuel can lead to 
damage and malfunctioning of different components, affecting the frequency of 
failures. Particularly, this is relevant for adjacent valves, pressure relief devices or 
other components which are not strictly rated for cryogenic temperatures [94]. 
Based on the data considerations presented above, several opportunities to expand 
data collection activities in hydrogen fueling stations are available for future consideration. 
It should be noted that these aspects can also be addressed through other types of 




Chapter 5. Conceptual Development of PHM Framework for LH2 
Storage Systems 
The design and implementation of data-driven PHM frameworks in engineering 
systems require systematic collection and robust processing of data. This chapter presents 
key aspects concerning condition-monitoring data collection and an overview of selected 
applications in complex engineering systems to establish common procedures and 
implementation requirements. This, with the purpose of extending their use to hydrogen 
systems. This is followed by the conceptual development of a data-driven PHM framework 
for the studied LH2 storage system. The selection of monitoring variables is based on the 
results from Section 3.3.1 as well as from related applications of components similar to 
those found in this system. This chapter discusses possible condition-monitoring data 
sources and their application for early fault detection, which can be the first PHM-related 
task enabled by the current knowledge of the system’s operation. 
5.1. Methodology 
This section refers to the methodology followed to develop an early concept of a 
PHM framework for a LH2 storage system. First, as mentioned in Section 2.4, the first stage 
of a PHM framework is dedicated to data acquisition. For this purpose, key aspects 
regarding data collection for PHM frameworks are presented. 
Second, selected examples of PHM applications in complex engineering systems 
are used as a means to discuss the diverse set of tools available to use condition-monitoring 
data for LH2 systems. The presented case studies include systems whose operation is 
inherently linked to variable operational conditions and for which no comprehensive 
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physics-based models exist to characterize either their performance or degradation 
processes. 
Third, based on the relevant aspects identified through the review of data collection 
procedures and application in engineering systems, the basic foundations of a PHM 
framework designed for a LH2 storage system are described. This step is divided into the 
identification of the potential condition-monitoring sources in the LH2 system and the 
definition of the PHM framework design steps. 
Finally, the last section of this chapter is dedicated to the discussion regarding the 
potential integration of PHM and QRA frameworks for risk and reliability analysis of 
complex systems. 
5.2. Data Collection in PHM Applications 
In this section, key aspects of condition-monitoring data collection are discussed. 
This includes a brief review of industrial PHM standards and of commonly used benchmark 
datasets that have supported the recent surge of data-driven PHM applications in published 
literature. 
5.2.1. Data Types for Diagnostics and Prognostics 
The acquisition of both sensor and event data is an initial and one of the most 
essential steps of PHM frameworks [63]. Sensor data from condition-monitoring systems 
are the most common source of raw data used in PHM. Measurements collected via a 
variety of installed sensors whose performance is linked to the overall’s system health state 
are referred to as condition-monitoring data. Collected data types can vary depending on 
the desired PHM task. Frequently, however, it is the availability of data that limits the 
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possible applications to any system. Most complex systems have integrated sensors for 
control and maintenance purposes; it is possible that valuable information can be extracted 
from currently operating systems. 
Sensor data types can be summarized by three categories: value, waveform, and 
multidimensional [95]. Value data generally refers to measurement time-series. Examples 
of value data are temperature, pressure, and humidity. It should be noted that ambient 
conditions may also affect the system’s behavior (e.g., ambient temperature, humidity) in 
unforeseen ways. Waveform data include acoustic emission, vibration, and electrical 
signals (e.g., current, voltage). Waveform data are particularly popular as they are 
complemented with a vast knowledge of signal processing techniques. These 
measurements are also highly linked to CBM, especially for damage and anomaly 
detection. Finally, multidimensional data mainly refers to images, including those obtained 
through various data processing methods. A vital component of this sensor data is the 
corresponding timestamp. Ideal sampling frequency (i.e., the time period between 
measurement timestamps) depends on the failure mechanisms and the temporal response 
these produce on the monitored data. Collecting data during operation can allow the 
characterization of ‘normal’ and ‘anomalous’ behavior in the system. This is the basis for 
health-state diagnostics, which requires system-specific knowledge, e.g., system layout, 
sensor types, and nominal sensor values. An example is presented in Figure 5-1 [24]. 
Event data include information from maintenance actions taken in response to 
adverse events (e.g., failure, breakdown, installation, etc.) which occur in the system. Ideal 
maintenance records should indicate timestamps of the detected failure and what 
components were involved. Designing an adequate maintenance record facilitates the use 
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of other contextual data for diagnostics tasks, such as the specific failure mode experienced 
by the system. This can include interruptions to normal system operation due to internal or 
external reasons. Combining this event data with the operational conditions and anomalous 
behavior recorded by sensors prior to a failure can enable health-state prognostics and 




Figure 5-1: Examples of PHM applications: Health-state diagnosis in bearings. Lei et al. (2018). 
 
Figure 5-2: Examples of PHM applications: Health-state prognosis. Jouin et al. (2016). 
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Data collection campaigns for condition-monitoring data require adequate planning 
and design prior to their implementation. Multi-source monitoring systems yield large 
amounts of different types of data, increasing the difficulty of effectively analyzing and 
utilizing this information [97]. For this reason, system-specific analyses of the relative 
importance of each component and failure mode should be employed to identify and select 
the most relevant condition-monitoring variables in the system. 
5.2.2. PHM-Related Standards 
In 2014, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published a 
survey of existing PHM-related standards, with the purpose of guiding the expansion of 
their application to manufacturing systems [98]. Their work addressed the extent, 
similarities, and potential gaps of standards present in other industries related to PHM 
system development. This work summarizes several formal definitions and procedures 
required to plan, design, and implement PHM within real industrial multi-component 
systems. These approaches present a stark difference to most recent academic publications, 
that generally only address component-level aspects of PHM systems. 
In this report, PHM-based assessment of failure or degradation is defined as a 
process requiring performance metrics appropriate to the specific challenge addressed. A 
distinction should be made between performance metrics developed for detection tasks (to 
determine the system’s health state) and isolation (to identify a root cause for the fault or 
failure mode) to prognostics tasks (to determine the RUL). A guidance for measurement 
techniques and diagnostic models is presented in ISO 17359:2011 and ISO 13379-1:2012, 
respectively. Understanding the relationships between failure mode and measurable 
symptoms is fundamental for planning and designing PHM frameworks. The 
110 
 
aforementioned standards refer to the incorporation of failure logic analysis such as FMEA 
and FTA to identify ideal sensor locations for condition-monitoring data collection 
efficiency. Table 5-1 [98] presents some measurement and diagnostic techniques along 
with their state of development at the time of the study (2012). The techniques mentioned 
are categorized as either knowledge-based and data-driven methods and do not explicitly 
address physics-based methods. Of these, rule-based and statistical methods are the 
diagnostic models with a higher degree of development, while faults identified through 
process parameters and the system’s performance are more widespread applications. 
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This NIST report concludes that the standards referring to diagnostics and 
prognostics tools are limited; however, the existing standards are still valuable for industry 
[98]. The specific contents of the standards are subject to continuous review processes, yet 
the structure these standards provide for PHM system implementation are valuable 
guidelines for exploring applications in other areas. The existence of these standards may 
also provide security to stakeholders to whom these methods are presented as alternatives 
for CBM and are unsure or unaware of related academic research. It should be noted that 
this survey does not cover the state-of-the-art developments of the past six years, which 
has diversified both techniques and applications of PHM, particularly on the development 
of DL frameworks. 
5.2.3. Benchmark Datasets 
Applications of PHM and CBM frameworks have addressed a wide variety of 
engineering problems in electrical and mechanical systems. The state of the art of these 
applications differ and depend mainly on the available data for technical and engineering 
reasons. For instance, many electrical systems are equipped with ‘virtual sensors’ which 
provide easy and non-intrusive access to condition-monitoring data (e.g., voltage, current, 
etc.) without requiring the installation of additional sensors. In contrast, applications 
seeking to monitor crack growth need to rely on indirect measurements (e.g.: vibrations 
signals and acoustic emissions) as the damage cannot be accessed during the system’s 
operation (i.e., crack growth can be measured through intrusive techniques during 
inspection or maintenance activities). Machinery prognostics research flourished thanks to 
the availability of benchmark datasets originating from either simulations or simplified 
test-rigs to test data-driven architecture performance [24]. Some of these are: 
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• C-MAPSS turbofan dataset [99]. This dataset was originally released as the data 
challenge in the IEEE PHM 2008 conference [100] and is composed of multiple 
run-to-failure data of turbofan engines. The effects of faults and degradations in 
major rotating components of turbofan engines are simulated using a thermo-
dynamical simulation model. A total of twenty-seven outputs (including 
temperature, pressure, speed, bleed) are utilized to measure the system response 
and RUL under up to six different operational conditions and two failure modes 
represented in four sub-datasets. 
• FEMTO bearing degradation dataset. This RUL dataset was employed for the 
prognostic challenge of IEEE PHM conference in 2012 [101], [102]. The data is 
composed of seventeen run-to-failure data of rolling element bearings acquired 
from a PRONOSTIA platform. Accelerometers and thermocouples were used to 
monitor the bearings, but its low sampling frequency (10 Hz) does not allow in-
depth analysis. 
• Center for Intelligent Maintenance Systems (IMS), University of Cincinnati 
bearing degradation dataset [103], [104]. It is composed of accelerometer readings 
at a sampling frequency (1Hz) which does allow the extraction of frequency-
domain features to monitor the degradation processes of specific components. 
• Milling machine degradation. This dataset includes run-to-failure data acquired 
from tool wear experiments of a milling machine [105], [106]. Acoustic emission, 
vibration and current sensors recorded tool wear processes under different realistic 
industrial operational conditions. 
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To date, several other datasets have been published including tool wear, gearbox 
and lithium-ion battery degradation [68]. However, available data does not represent 
realistic situations in industry, where run-to-failure data is expensive and usually expressed 
through long-term degradation processes [24]. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this is expected 
to improve given the future widespread integration of IoT and Industry 4.0. 
5.3. PHM Applications in Engineering Systems 
As stated in [107], the main challenge in data-driven degradation analysis is to 
extract useful representative features from raw collected data. Analysis of rotating 
machinery data has been one of the focus of PHM applications in engineering systems. 
Given the availability of benchmark datasets and the relative simplicity of experimental 
setups, bearing failures have been intensively researched. Vibrations, acoustic signals, and 
temperature monitoring are frequently employed to determine the health state of these 
components and obtain an accurate prediction of the RUL based on current operational 
conditions [59]. 
In the following sections, brief examples of system-specific data processing and 
common procedures for energy-related systems are discussed. Aspects of the data-driven 
techniques described below present relevant insight to the design requirements of health-
monitoring applications in hydrogen systems. 
5.3.1. Variable Renewable Energy Systems 
The use of PHM under dynamic operational conditions is a constant challenge to 
the completeness of the data-driven model’s training stage. Such is the case of wind or 
solar energy systems, where data-driven health-state assessments must incorporate an 
understanding of external processes, such as the availability of solar and wind energy 
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sources, to correctly identify failures in the system. Given the limited availability of 
physics-based degradation models, data-driven tools play an important role in aiding the 
safer deployment of these technologies. Applications of PHM frameworks in renewable 
energy systems face unique challenges, particularly in cases in which the systems function 
under varying operational conditions. 
For instance, Stetco et al. [69] present an in-depth analysis of previously published 
works in which ML methods were applied for PHM frameworks to wind turbine systems. 
These frameworks have been proposed by several authors as alternatives to reducing 
maintenance costs, particularly in offshore installations. This meta-analysis classifies the 
models by data sources, feature selection and extraction, model selection, validation, and 
decision-making stage development. In this industry, these data-driven applications are 
mostly focused on fault diagnosis via classification approaches and typically employ 
techniques such as NN, SVM and Decision Trees (DT). Data-driven approaches are of 
interest to wind turbine industry per the successful studies in fault detection for rotary 
machinery data analysis. This industry also benefits from the availability of SCADA 
systems to collect data, which deliver time-series signals in regular intervals during 
operation. Frequently, these monitoring systems cover a variety of variables, such as 
bearing vibration and temperature, phase currents, and wind speed to assess the turbine’s 
operational state. The use of time-frequency processing techniques for signal analysis is 
common, but implementation is complicated by dynamic operational conditions. 
One example of a data-driven application in wind turbines operations is the use of 
regression models for anomaly or fault detection. Here, data collected under normal 
operational conditions is used for ‘healthy state’ modeling. Specific variables, such as 
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power generation, are replicated based on healthy sensor data and then compared with the 
observed outputs to identify anomalous behavior. This can be complemented with 
parametric models, such as power curves, to establish engineering-based criteria to detect 
anomalous behavior rather than relying only on statistical thresholds. For classification 
models, failure data is important to enable diagnostic capabilities. This underscores the 
importance of condition-monitoring applications from an engineering perspective: 
frequently failing components and their corresponding failure modes must be identified 
before designing the data collection process. In this context, ML and DL techniques have 
been introduced to analyze, replicate, and diagnose the health at both the component and 
system level. A variety of diagnostic and prognostic tasks for wind turbines have been 
addressed, including blade fault detection, generator brush failure prediction, transmission 
system fault diagnosis, and lubricant pressure monitoring. 
Similar PHM frameworks have been proposed and implemented for fault detection 
and diagnosis of solar photovoltaic array (PVA) systems [108]. In their review, Mellit et 
al. summarize the growing number of data-driven applications for fault detection, 
localization, and diagnosis in PVA systems. Of these, fault localization is the most 
challenging, as it strongly depends on the monitoring system design. This aspect is of 
fundamental importance in these systems, in which electrical and thermal faults can be 
developed over a wide range of spatial and temporal dimensions. For instance, visual and 
thermal methods are frequently employed to diagnose module-level faults, while electrical 
methods also allow fault detection at system level. The work developed in this industry has 
led to the creation of specific guidelines and standards for data-driven fault detection and 
diagnostic frameworks. Examples are the Standard IEC 61724: Photovoltaic system 
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performance monitoring – Guidelines for measurement, data exchange and analysis, 
which details the required accuracies and validation procedures for data quality [109]. 
Applications reviewed in [108] include SVM, k-NN and NN employed to classify 
known operational conditions and faults or identify anomalous behavior. As with the 
process described for wind turbines, regression-based fault detection methodologies 
consist of using parametric or empirical techniques to compare observed states with 
estimated data. One common approach in PVA systems relies on the prediction of 
generated power estimated from measured solar irradiance, module temperature, and 
historic energy generation at the array level. From a monitoring system design perspective, 
the sampling frequency of the measuring system significantly influences which failures are 
detected in PVAs. While a lot of research has focused on short-term forecasting and fault 
detection, current efforts are directed at extending these frameworks for longer-term 
degradation behavior analysis. 
5.3.2. Lithium-ion Batteries and Fuel Cells 
At the component level, beyond bearing analysis, considerable research has been 
focused on the application of data-driven PHM techniques to lithium-ion batteries and fuel 
cells. Both of these components’ performance is affected by the conditions under which 
they operate (e.g., environment, loads, etc.), which increases the challenges to execute 
precise prognostic tasks. Case studies differ significantly between these areas, given the 
complexity of the observed degradation process within these components and the effect 
over the system’s performance. 
Research related to the health monitoring of lithium-ion batteries has seen a surge 
in recent years, encouraged by the widespread demand of this technology as energy carriers 
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in the electronics, energy, and transport sectors [23]. The main challenge of modeling the 
performance of these systems is due to the complex electrochemical reactions that occur 
during operation, especially during transient operation. However, an advantage of PHM 
applications in battery systems is the prevalent availability of using non-invasive 
measurements to characterize their performance through variables such as voltage, current, 
capacity, inner resistance, and working temperatures. These measurements have 
traditionally been employed to assess the electronic system’s performance during normal 
operation and degraded conditions through various physics-based models [110]. Further, 
by implementing data-driven approaches, the modeling of the battery’s operation can be 
complemented with methods aimed at estimating two HI critical to the assessment of the 
RUL: State of Health (SOH) and State of Charge (SOC) [23]. 
Recently, research has focused on the development of data-driven and hybrid 
applications, including PF, NN, SVR and GPR. One example characterizing battery faults 
under real operational conditions through voltage measurements during a yearlong 
operation of a taxi EV was developed in [111]. These systems operate under an intense 
regime of varying operational conditions that can lead to the accelerated development of 
abnormal voltage faults. After a correlation analysis of available measurements, four 
variables are selected to predict future voltage values through a LSTM model: historical 
cell and battery pack voltage, the SOC, vehicle speed and a brake pedal stroke 
measurement. Model-based alarm and warning thresholds were introduced depending on 
the severity of possible consequences caused by voltage abnormality. Some of the 
important aspects discussed in this work are: the relevance of including different 
operational conditions and how selecting adequate prediction horizons has a direct impact 
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of the usefulness of the framework. In this case, the study considered environmental aspects 
which vary throughout the year, such as ambient temperature, a variable known to affect 
battery operation, as shown in Figure 5-3 [111]. 
 
Authors argue that practical aspects of data collection need to be considered when 
discussing the selected prediction horizons (i.e., how far in the future the predicted value 
is expected). In the case of battery systems, collecting data for very short-term predictions 
(e.g., 1-minute in the future) is impractical in terms of the amount of storage required to 
analyze extended periods of time. However, these short-term predictions are also 
fundamental to diagnose rapidly developing high-severity thermal failures (such as thermal 
runaway) and take the corresponding safety measures in time to avoid high-consequence 
accidents. 
Another example is the study of prognostics in Proton Exchange Membrane Fuel 
Cells (PEMFC), a relatively new technology with promising applications but which suffers 
 





from reduced lifespans and long-term underperformance [25]. While physics-based models 
have used voltage, temperature, impedance, and pressure-drop measurements for short-
term HIs, model-based long-term failure prognostics is limited by current knowledge of 
degradation and failure mechanisms [112]. Hence, several works have sought to 
characterize PEMFC operation through data-driven applications with the purpose of 
providing useful information about observed long-term degradation processes, aiding both 
operation and maintenance decisions to extend their useful life. 
Diagnostic approaches for fault detection and isolation, as well as RUL estimation 
in PEMFC have been addressed through model-based, data-driven, and hybrid approaches. 
In these complex systems, specific events (such as transients) relevant to the performance 
and corresponding lifespan are difficult to sample under real operation. Under limited 
available data, SVM and BNs have demonstrated better performance than more complex 
DL methods [113]. For example, the study presented in [25] proposes a hybrid prognostic 
method for PEMFC combining a SVM variant (least square support vector machine, 
LSSVM) and a PF variant method (regularized particle filter, RPF). Using voltage drop as 
an indicator of the PEMFC’s health, the SVM model was trained to replicate the PEMFC’s 
voltage until surpassing a known degradation threshold. Further, based on the predicted 
voltage values, the RPF provides a RUL probability distribution as a measure of 
uncertainty, as shown in Figure 5-4 [25]. 
This combined framework presents higher performance than regular PF and RPF, 
given that these relied on physics-based voltage models. Although this work only addresses 
the framework’s performance under steady state operational conditions, it is relevant to 





These examples of PHM applications in complex engineering systems for both 
diagnostic and prognostics tasks illustrate the wide range of opportunities for hydrogen 
systems to incorporate into maintenance-scheduling and risk assessment activities. In the 
next section, potential data sources are discussed in the context of LH2 storage system 
applications. 
5.4. Potential Condition-Monitoring Data Sources in LH2 Storage 
Systems 
Guidelines for design, maintenance, and installation procedures of hydrogen 
infrastructure are presented in the CGA documents discussed in Section 2.1.1.2. These 
guides include descriptions of sensors and testing based on temperature fluctuations, 
pressure measurements, vibrations, pump electric motor operation, multiphase flow 
identification, and acoustic signals. Additionally, insights from these codes, design and test 
procedures refer to normal operation thresholds aiding anomaly detection and diagnosis 
tasks. This implies that condition-monitoring data can be collected from hydrogen systems 
to explore the feasibility of applying data-driven models for the system’s health 
 
Figure 5-4: Estimated RUL probability distribution. Cheng, Zerhouni, and Lu (2018). 
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management. In this section, relevant sensor measurements and their possible use for early 
fault detection in the main components in the system are discussed. 
5.4.1. LH2 Storage Tank and Pipelines 
Storage tanks and pipelines are the main components of concern in the studied LH2 
system. Vacuum conditions between double-walled components are monitored for 
operational safety reasons. The same monitoring could enable detection of thermal 
insulation loss or leakage from the inner tank [29]. Similarly, failure criteria for composite 
tanks have been developed through physics models and simulations based on variables 
such as burst pressure and estimated fatigue lifetimes [114]. For instance, the effects on 
permeation rates in vehicle fuel high-pressure containers under pneumatic cycling was 
previously addressed in [94]. Thus, temperature and pressure anomalous variations could 
be employed as indicators for fault detection in these LH2 storage system components. 
Alternatively, identifying precursor operational or ambient conditions leading to leakages 
can enable prognostic capabilities. Relevant information could include fueling history and 
ambient temperature fluctuations and other variables related to seasonal effects. This can 
prove to have a greater effect when applied to elements present in the dispensing systems 
(hose, connections, etc.), which represent the majority of unscheduled maintenance events 
in hydrogen fueling stations [115]. 
Although storage tanks consist of no moving parts, vibration analysis is one viable 
method for leakage detection. Previously, online monitoring systems have been 
implemented for damage detection and localization in hydrogen vessels [116] through 
piezoelectric (PZT) sensor array and vibrations analysis. Yang et al. [116] presents a 
method for fully automatic detection and localization of defects in hydrogen storage vessels 
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based on an online monitoring system. This work utilizes guided wave-based techniques 
that have been successfully employed for localization and detection of micro-crack defects 
in different structures [117], [118]. Experiments were conducted on a cylindrical hydrogen 
storage vessel where an array of eighteen surface-mounted PZT transducers were used to 
identify faults. Induced faults were identified through ellipse localization algorithms based 
on guided wave paths generated and received by pairs of PZTs at different exciting 
frequencies and wave velocities. Fault localization was characterized in the vertical (mm) 
and the azimuth (rad) direction. The minimum combined fault detection errors reach 
2.65%. An example of the effect of excited frequencies is shown in Figure 5-5, where the 
PZT are shown as bright green points and the real damage location is circled in black. 
 
Similarly, acoustic wave analysis has been implemented for leak detection in gas 
pipelines and valves. In [119], a data-driven pipeline fault detection method was developed 
  
(a) 120 kHz (b) 250 kHz 




based on acoustic signals and the use of specific signal analysis for feature extraction. 
These are then integrated into SVM models to classify the severity of the leak. As 
pressurized gas escapes at high velocity through a leak site in a pipeline, the pressure 
difference between the outside medium and the gas induces vibrations that travel through 
the pipeline’s walls. From an experimental pipeline setup with induced leak sites, 
specialized wavelet transform procedures are employed to de-noise the received acoustic 
signals and extract time-frequency features for analysis. An SVM was implemented for a 
multiclass classification problem consisting of four severity classes: normal (no leak), 
small leak, middle leak, and large leak; based on the ratio between the leak size and cross-
section of the pipeline. 
In a similar work [120], a valve leakage detection framework was developed based 
on acoustic emission signal analysis, Principle Component Analysis (PCA) for model-free 
feature extraction, and a multiclass SVM model for leakage severity classification. Leaked 
flowrates and corresponding acoustic responses were measured from an experimental setup 
and divided into eight severity classes. Following time-frequency feature extraction, PCA 
was used for dimensionality reduction which were then used as input for the classification 
model. Different techniques were used, including DT, NN, k-NN and SVM, the latter 
obtaining over 95% detection and classification accuracy. The applications described in 
the pressurized vessels and piping sections have achieved high accuracy in experimental 




5.4.2. Centrifugal Pump for LH2 Cryogenic Applications 
Another component of interest in the studied LH2 system is the cryogenic pump. 
The operation of centrifugal pumps has known ‘nominal’ operational conditions and so the 
dynamic behavior of its monitored variables can be used to detect anomalies. Complex 
components such as cryogenic pumps may require the monitoring of several variables, 
depending on the specific failure mode to be detected, including differential pressure, flow 
rate, electric current, electric voltage, vibration, and acoustic emission monitoring. In this 
case, data-driven models are more convenient than physics-based ones due to the high 
number of components and their varying operational conditions. For instance, centrifugal 
pump degradation based on vibration measurements has been used to detect flow blockages 
and predict impending cavitation [121]. Vibration signatures are extracted using two tri-
axial accelerometers, one installed on the pump housing and the other on the bearing 
housing, at five stages of manual flow blockage and at the start of bubble formation 
preceding cavitation. In this work, SVM classification models are used to classify these 
operational conditions based on statistical features extracted from the time-domain 
vibration signals. Binary (“healthy” vs “blocked”) and multiclass (depending on the 
blockage stage) classifications are compared at different operating speeds of the centrifugal 
pump. The results show that the classification accuracy for both binary and multiclass 
experiments increase with the blockage level and pump speed, implying that this procedure 
is useful for progressive degradation monitoring. 
Vibration signals and acoustic emissions have also been preprocessed as images to 
take advantage of powerful image-processing techniques. In [122], the analysis is focused 
on detecting normal operation from incipient and developed cavitation regimes through 
vibration analysis. Following the time-domain analysis of the recorded vibration signals, 
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several statistical and CNN-based image feature extraction procedures are compared for 
different multiclass classification models to diagnose the pump’s operational state in terms 
of accuracy and implementation time. Considering the multiple combinations of processing 
and classification models presented in this paper, it is determined that k-NN, RF and SVM 
classification models obtain accuracies over 96%. Similarly, [123] analyzed bearing and 
impeller defects detected with acoustic emission data processed as 2D gray-scale acoustic 
images. 
5.4.3. Proposed Condition-Monitoring Data Sources in LH2 Storage System 
As discussed in the previous sections, there are many fundamentally important 
variables for PHM applications in LH2 storage systems. For classification tasks, 
measurements such as vibrations and acoustic signals suggest promising results for damage 
detection and localization. While for prognosis, possible use of sensor variables such as 
temperature and pressure fluctuations could have potential to be employed for prognosis 
tasks. A list of potential measurements and data sources for LH2 storage systems are 
presented in Table 5-2, and a visual representation of the proposed monitoring system 
layout overlaid with the studied LH2 storage unit is presented in Figure 5-6. 
 
Table 5-2: Opportunities for PHM applications in LH2 Storage Systems. 
Component Possible measurements Possible Outputs 
Cryogenic pump & 
 electric motor 
• Discharge temperatures & flow rates 
• Current consumption 
• Vibrations & acoustic emissions 
• Pump & motor 
degradation 
• Leak detection 
Storage tank & 
Pressure relief valve 
• Pressure in inner vessel/vacuum 
• Temperature vacuum/outer jacket 
• Relative humidity in vent stacks 
• Leak detection 
• Thermal insulation 
degradation 
General • Maintenance logs 
• Sensor placement & system layout 
• Component failure rates 




 A significant effort must be applied to develop data collection campaigns to 
explore data-driven reliability-focused applications in LH2 systems. The overview of data 
types presented above was developed by reviewing current PHM research related to other 
systems. Yet, similarly to the limitations of available traditional reliability data regarding 
hydrogen systems, data collection should be conducted specifically for liquid systems. 
Previous work related to anomaly and fault detection techniques suggest that reliability in 
some components, such as the storage tank, piping, and cryogenic pump, could be 
complemented with these techniques. While anomaly and fault detection are useful 
capabilities, prognostics applications and pragmatic considerations (e.g., reducing required 








5.5. PHM Framework Design Stages for LH2 Storage System 
Several works have reviewed the design methodologies behind the implementation 
of PHM frameworks, including project management aspects, selection of failure modes, 
and corresponding diagnostic and prognostic tools [124], [125]. For instance, a 
comprehensive review and a high-level, systematic methodology for PHM architecture 
design oriented to aircraft maintenance applications was recently presented in [61]. 
Currently, the NFPA 2 code establishes minimum requirements of periodic 
maintenance in hydrogen systems given the manufacturer’s recommendation and the 
necessary corrective action [4]. Given the analysis of the reliability data collected from 
surveys discussed in Section 4.2.1, small, low-consequence leaks have the greatest effect 
on the availability of hydrogen stations. Hence, the inclusion of proactive maintenance 
policies based on PHM frameworks for early failure and leak detection could help to 
significantly reduce the number of unscheduled maintenance hours, while also providing a 
means to study long-term component degradation behavior. 
Future implementation of data-driven techniques for PHM in LH2 systems should 
consist of the phases described in the following subsections. These phases were developed 
considering the methodological and conceptual aspects of design and the review of 
applications presented previously. 
5.5.1. System Failure Characterization 
A component-level breakdown of the studied system is needed to identify relevant 
components, failure modes and failure detection methods. This can be developed through 
the analysis of failure and maintenance records, and/or results obtained from FMEA or 
HAZOP tools for risk screening. ESDs and FTAs can be developed to study specific 
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failures in the system to aid in the process of selecting important condition-monitoring 
variables and other HI for the system. Further, this step can be used to design the 
monitoring and data acquisition system. It must be noted that constructing comprehensive 
maintenance records can potentially enable the use of traditional probabilistic-based 
reliability analysis. 
5.5.2. System Behavior Characterization 
Given a set of measurements related to the operation of the mentioned components, 
a first phase should be dedicated to analyzing the temporal behavior of these measurements 
and calculating their statistical parameters. Useful information related to nominal 
operational values can be retrieved from manufacturer specifications and coupled to 
historical measurements to determine statistical thresholds of normal operational 
conditions. Time-series visualization is an important tool to determine the necessary data 
processing steps by identifying trends or whether there are significant outliers within the 
data. Representation under different conditions (such as ambient temperature, fueling 
demand) is important to understand seasonal and periodic fluctuations. For example, Figure 
5-7 depicts two applications in which the system’s state of health is graphically represented 
in two or three dimensions [119], [120]. 
The state of health, known beforehand, is color-coded in these figures, showing 
‘regions’ of operation which can later be used for diagnosis of the system. If the state of 
health is unknown, other methods can be used to identify possible different regions of 
operations, such as clustering though k-NN. Figure 5-7a presents an example of 
dimensionality reduction, where multi-sensor condition-monitoring data has been reduced 
to an abstract representation through PCA. Meanwhile Figure 5-7b presents an abstract 
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representation based on identifying the most statistically significance features related to the 
monitored variable, in this case, vibrations for leak damage detection. 
 
5.5.3. Anomaly Detection 
Although an important element needed to enable maintenance scheduling is the use 
of failure records, these might not be as informative as required to label the monitored data 
correctly between ‘healthy’, ‘degraded’ and ‘faulty’ states. For this reason, the known 
behavior of the system should be replicated through a selected representative variable, e.g., 
the pump’s power consumption time-series, and then compare it with either known or data-
extracted performance thresholds. Achieving this can enable simple anomaly detection 
methods through the comparison between observed and estimated measurements. Here, the 
use of ML and DL tools have been successfully applied to identify potential differences 
between operational conditions, either in binary anomaly or fault detection tools, or in 
multiclass classification tools for damage detection, localization, and diagnosis. While the 
  
 
(a) Feature dimension reduction using RBF 
kernel PCA for eight levels of leak 
damage in a gas pipeline. Li et. al (2017). 
(b) Scatter plot of three most discriminative 
features for four levels of leak damage in a 
pipeline. Xiao, Hu, and Li (2019). 




first can be explored as an unsupervised task, the latter requires knowledge on the system’s 
failure states. An example of these are methods based on signal reconstruction and 
subsequent health-state classification through methods such as AE and SVR [126]. Figure 
5-8a presents an example of an anomaly detection application for aircraft through 
acceleration signal reconstruction and threshold infringement [66]. 
 
5.5.4. Diagnosis of Faulty Behavior 
To employ data-driven methods such as the ones described in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, 
labeled datasets need to be constructed from the acquired sensor data. The steps needed to 
acquire representative sensor measurements and process the data vary with each 
application and are still a topic of discussion in current literature [60], [68]. As a starting 
point, as mentioned in the previous step, system-specific knowledge can enable binary 
classification tasks for anomaly or fault detection. Further, as shown with the cited works 




(a) Example of anomaly detection in 
aircraft through SVR. Lee et al. (2020). 
(b) Characterization of I-V curves of PVA 
simulated under different faults. Chen et 
al. (2019) 




multiclass classification tasks for various failure modes. Another example of this is shown 
in Figure 5-8b [127], where different failure modes in a PVA system are characterized 
through the I-V curve, a frequently-used HI in these systems. When analyzing a multi-
component system, a first approach may include identifying the monitored data’s behavior 
during failures in specific components as separate failure modes. Complexity can be 
increased by comprehensively breaking down component failure modes and specific 
failure detection methods, enabling more complex tasks such as damage localization and 
quantification. The main advantage data-driven models possess over traditional, statistical, 
or rule-based alarm thresholds is that these methods have the flexibility to identify and 
classify the system’s behavior without explicitly relying on system knowledge. While a 
detailed record of system performance and failures enhances this stage, simplified 
knowledge of what is considered ‘healthy’ and ‘failure’ states is sufficient. However, as 
mentioned in Section 2.4.3, this can also lead to unexplainable models and are significantly 
limited by the data quality, particularly in industry settings where noisy and heterogenous 
data is more likely to be found than in experimental setups. 
5.5.5. Prognosis of Future Health States 
The prognosis of future health states of a system and the development of tools 
which correctly predict the RUL at component and system level has captured the attention 
of recent PHM-related research [24], [128]–[130]. The development of this stage depends 
on various aspects discussed for the previously described tasks. Methodologically, a 
difference must be drawn between the ‘real’ time-to-failure of a component, which might 
be dynamic based on the operational condition, and the RUL generated labels from 
recorded failures. An example of RUL prediction for a milling tool in a CNC machine is 
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presented in Figure 5-9 [128]. Here, the ‘Ground truth RUL’ labels are constructed as a 
linear function from the point at which the component failed and up to 4500 seconds prior 
to this moment. 
 
The implementation of a prognostic tool requires that the collected condition-
monitoring data provide evidence of degradation or abnormal behavior prior to or during a 
previously defined failed state. Hence, the predicted RUL based on this data does not 
necessarily accurately follow the linear labels until the point at which a clear degradation 
trend has been identified [128]. Considering this, RUL prediction depends on the system’s 
operation nature (periodical, continuous, on-demand, etc.), failure mode and degradation 
mechanisms, and ultimately the quality of the data processing and of the sensor data itself. 
The complexity of these issues and the need to introduce active uncertainty estimation and 
management techniques for RUL prediction are discussed in detail in [60]. 
5.5.6. Framework Integration to System Operation 
The final objective of integrating a PHM framework into any system’s operation 
may vary between applications and current state of knowledge of its operating and failure 
 




logic. Maintenance scheduling has been one of the most frequent implementations cited in 
the literature, either through early fault detection or actual calculation of the RUL of a 
component or system. A summary of tools available, expected outputs and levels of 
implementations can be found in Table 5-3. 
 
While the first design stages described in this section require offline development, 
several works have aimed to construct online fault detection, diagnostic, and prognostic 
tools, i.e., methods which can determine the state of health of a system during operation. 
However, it should be noted that online applications depend on a series of factors, including 
data acquisition frequency, system inertia, and degradation behavior. As discussed in the 
case of solar PVAs (Section 5.3.1), failures in these systems may cover a wide spectrum 
Table 5-3: Design of implementation stages for PHM frameworks. 




records/FMEA/HAZOP for risk 
screening; ESD/ETA/FTA for 
failure modeling.  
Identification of most 
relevant components 
and failure modes to 




Time-series analysis of 
monitored system variables, 
nominal operational thresholds, 
dimensionality reduction (PCA); 










Comparison of monitored data 
with statistical or rule-based 
thresholds; NN models (AE). 
Health indicators based 
on system operation. Offline or online 
Diagnosis  
Various model, physics, and 
statistical-based methods. 
Includes ML (SVM, RF, etc.) and 
DL (NN, CNN, etc.) methods. 





Offline or online 
Prognosis  
Physics-based models when 
available, data-driven model 
depending on data quality (SVR, 
NN, RNN, etc.), hybrid models 
(PF).  
Health-state evolution, 




of temporal and spatial scales. While detecting thermal or electrical anomalies might be 
possible within minutes, the detection and diagnosis of long-term degradation effects 
require other criteria. In contrast, offline applications can be opportunely scheduled during 
inspection tasks [61]. 
Given the current knowledge of the LH2 storage system failures, significant effort 
is required to implement future data-driven PHM applications. Figure 5-10 presents the 
sequential data requirements for the construction of a general data-driven framework, 
where the early-stage research opportunities are highlighted in the dashed box. The 
implementation of diagnostic and prognostic tools is presently limited under the current 
state of knowledge of LH2 system failure behavior and the uncertainty regarding the quality 
of the deployed data collection abilities of hydrogen stations. However, as mentioned in 
Section 5.4, studies aimed at fault detection in storage tanks, piping sections and centrifugal 
pumps serve to illustrate the short-term potential capabilities these tools could present for 
hydrogen systems. 
In both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the discussion centered on defining methods and 
data requirements to improve the state of system knowledge and failure characterization. 
A crucial aspect to enable any kind of prognostic tool, either data-driven or based on 
probability theory, is the inclusion of maintenance records in the analysis. These records 
facilitate reliable estimates of reliability metrics like time-to-failure or filling-cycles-to-
failure. Early implementations of this can be seen in Figure 4-6, in which the system-level 
failure rate of a hydrogen fueling station is estimated based on historic data. Ideally, failure 
and maintenance records should reflect a comprehensive equipment, component, and 
failure mode breakdown. The most important components contributing to overall system 
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failure need to be identified in terms of the risk they represent, considering both the 
frequency of failure and possible consequences. An analysis of maintenance records will 
indicate whether it is more valuable to monitor, for example, valve operation than a storage 
tank, as discussed in Section 4.2.1. 
 
Additional contextual information, beyond the time-to-failures extracted from 
maintenance records, periodic inspection and accelerated testing may be collected for use 
in probabilistic reliability theory. Accordingly, sensor data must be actively collected 
during operation for the implementation of both condition-based and prognostic tools for 
proactive maintenance scheduling. In this regard, the quality data acquisition, analysis, and 
preprocessing stages depicted in Figure 2-10 are arguably the foundation of PHM 
 




frameworks [131]. Several tools have been discussed as candidates to analyze sensor data 
retrieved from possible sources detailed in Section 5.4. Of these alternative sources for 
condition-monitoring data, given the relatively easier access to simultaneous monitoring 
points in different sections of a LH2 storage system, temperature and pressure fluctuation 
emerge as promising candidates for as anomaly and fault detection alarms. The 
implementation of these anomaly detectors could also be used to diagnose loss of insulation 
and leakage events throughout the piping network system. By monitoring strategic points 
as depicted in Figure 5-6, such as immediately upstream and downstream of the centrifugal 
pump, the evaporator, or any major valve, leakage failures in connecting elements could 
be detected through comparison to either nominal or statistically-defined fluctuation 
thresholds. The occurrence and recording of anomalous or faulty system states is 
fundamental to comprehensively implement these detectors while reducing the risk of false 
alarms. Alternatively, if maintenance records warrant particular attention to certain 
components, dedicated monitoring could prove to be a useful approach to limit the number 
of unscheduled maintenance events in these systems. One application of dedicated 
component monitoring could be fault diagnosis on centrifugal pumps through vibration 
analysis. 
5.6. Proposed PHM and QRA Integration Framework 
The previous sections summarized various PHM frameworks, reviewed selected 
case studies in complex engineering systems, and conceptually formulated possible 
applications in LH2 storage systems. A visual representation of the information flow in a 
PHM framework to support preventive maintenance decision-making is presented in 
Figure 5-11. The implementation of data-driven models for anomaly detection, fault 
137 
 
diagnosis, and fault prognosis faces several challenges, particularly regarding data quantity 
and quality. 
 
To balance the conversation, it is important to highlight the following positive 
aspects of data-driven models: 
• Data-driven PHM models are based on data collected during the system’s normal 
operation through non-invasive condition-monitoring sensors. 
• Several PHM standards have been developed to guide design and implementation 
in various engineering systems and are intended to close the gap between industrial 
system management and academic research. 
• PHM frameworks consist of several different approaches. This progressively 
enables tasks depending on the quality and quantity of the data collected, from 
anomaly detection to fault diagnosis and failure prognosis. 
 




• There is a growing history of successful applications in various engineering 
problems in electrical and mechanical systems. Although most research focuses on 
synthetic data or collected under experimental tests, these are promising results 
paving the road in the Industry 4.0 era. 
Previous chapters also discussed the use of QRA in the context of developing risk-
informed SCS for hydrogen systems. Selected results from published literature were 
discussed, highlighting their role in technology deployment. Important steps of this 
framework related to frequency analysis have been addressed for the generic LH2 storage 
system, including FMEA, ESD, and FTA development. In Figure 5-12, the information 
flow of a QRA process aimed towards standard and code improvement is depicted. 
 
As discussed in previous chapters, data limitations significantly impair the adequate 
characterization of risk and may lead to unrepresentative requirements in SCS, either by 
under- or overestimating risk. However, the strengths of QRA lie in: 
 




• The flexibility to merge a variety of data sources to adequately represent contextual 
information particular to the studied system. 
• The existence of well-documented technical standards to develop QRAs and a 
history of research related to hydrogen risk assessments to build from. 
• The flexibility to continuously address and manage risk in a system throughout 
various stages of technology development, deployment, operations, maintenance, 
and retirement. 
 
QRA and PHM frameworks currently operate at different temporal and spatial 
scales. QRA methodology is designed for system-level analysis, including contextual 
information. As QRAs must consider worst-case scenarios possible when developing and 
ranking risk scenarios, this has reduced the importance of how these faults are developed 
in the system and the precision on event frequency. While reliability data is being collected 
and can finally lead to probabilistic models of station availability, it is also possible to adapt 
this framework to assess risk in a dynamic way through the inclusion of online data-driven 
applications. Alternatively, by incorporating QRA aspects to PHM frameworks, a risk 
perspective could be incorporated into the design and decision-making stage, as portrayed 
in Figure 5-13. 
This concept has already been indirectly addressed through the design of CBM and 
PHM frameworks based on the study of failure modes, incorporating tools such as FMEA 
and FTA to guide the design of the sensor monitoring system. For instance, feature 
extraction and selection processes can be designed from an engineering point of view, i.e., 
considering the impact and development of specific failure modes and mechanisms in the 
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system. On the other hand, HIs extracted from analyzing the health state of a system based 
on sensor monitoring data could be included in a risk-screening process, allowing the 
development of dynamic risk assessment frameworks. 
 
Additionally, there are design and operation requirements that contribute to the 
station’s safety which must also be considered when quantifying the risk inherent to a 
station. Some key design features which are currently specified in hydrogen SCS are 
interlocked leak detection and isolation capability, emergency manual shut-off switches, 
process monitoring and safety interlocks, and fail-safe design requirements [6]. On the 
other hand, operational requirements can include safety procedures for normal operation, 
monitoring, maintenance, and emergencies in case of major accidents. Quantifying the 
effects and comparing the costs and benefits of safety measures are complex tasks for SCS. 
In the context of safety measures, condition-monitoring techniques can be a valuable tool 
for assessing the current and future health state of a system. Critical aspects of framework 
 
Figure 5-13: Combined QRA-PHM Framework. 
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design and integration, such as costs associated with adequate sensor network design, data 
acquisition, analysis, and storage must be addressed in a system-specific way to avoid 
overshadowing apparent benefits if these are not planned correctly. 
The development of tools based on sensor monitoring data represents an 
opportunity for hydrogen fueling station stakeholders to take credit for the inclusion of 
risk-informed barriers and mitigation measures for SCS compliance. Incorporating real-
time information collected from hydrogen systems can potentially deliver better estimates 
of the existing risks in the station and improve passive security measures. Strengthening 
these passive measures under the established risk acceptance criteria may also lead to the 




Chapter 6. Discussion and Conclusions 
This thesis analyzed a generic LH2 storage system in a hydrogen fueling station 
from a risk assessment perspective with the purpose of identifying data collection priorities 
to enable future QRA and PHM framework approaches. The main products of this thesis 
are the identification of data collection opportunities to fill the current gaps of QRAs in 
LH2 systems and to explore PHM applications for main components in the system, such as 
early failure detection. These aspects are summarized in the following section, including 
technical contributions and limitations, as well as recommendations for future work. 
A long-term goal of introducing PHM frameworks to hydrogen systems is to 
develop end-to-end risk assessment tools which use online monitoring components to 
enable condition-based decision-making. Ongoing challenges for hydrogen fueling stations 
include the use of risk-informed SCS to design and permit the operation of these systems. 
Quantifying the risks associated with LH2 systems is of critical importance to address 
safety questions, further enabling the development of standards such as NFPA 2 and ISO 
19880-1, and ultimately the widespread deployment of hydrogen infrastructure. Further, 
the use of data-driven reliability tools such as early failure detection and prediction may 
enable dynamic maintenance scheduling and increase the reliability and availability of 
hydrogen stations which currently suffer from frequent low-consequence leakage events 
and downtime. Station downtime is an increasingly significant barrier to deployment of 
hydrogen vehicles. Increasing the station reliability is fundamental requirement to enable 




The framework described in Chapter 5 creates possible opportunities to incorporate 
dynamic risk assessment into the operational phases of a system, rather than solely during 
the project’s design or implementation stages. This work constitutes an initial step in 
exploring towards these long-term goals, focusing on identifying LH2 release scenarios and 
system failure modes, identifying reliability data requirements which support the 
improvement of PHM and QRA frameworks, and providing a pathway for using PHM to 
improve system reliability and safety. 
6.1. Summary and Technical Contributions 
This thesis has been divided into three interrelated tasks addressing: a) the 
quantitative risk assessment of a bulk LH2 storage system consisting of FMEA, ESD and 
FTA to identify, develop and quantify high-risk scenarios and LH2 release events in the 
system; b) an analysis of currently available hydrogen-related QRA and reliability data 
including leak frequencies, accident scenario databases, safety reports from currently 
operating facilities, and generic industrial failure data from reputable sources used in risk 
and reliability assessments; and c) a review of data-driven PHM techniques and 
applications to identify main elements, condition-monitoring data sources and possible 
outcomes of PHM framework that can be applied to LH2 storage systems. The main 
contributions and insights are summarized as follows: 
1. A hydrogen fueling station design with a bulk LH2 storage system corresponding 
to the expected future state of the industry was characterized and analyzed through 
an FMEA process. A survey of hydrogen reliability data was conducted for this 
analysis, based on published literature and available public databases available. 
Several works refer to generic databases, citing expert knowledge or experimental 
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results to incorporate site-specific data. Consequence analysis is addressed 
qualitatively for the purpose of this work. This led to the identification of high-risk 
failure modes related to the release of LH2. The three most critical failure scenarios 
are: leakage events caused by the malfunction of the pressure relief valve system 
due to cryogenic temperatures, operation failure (fail closed) at prescribed time of 
the air-operated valve, and hydrogen release caused by a rupture of the evaporator 
due to either a collision or an external accident. 
2. ESD were developed to model the LH2 hazard scenarios. The proposed ESD 
updates a general ESD that was included in the HyRAM architecture, but which 
only included GH2 releases. The newly developed ESD incorporates liquid and 
gaseous leakage, dispersion, and ignition events. However, insufficient information 
on LH2 release and consequence behavior limits the quantification of these ESDs. 
To estimate the initiating event related to LH2 releases in the storage system, a fault 
tree was developed based on an analysis of generic component failure data and 
LOC event frequencies using data from OREDA and The Purple Book. 
3. Based on the previous FMEA, ESD, and FTA results, it was determined that the 
application of QRA methods for LH2 systems is limited by poor quality, 
unrepresentative hydrogen component reliability data and leak frequencies. 
Proposed data collection strategies should focus on a) monitoring the effects of 
pressure and temperature cycling on the failure frequencies of the main components 
to enable PHM, b) estimating LH2 leak frequencies of specific components of these 
systems, as recorded frequency data for GH2 infrastructure cannot be assumed to 
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be representative, and c) characterizing the indirect effect of cryogenic LH2 releases 
on infrastructure and instrumentation reliability. 
4. The core elements of a PHM framework for LH2 storage system were identified. 
From previous literature, several condition-monitoring variables were proposed to 
be used as HIs in the storage tank, piping, and centrifugal pump, including 
temperature, pressure, vibrations, and acoustic emissions. The design and 
implementation stages of PHM applications were discussed in terms of required 
data types, available tools, expected outputs and possible integration methods. 
6.2. Discussion and Limitations 
The work presented in this thesis addresses critical technical gaps and contributes 
to advancing the state-of-the-art risk assessments currently applied to LH2 systems. 
Systems can be engineered for safety and reliability purposes. To achieve the overreaching 
goals of risk reduction, as well as increased reliability and safety, engineers need insight 
into how to prevent, mitigate, and recover from system failures and accidents. Additionally, 
reliability-related research and implementation can reduce costs by proactively mitigating 
risk throughout the lifecycle, optimizing maintenance costs, preventing major accidents 
and bad public relations. Risk consists of three concepts: existence of scenarios leading to 
hazard exposure, frequency of occurrence, and the magnitude of the resulting 
consequences. A good characterization of risk facilitates the design of prevention and 
mitigation barriers to maintain tolerable exposure frequency, regulated by technical and 
societal risk acceptance criteria. While the results summarized in the previous section 
represent a step forward to better characterize the data requirements to strengthen QRAs 
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and enable future data-driven PHM applications in hydrogen systems, the following 
aspects should be noted. 
The work is based on a high-level design of a hydrogen station layout which 
includes liquid and gas storage systems. Modern hydrogen systems are relatively new, and 
the application of risk assessment techniques for this domain are also new. Few public 
details are available regarding specific designs and components, particularly regarding 
valves, connecting elements, instrumentation, and emergency system operation. Hence, the 
design used in this study allowed the interpretation of the system’s failures logic but does 
not allow for specific failure mode identification for an as-built system. The failure rate 
data extracted from the OREDA and The Purple Book databases have a limited 
representativeness of the system, in particular because hydrogen is not among the 
hazardous materials contained in those data sources, nor are fueling stations included in 
either data source. As discussed in Chapter 2, few published works have addressed the 
leakage event frequency in LH2 storage systems, or even the failure modes of unique 
hydrogen components. Most existing works that do address hydrogen fueling stations are 
focused on GH2 systems, which have gradually constructed databases of leak frequencies 
originating from other industries and updated through Bayesian procedures from a small 
number of experiments and recorded accidents for over a decade. 
As a result, the FMEA developed considers only the list of components extracted 
from the generic layout and failure modes have been inspired in the limited accident 
databases and from The Purple Book. It should be noted that this analysis has focused 
exclusively on risks related to LH2 and have not introduced or presented a comprehensive 
analysis of GH2 risks in this station design. Risks referring to GH2 systems have been 
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evaluated previously during the development of the HyRAM software and are not re-
evaluated in this work. However, some are included to understand the process required to 
analyze LH2 risks. Ideally, FMEA procedures are developed in a diverse group of experts 
over a lengthy process with continuous feedback loops. However, this has not been the 
case for this work and thus the completeness of the risk-screening process cannot be 
guaranteed. The high risks identified in the system might have also been overestimated in 
terms of frequency and consequences, yet this process serves as a comparison point to then 
define locations of interest in the system. The ESDs developed are inspired in the HyRAM 
software, but currently HyRAM lacks sufficient data to populate the newly added events 
in these diagrams. Moreover, the limited experience with liquid systems is a particularly 
important challenge for developing pooling and cryogenic plume scenarios, as it is unclear 
what operational conditions lead to these events instead of immediate evaporation from the 
leak site, which has been the usual assumption employed in these analyses. 
The unreliability of the LH2 storage system was estimated based on the fault tree 
design, which also serves as a representative initiating event of the developed ESDs. This 
FTA considers three different classes of failure mechanisms: first, external accidents 
leading to storage component ruptures; secondly, random leaks which have gone 
undetected by the emergency systems; and thirdly, failures caused by a combination of 
events and interactions between the components. To quantify these events, failure rate data 
representing random events was used, although the structure of the fault tree implies a 
dependency between these events (as opposed to completely random events). The biggest 
limitation of this is even though the OREDA database has been thoroughly analyzed by 
component types and failure modes, many assumptions have been made to correctly match 
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the failure modes on the components described in the book with the ones identified in the 
station through the FMEA. The FTA delivers an estimated unreliability of 0.1042 in a year 
which appears to be a conservative estimate compared those implied by the available 
maintenance and accident records. However, this only refers to the liquid storage system 
and does not include the dispensing units, which represent the majority of the unavailability 
events in these stations. 
Finally, the development of the PHM framework is set in the context of exploring 
new risk assessment applications in hydrogen systems. This, with the purpose of aiding the 
hydrogen community in incorporating these methodologies for future QRA and system 
safety applications. The main results of this analysis are a description of what a data-driven 
PHM framework should look like in a hydrogen system, including the stages needed to 
define and implement them. The main focus is on the data requirements but in this case, 
the analysis is conceptually constructed based on other published literature where PHM 
frameworks have been successfully implemented in other systems, including variable 
renewable energy systems, lithium-ion batteries, and fuel cells. From the previous 
experience of PHM applications in complex engineering systems, a list of possible 
measurements in different components of the LH2 storage system was developed, as well 
as the planification of what kind of outcome could be obtained from implementing these 
data-driven models. As mentioned, this design is on a conceptual level as there is currently 
no publicly available data that could be used to validate this framework. 
6.3. Recommendations and Future Work 
In this section, the identified possible actions, and recommendations for the future 
development of this work are discussed. Regarding the current state of hydrogen system 
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QRAs, it is important to adequately design new incident report databases and data 
collection methods for operation, maintenance, and failure of hydrogen systems. It is 
critical to design these databases in such a way that proves useful for QRA to improve the 
risk assessments of hydrogen systems and support the development of risk-informed codes 
and standards. 
This leads to another aspect of data challenges, which is the lack of data 
characterizing operational conditions in hydrogen stations leading towards the leak event. 
To date, the research in hydrogen safety assessments has focused more heavily on 
consequences than on frequency analysis, aiming to reduce the risk entirely through 
consequence reduction. An unintended effect of this has led to unsystematic reliability data 
collection, analysis, and integration to QRAs. While accident reports have been used to 
develop credible risk scenarios and consequence models, attention should also be brought 
towards proactively reducing incidents through predictive maintenance strategies. This is 
highly relevant to hydrogen fueling stations, as the most reported events causing station 
unavailability are frequent, low-consequence leaks. 
A logical step towards this includes exploring, and if necessary, updating the leak 
frequency probability distributions and transition event probabilities collected in the 
HyRAM software in the context of LH2 infrastructure. On the one hand, this action consists 
of introducing new components into HyRAM (e.g., pumps, evaporators), as the design of 
these LH2 stations is different than those of which the historic gas data has been based on. 
On the other hand, LH2 release conditions need to be verified through experimental setups 
and further quantified to be incorporated in the HyRAM ESD models. Detection, ignition, 
and dispersion behavior probabilities may need to be updated based on the initiating 
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conditions of a LH2 leak, including new scenarios such as pooling or cryogenic plume. For 
these reasons, the primary focus of the next stages of developed QRA research must 
focus on the scenario developments and system failure data aspects essential in a 
complete risk assessment. 
As mentioned in Section 2.1.1.1, physics-based models for simulating the behavior 
of multiphase hydrogen flow within pipelines and liquid release behavior are currently 
being researched. Further steps may consider monitoring the effects of pressure and 
temperature cycling in LH2 components’ failure probabilities as mentioned in Section 
3.4.3. 
Experimental research should also shift towards the study of the physics of failure 
in hydrogen components, incorporating phenomena such as hydrogen embrittlement and 
fatigue models to risk assessment procedures from a reliability perspective. It should be 
noted that physics of failure research would be particularly beneficial for components with 
limited lifespans, such as seals, hoses, and other connecting elements which are key drivers 
of safety, despite the fact that much of physics-based safety research in hydrogen has 
extensively focused on storage tank design (for both LH2 and GH2). Counterintuitively, 
this may result in significant improvement to the hydrogen fueling station reliability by 
reducing more frequent, lower-consequence leaks in connecting elements rather than less 
frequent, but high-consequence scenarios in the storage tanks. 
While ongoing research is being developed for physics-based models for LH2 
releases, recent advances in CBM and PHM in other engineering systems have yielded 
promising results which merit further exploration. Risk assessment could benefit from the 
integration of PHM metrics and techniques along with uncertainty and sensitivity analysis 
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of diagnosis and prognosis tasks. For instance, monitoring and predicting temperature 
changes and pressure cycling within storage vessels can allow individual risk estimations 
associated with hydrogen releases and subsequent combustion-related hazards. For this, it 
is critical to obtain access to a hydrogen station’s system information and, if available, 
monitored data. It is important to analyze site-specific information, such as fueling history 
and maintenance records, to tailor the design of a data-driven PHM framework. If 
monitoring data is not available, a risk-screening process and analysis of reliability data 
can help identify points of interest in the system for designing future applications. 
Relevant applications have been described in terms of the cryogenic pump, storage 
tanks, and piping health diagnosis applications in the previous chapter. However, it is 
probable that anomaly and fault detection applications could have a greater impact in 
improving the reliability and availability dispensing system, as this concentrates the 
majority of unscheduled maintenance events. Short-term goals for the implementation 
of data-driven PHM frameworks in hydrogen systems should explore the connection 
between PHM frameworks, reliability, and safety. Including the use of a grid-like 
temperature and pressure sensors in various locations, e.g., upstream and downstream 
measurement points surrounding main valves and both the cryogenic pump and the 
evaporator in the case of LH2 storage systems provides opportunities to use this data for 
additional purposes. As implied by the NFPA 2 and CGA codes as well as the available 
P&ID, these sensors are likely already be installed in critical points of the system. These 
could be employed for the monitoring of abnormal conditions or for leakage detection 
along the piping and connecting elements, thus enhancing system safety. More complex 
monitoring system interventions include the installation of accelerometers either critical 
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piping sections such as joints and in the vicinity of main valves, as well as in the centrifugal 
pump shaft and corresponding bearing housing to study and detect pump degradation. 
As highlighted through many applications in other complex engineering systems, 
data-driven PHM frameworks for fault detection, diagnosis, and prognosis are important 
tools for modernizing the traditional approach to maintenance policies. While there are 
many examples of applications in the data-driven reliability area, further work is required 
to determine how PHM frameworks should be integrated to modern risk assessment 
strategies. Alternatively, the worth of including risk-screening techniques in the design of 
a monitoring system for health management in complex systems appears to be in line with 
the PHM standards developed for industry. Incorporating real-time information from a 
hydrogen system’s operation can potentially improve hazard management and reduce some 





Appendix A. Hydrogen Fuel Properties 
Until 2016, renewable energy production accounted for 14% of the global energy 
mix, where electricity-based technologies have led the transition to cleaner and more 
sustainable alternatives [132]. Hydrogen has historically been considered as a valuable 
commodity gas and chemical feedstock, however, in recent years, it has also become a 
valuable alternative for decarbonizing both heating and transport sector, in particular for 
light and heavy-duty vehicle fuel purposes [133]. This is particularly important for 
sustainable development goals, as also is the maturity of the technology for producing 
green hydrogen through renewable energy sources and electrolysis processes as reported 
in 2018 by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) [134]. 
 
Gaseous hydrogen is non-toxic, environmentally safe, and by having a low 
radiation level, it also presents a reduced risk of secondary fires [1]. Hydrogen is usually 
safer than other fuels in the event of leaks [75]. Yet, specific regulations and standards for 
storage and usage must be implemented, along with detection systems to avoid any 
accident or components failure due to hydrogen attack or hydrogen embrittlement [75], 
[135]. The Compressed Gas Association (CGA) H-5 Standard for Bulk Hydrogen Supply 
Systems [31] describes the main safety hazards to consider when handling and storing 
hydrogen: 
• Hydrogen gas is odorless, asphyxiant gas which can displace oxygen. However, it 
is lighter than air and can accumulate in high spots. Detonations in open areas are 
highly unlikely due to its high volatility and release speed (20 m/s) [136]. 
• Hydrogen gas has a wide flammability range (4%-75% in air), and low ignition 
level (0.02 mJ), so it is comparatively easier to ignite than other liquids and gases, 
for instance, than gasoline (0.24 mJ) or methane (0.29 mJ). It also possesses a high 
laminar burning velocity (2.37 m/s). On the other hand, self-ignition temperature 
of hydrogen (585 °C) is significantly higher than for gasoline (228–501 °C) and 
natural gas (540 °C) [135]. 
• Hydrogen gas burns with almost invisible flame in daylight. It has a wide 
detonation range (18.3%-59% in air), yet these limits are higher than those for 
gasoline (1.1–3.3%) and natural gas (5.7–14%). 
 
Currently, compressed GH2 at ambient temperature and high pressures is the most 
common and mature technology adopted in various hydrogen systems [137]. On the other 
hand, liquid storage presents the advantage of having a higher density reaching up to 0.07 
kg/L compared to 0.03 kg/L achieved by compressed GH2 [138]. However, the liquefaction 
process consumes approximately 40% of its energy content while compressing hydrogen 
gas has lower losses estimated at 10% [7]. Additionally, liquid storage requires 
temperatures to be below the hydrogen boiling point of -253°C at atmospheric pressure. 
The use of liquid hydrogen must also consider all of the mentioned safety aspects, as well 
as those related exclusively to unsafe releases of cryogenic liquid hydrogen: frostbite, 
cryogenic burns, hypothermia, ice formation on vents and valves, air condensation, and 
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oxygen enrichment, moisture within storage due to inadequate purging, damage to boil-off 
and release valves [40]. Liquid hydrogen will vaporize when allowed in contact warm 
surfaces and although vaporized hydrogen is lighter than air and will disperse rapidly, 
containment increases hazard because it slows down the rate of vaporization. 
 
To maintain cryogenic and pressure conditions, double-walled storage tanks are 
required, consisting of an inner pressure vessel and an external protective jacket. The inner 
tank is frequently constructed from cold-stretched stainless steel and can be both thermally 
isolated and maintained in vacuum conditions [77]. Generic design methods are described 
in the ISO 21009-1:2008 Cryogenic vessels — Static vacuum-insulated vessels — Part 1: 
Design, fabrication, inspection and tests and ISO 21009-2:2015 Cryogenic vessels — 
Static vacuum insulated vessels — Part 2: Operational requirements standards [139], 
[140]. Certain materials are susceptible to hydrogen embrittlement, particularly high-
strength steels, and carbon steel at low temperatures. Hydrogen embrittlement is usually 
observed at ambient temperatures and its effects below -150℃ can be neglected in unstable 
austenitic stainless steels often used for cryogenic vessels. At low temperatures, although 
it is a non-corrosive liquid, other effects damaging to material integrity must be considered. 
For instance, changes in mechanical characteristics, expansion, and contractions 
phenomena, as well as increased brittleness addressed with proper thermal insulation [78]. 
Additional to the embrittlement of sealing materials, due to the low temperatures, material 
selection must also account for ductile to brittle transition temperature (DBTT), plastic 
deformation at low temperatures, and thermal and pressure cycling. 
 
In hydrogen fueling stations, GH2 is dispensed into vehicles at 35 MPa or 70 MPa 
and the most frequently-used storage system is compressed hydrogen gas storage. 
However, GH2’s low density, in terms of volume use and energy capacity, implies 
additional safety challenges for bulk storage and transportation. Alternative physical and 
chemical methods exist for hydrogen storage, such as liquefaction and the use of hydrides 
as described in [7]. Liquid hydrogen storage design, material selection, and cost are directly 
related to the effect of cryogenic temperatures over the storage system’s different 
components. At the present, even if LH2 storage systems are more energetically efficient, 
challenges remain regarding the energy cost in the hydrogen liquefaction process, the high 
material costs, evaporation losses, and security [141]. Currently, ongoing research is 
focused on the nature of liquid hydrogen and whether unsafe releases can lead to risks such 
as ignition, explosions, and cryogenic-temperature related damage. 
 
Renewable on-site hydrogen production in zero-emission stations accounted for 
13% of them, mostly found in the USA and Europe. In 2015 the costs of producing 
hydrogen varied from $1.8 to 2.9/H2 kg for Coal gasification, 2.3–5.8/H2 kg for steam 
methane reforming (SMR), $6–7.4/H2 kg for wind power, and $6.3–25.4/H2 kg for solar 





Appendix B. Additional Risk Scenarios and Mitigations in HAZOP study 
 
A-Table 1: P-28 HAZOP Consequences in other system nodes. 
# Deviation Caused by Consequences 
1.1 High pressure Operator error – trapped 
liquid by improper valve 
sequencing 
Hose or line rupture resulting in hydrogen 
release with possible fire/explosion, 
equipment damage, and personal injury. 
1.6 High flow Line rupture, valve, or 
component failure 
Hydrogen release with possible 
fire/explosion, equipment damage, and 
personal injury. 
1.16 Loss of 
containment  
External impacts Hydrogen release, and possible 
fire/explosion, equipment damage, and 
personal injury. 
Natural disasters 
External fire PRD functions. Hydrogen release, and 
possible fire/explosion, equipment damage, 




Hydrogen release, and possible 
fire/explosion, equipment damage, and 
personal injury. 





External fire Demand on thermal relief system with 
hydrogen release, possible fire/explosion, 
equipment damage, and personal injury. 
3.14 Loss of 
containment 
External impacts Hydrogen release, and possible 
fire/explosion, equipment damage, and 
personal injury. 
Natural disasters 
External fire Thermal relief functions. Hydrogen release, 
and possible fire/explosion, equipment 
damage, and personal injury. 
4.6 High flow Line rupture Hydrogen release, possible fire/explosion, 
equipment damage, and personal injury. 
Customer demand 
exceeds design rate 
Overdraw the system with cold gas or liquid 
to carbon steel piping with possible line 
failure, hydrogen release, possible 
fire/explosion, equipment damage, and 
personal injury. 
4.12 Change of state 
(vapor to liquid) 
Overdraw the vaporizer Cold gas or liquid to carbon steel piping 
with possible line failure, hydrogen release, 
possible fire/explosion, equipment damage, 
and personal injury. 
4.15 Loss of 
containment 
External impacts Hydrogen release, and possible 
fire/explosion, equipment damage, and 
personal injury. 
Natural disasters 
External fire PRD functions. Hydrogen release, and 
possible fire/explosion, equipment damage, 





Component failures, reactions, corrosion, 
cryogenic brittle fractures with hydrogen 
release, and possible fire/explosion, 
equipment damage, and personal injury 
  Operator error- 






A-Table 2: P-28 Other safeguards for large range consequence scenarios.  
# Deviation Safeguards 
1.1 High pressure Trailer relief valve. 
Operating procedures. 
Trailer’s bursting disks. Vent system. 
Trailer’s emergency shutdown. 
Properly labeled lines and valves. 
1.6 High flow Pneumatic trailer air switch. 
Operator training. 
Mechanical integrity program. 
1.16 Loss of containment  Proper tank sitting in accordance with NFPA 55. 
Proper foundation. 
Properly designed PRD vent system. 
Mechanical integrity program. 
Proper material selection (material compatibility). 
Anti-towaway system (vehicle brake interlock). 
Wheel chocks. 
3.4 High temperature Proper tank sitting in accordance with NFPA 55. 
Fire-rated isolation valves. 
Mechanical integrity program. 
3.14 Loss of containment Proper tank sitting in accordance with NFPA 55. 
Foundation design. 
4.6 High flow Adequate vaporizer and system design for maximum use demand 
Low temperature protection system. 
Mechanical integrity program. 
4.12 Change of state 
(vapor to liquid) 
Adequate vaporizer and system design for maximum use demand. 
Low temperature protection system. 
4.15 Loss of containment Proper tank sitting in accordance with NFPA 55. 
Area fenced-in location. 
Remotely operable emergency shutoff valve. 
7.2 Material 
incompatibility 
Mechanical integrity program  
System design- austenitic stainless steel or aluminum 




Appendix C. Hydrogen Fueling Station P&IDs 
 
The documents presented in this Appendix section correspond to those presented by the 
Hydrogen Fueling Infrastructure Research and Station Technology (H2FIRST) project 
initiated by the DOE in 2015 and executed by Sandia National Laboratories and the 













































A-Figure 5: Reference Station P&ID – Dispenser. 
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C.6.  Subsystem components by P&ID Nomenclature 
A list of the components within each subsystem presented in the previous sections 
are shown below. 
C.6.1.  Liquid Storage Subsystem 
Using the nomenclature of A-Figure 1 the storage subsystem components are listed 
as follows: 
• Liquid Storage Tank; 800 kg capacity, double wall. 
o Two-way pressure relief valve (PSV-100); pressure switch valve (PSV-
101). 
o Temperature transmitter (TT-100). 
o Pressure indicator (PI-100); pressure transmitter (PT-100). 
o Hand valve (HV-101). 
• Air-actuated valve, spring return closed; flow valve (FV-1020). 
o Position indicator (ZI-100). 
o Position switch; open (ZSO-100). 
o Position switch; closed (ZSC-100). 
o Position actuator air (ZZO-100). 
• Cryogenic Pump (CNL-100). 
• Ambient air evaporator (GH-100). 
• Hand valve (HV-100). 
• IR flame detector aimed at hydrogen storage; radiation alarm high (RAH-100). 
C.6.2.  Compression and Cooling Subsystem 
Using the nomenclature of A-Figure 2, the compression and cooling subsystem 
components are listed as follows: 
• Pressure indicator (PI-101, PI-202, PI-300); pressure transmitter (PT-101, PT-202, 
PT-300). 
o Ball valve; hand valve (HV-101, HV-202, HV-300). 
• Check valve; flow stich valve (FSV-100, FSV-300). 
• Air-actuated valve, spring return closed; flow valve (FV-100, FV-101, FV-400). 
o Position indicator (ZI-100, ZI-101, ZI-400). 
o Position switch; open (ZSO-100, ZSO-101, ZSO-400). 
o Position switch; closed (ZSC-100, ZSC-101, ZSC-400). 
o Position actuator air (ZZO-100, ZZO-101, ZZO-400). 
• Ball valve; hand valve (HV-201, HV-301. HV-400). 
• Multiple Stage Compressor (CNH-300). 
o Ball valve; hand valve (HV-203, HV-204). 
o Air blown cooler (GW-800, GW-801). 
o Water filter (OF-802). 
o Centrifugal water pump (CW-800). 
• Flow filter (FF-300). 
• Check valve; position valve open (ZVO-046). 
• PLC/Gas control cabinet. 
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o Position valve open (ZVO-100, ZVO-101, ZVO-400, ZVO-401, ZVO-402, 
ZVO-403). 
• Air compressor COH-100 
o Air dyer; air filter (AF-100, AF-101). 
o PBAL-100. 
• IR flame detector aimed at hydrogen compressor; radiation alarm high (RAH-100). 
• Chillers (GN-900, GN-901, GN-902, GN-903). 
C.6.3.  Gas Cascade Storage Subsystem 
Using the nomenclature of A-Figure 3 and A-Figure 4, the components of the gas 
cascade storage are listed as follows: 
• Ball valve; switch valve (SV-1, SV-2, SV-3, SV-4). 
• Cascade Unit, H2 storage Unit MAWP-13780 PSIG. 
o Air-actuated valve, spring return closed; flow valve (FV-4X1, FV-4X2, FV-
4X3, FV-4X4, FV-4X5). 
 Position indicator (ZI-4X1, ZI-4X2, ZI-4X3, ZI-4X4, ZI-4X5). 
 Position switch; open (ZSO-4X1, ZSO-4X2, ZSO-4X3, ZSO-4X4, 
ZSO-4X5). 
 Position switch; closed (ZSC-4X1, ZSC-4X2, ZSC-4X3, ZSC-4X4, 
ZSC-4X5). 
 Position actuator air (ZZO-4X1, ZZO-4X2, ZZO-4X3, ZZO-4X4, 
ZZO-4X5). 
o PBNH-4X1, PBNH-4X2, PBNH-4X3, PBNH-4X4. 
• Pressure indicator (PI-4X1, PI-4X2, PI-4X3, PI-4X4, PI-4X5); pressure transmitter 
(PT-4X1, PT-4X2, PT-4X3, PT-4X4, PT-4X5). 
• Ball valve; hand valve (HV-4X01, HV-4X02, HV-4X11, HV-4X12, HV-4X21, 
HV-4X22, HV-4X31, HV-4X32, HV-4X41, HV-4X42). 
• PLC/Gas control cabinet. 
o Position valve open (ZVO-4X1, ZVO-4X2, ZVO-4X3, ZVO-4X4, ZVO-
4X5). 
• Unnamed two-way pressure relief valves, five units. 
C.6.4.  Fuel Dispenser Subsystem 
Using the nomenclature of A-Figure 5, the components of the dispenser subsystem 
are listed as follows: 
• Heat exchanger, four unnamed units. 
• Dispensers (DN-900, DN-901, DN-902, DN-903). 
o 700 bar nozzles. 
o Hand valve (HV-900, HV-901, HV-902, HV-903). 




Appendix D. Frequency Data Sources 
D.1.  HyRAM Frequency Data 
The event sequence diagram presented in Figure 2-4 refers to the possible scenarios 
caused by a hydrogen release from a component in a hydrogen fueling station [45]. The 
frequencies of occurrence for each of these events are: 
 𝑓𝑓𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻2 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 × 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼) (3) 
 𝑓𝑓𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻2 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ×𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼�����������) × (1 −𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒)
−𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒) (4) 
 𝑓𝑓𝐽𝐽𝐼𝐼𝜆𝜆 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐼𝐼 = 𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻2 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 × 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼�����������) ×𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒) (5) 
 𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛 = 𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻2 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 × 𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼�����������) × 𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒) (6) 
   
Here, 𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻2 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is the annual frequency of a hydrogen releases per component, 
𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼) is the probability of release (leak) detection and isolation before ignition, 
𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒) is the probability of immediate ignition, and 𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒) is the 
probability of delayed ignition. These default probability values are: 
 
1. Release Detection and Isolation Probability 
The default value for successful detection and isolation of a release is: 
𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒) = 0.9. This value incorporates many considerations on how likely the 
hydrogen is to detect, including ventilation, sensor placement, leak location, and the ability 
of the sensor and isolation valve to operate successfully on-demand. 
 
2. Ignition Probabilities 
The default hydrogen ignition probabilities are a function of the hydrogen release 
rate and are obtained from [142] as seen in A-Table 3. It should be noted that both the 
immediate and delayed ignition probabilities are independent and both relative to a 
hydrogen release; the delayed ignition probability is not conditional upon the immediate 
ignition having not occurred. The total probability of ignition of hydrogen is the immediate 
and delayed ignition probabilities added together. 
 
3. Component Leak Frequencies 
HyRAM calculates the annual frequency of a hydrogen release for release sizes of 
0.01%, 0.1%, 1%, 10%, or 100% with respect to the component pipelines. This annual 
frequency of random leaks is assumed to be distributed as a lognormal distribution (𝜇𝜇, 𝜎𝜎). 
Given its characteristics, the median value is used in the release calculations. The default 
A-Table 3: HyRAM Probability Data. 
Hydrogen release rate (kg/s) P (Immediate Ignition) P (Delayed Ignition) 
<0.125 0.008 0.004 
0.125-6.25 0.053 0.027 






values are generic hydrogen-system annual leak frequencies are found in A-Table 4 and A-
Table 5. A particular FTA model has been developed for dispenser releases. 
 
The median of the leak rate 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) are found as: 
 𝑀𝑀[𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡)] =  𝑒𝑒𝜇𝜇  (7) 
To incorporate the leakage frequencies into the calculation of the release 
frequencies, HyRAM uses the following equation, for which an example for 0.01% leaks 
is showed in A-Figure 6: 
 𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼 𝑘𝑘 = �𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1




A-Figure 6: Example of HyRAM Fault Tree for Random Leaks.  
 
A-Table 4: Random leak frequency parameters per components. To be continued. 
Component Release size % 𝝁𝝁 𝝈𝝈 Mean 5
th 𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 95th 
Compressors 0.01 -1.73 0.22 1.8E-01 1.2E-01 1.8E-01 2.6E-01 
0.1 -3.95 0.50 2.2E-02 8.5E-03 1.9E-02 4.4E-02 
1 -5.16 0.80 7.9E-03 1.5E-03 5.8E-03 2.2E-02 
10 -8.84 0.84 2.1E-04 3.6E-05 1.4E-04 5.7E-04 
100 -11.34 1.37 3.0E-05 1.3E-06 1.2E-05 1.1E-04 
Cylinders 0.01 -13.92 0.67 1.1E-06 3.0E-07 9.0E-07 2.7E-06 
0.1 -14.06 0.65 9.6E-07 2.7E-07 7.8E-07 2.3E-06 
1 -14.44 0.65 6.6E-07 1.8E-07 5.4E-07 1.6E-06 
10 -14.99 0.65 3.8E-07 1.1E-07 3.1E-07 9.0E-07 
100 -15.62 0.68 2.1E-07 5.3E-08 1.6E-07 5.0E-07 
Filters 0.01 -5.25 1.99 3.8E-02 2.0E-03 5.3E-03 1.4E-01 
0.1 -5.29 1.52 1.6E-02 4.2E-04 5.0E-03 6.1E-02 
1 -5.34 1.48 1.4E-02 4.2E-04 4.8E-03 5.5E-02 
10 -5.38 0.89 6.9E-03 1.1E-03 4.6E-03 2.0E-02 





D.2.  OREDA 
OREDA holds a collection of failure data, failure modes and mechanisms recorded 
for specific components in engineering systems. Given the wide variety of industrial 
components and failure rates described, this is considered one of the most important 
A-Table 5: Random leak frequency parameters per components. Continued. 
Component Release size % 𝝁𝝁 𝝈𝝈 Mean 5
th 𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 95th 
Flanges 0.01 -3.92 1.66 7.9E-02 1.3E-03 2.0E-02 3.0E-01 
0.1 -6.12 1.25 4.8E-03 2.8E-04 2.2E-03 1.7E-02 
1 -8.33 2.20 2.7E-03 6.4E-06 2.4E-04 9.0E-03 
10 -10.54 0.83 3.7E-05 6.7E-06 2.6E-05 1.0E-04 
100 -12.75 1.83 1.5E-05 1.4E-07 2.9E-06 4.9E-05 
Hoses 0.01 -6.83 0.28 1.1E-03 6.8E-04 1.1E-03 1.7E-03 
0.1 -8.73 0.61 1.9E-04 5.9E-05 1.6E-04 4.4E-04 
1 -8.85 0.59 1.7E-04 5.4E-05 1.4E-04 3.8E-04 
10 -8.96 0.59 1.5E-04 4.9E-05 1.3E-04 3.4E-04 
100 -9.91 0.88 7.3E-05 1.2E-05 5.0E-05 2.1E-04 
Joints 0.01 -9.58 0.17 7.0E-05 5.2E-05 6.9E-05 9.1E-05 
0.1 -12.92 0.81 3.4E-06 6.4E-07 2.4E-06 9.3E-06 
1 -11.93 0.51 7.5E-06 2.8E-06 6.6E-06 1.5E-05 
10 -12.09 0.58 6.7E-06 2.2E-06 5.6E-06 1.5E-05 
100 -12.22 0.61 6.0E-06 1.8E-06 4.9E-06 1.3E-05 
Pipes 0.01 -11.91 0.69 8.5E-06 2.1E-06 6.7E-06 2.1E-05 
0.1 -12.57 0.71 4.5E-06 1.1E-06 3.5E-06 1.1E-05 
1 -13.88 1.14 1.8E-06 1.4E-07 9.3E-07 6.1E-06 
10 -14.59 1.16 9.1E-07 6.8E-08 4.6E-07 3.1E-06 
100 -15.73 1.72 6.4E-07 8.8E-09 1.5E-07 2.5E-06 
Valves 0.01 -5.19 0.18 5.7E-03 4.2E-03 5.6E-03 7.5E-03 
0.1 -7.31 0.42 7.3E-04 3.4E-04 6.7E-04 1.3E-03 
1 -9.71 0.98 9.8E-05 1.2E-05 6.0E-05 3.0E-04 
10 -10.34 0.69 4.1E-05 1.0E-05 3.2E-05 1.0E-04 
100 -12.00 1.33 1.5E-05 6.9E-07 6.1E-06 5.5E-05 
Instruments 0.01 -7.38 0.71 8.0E-04 1/9E-04 6.2E-04 2.0E-03 
0.1 -8.54 0.82 2.7E-04 5.1E-05 2.0E-04 7.5E-04 
1 -9.10 0.92 1.7E-04 2.4E-05 1.1E-04 5.1E-04 
10 -9.21 1.09 1.8E-04 1.7E-05 1.0E-04 6.0E-04 




industrial reliability data sources available. To analyze this database, the following 
definitions needs to be considered [87]: 
1. Failure is defined as the termination of the ability of an item to perform its required 
functions. This can also refer to the degradation of said function below acceptable 
limits. A failure event can include: 
• A partial or complete breakdown of the item which causes unavailability and 
requires corrective maintenance action. 
• Damage or degradation discovered during periodical inspection, testing, or 
preventive maintenance that requires repair. 
• Failure on safety devices or control/monitoring devices that necessitates 
shutdown, or reduction of the item’s capability below specified limits. 
2. A failure mechanism is defined as the apparent, immediate cause of the failure and 
is related to the lowest level in the system’s hierarchy where it can be identified. 
3. A failure mode is defined as the effect by which a failure is observed on the failed 
unit, related to the equipment unit level. The failure mode is a description of the 
various abnormal states/conditions of an equipment unit. Failure modes can be 
grouped into three main categories (ISO 14224): 
• The desired function is not obtained. 
• Specified function lost or outside accepted operational limits. 
• A failure indication is observed, but there is no immediate and critical impact 
on the equipment unit function. These are typical non-critical failures related to 
some degradation or incipient failure condition. 
4. Severity classes in the context of failures are used to describe the effect on 
operational status and the severity of loss of output from the unit. 
• Critical failure: a failure that causes an immediate and complete loss of an 
equipment unit’s capability of providing its output. 
• Degraded failure: a failure which is not critical, but it prevents and equipment 
unit from providing its output within specifications. Such a failure would 
usually be gradual or partial and may develop into a critical failure in time. 
• Incipient failure: a failure that does not immediately cause loss of a unit’s 
capability of providing its output, but which, if not attended to, could result in 
a critical or degraded failure. 
• Unknown: failure severity was not recorded or could not be deduced. 
The OREDA database is divided into topside and subsea equipment; the first will 
be the focus of this analysis. This includes data regarding pumps, electric motor, valves, 
instrumentation input devices, heat exchangers, process vessels, among others. Equipment 
types are further subdivided into particular applications, e.g.: pumps include centrifugal 
pumps for cooling applications. Each equipment type is described as a function of their 
subcomponents and corresponding maintainable items. Each failure mode is associated to 
the most probable combination of a maintainable item and failure mechanism. A-Table 6 
summarized the failure modes identified to be relevant in the analysis of the LH2 storage 
system. A list of relative contributions of each maintainable item and failure mechanisms 
to the total failure rate is presented decomposed for each failure mode. Both these inputs 
are valuable for FMEA and FTA analysis, primarily, as a method to prioritize failure modes 
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to monitor in the system. presents the failure modes selected as relevant for the analysis of 
the LH2 storage system. 
Failure rates ?̂?𝜆 are estimated from number of multiple failures of a single 
component or single failures from multiple components, as shown in Equation (9). A 90% 
confidence interval is given for every estimated failure rate through a 𝜒𝜒2 distribution. The 
failure data is formatted as shown in A-Table 7, under two aggregated time assumptions: 
calendar time and operational time. Calendar time is given with a higher certainty than 
operational time; however operational time-based failure rates are of importance to stand-








A general failure rate is given for each component and is also presented for each 
failure mode, when available. Further, these are also categorized into severity classes: 
critical, degraded, incipient and unknown. Additionally, maintenance data is also reported 
based on the number of demands or cycles of the total population. Active repair times and 
calendar manhours are reported for the corresponding maintenance action for each failure 
mode and severity class. However, in several cases these numbers only estimated and 
heavily depend on the facilities’ maintenance procedures and capacity. 
 
The scope of the OREDA handbook covers the following items for the topside 
equipment: 
• A drawing illustrating the boundary of the equipment unit and specification of 
subunits and maintainable items that are part of the various subunits. 
• A listing of all failure modes, classified as critical, degraded, incipient or unknown. 
• The aggregated observed time in service for the equipment unit, classified as 
calendar time, operational time, and number of demands. 
• The observed number of failures for each failure mode. 
• An estimate of the constant failure rate for each failure mode with associated 
uncertainty intervals. 
A-Table 6: Relevant Failure Modes from OREDA database. 
FM Description FM Description  
AIR Abnormal instrument reading NOI Noise 
AOL Abnormal output - low NOO No output 
ELP External leakage - process medium OHE Overheating 
ELU External leakage - utility medium OTH Other 
ERO Erratic output PDE Parameter deviation 
FTF Fail to function on demand SER Minor in-service problems 
FTS Fail to start on demand SPO Spurious operation 
HIO High output STD Structural deficiency 
INL Internal leakage UNK Unknown 




• Mean and maximum values of the active repair time, i.e., the elapsed time in hours 
to repair the failure and restore the function time (time when actual repair work was 
being done). 
• Mean and maximum values of the manhours repair time, i.e., the number of 
manhours requires to repair the failure and restore the function. 
• Supportive information, e.g., equipment population and number of installations. 
• A cross-tabulation of: 
a) Maintainable item vs Failure mode 
b) Failure mechanism vs Failure mode 
In the following sections, failure data related to the components in the LH2 storage 




D.2.1.  Pumps 
This equipment type is divided into five subdivisions: power transmission, pump 
unit, control and monitoring, lubrication system and miscellaneous elements. By analyzing 
the most frequent maintainable items as shown in A-Figure 7, it can be identified that there 
is a significant number of failures with no attributable subcomponent (i.e., unknown 
subcomponents), only surpassed by seals. Additionally, external leakage either of process 
(ELP) or utility (ELU) medium are the most common failure modes related to these 
maintainable items, as well as abnormal instrument readings (AIR). A-Table 8 lists the 
failure modes and mechanisms with higher relative contributions to the total failure rate, 
A-Table 7:OREDA Topside Data Table Format. 
Taxonomy no.:  
1.3.1.3  















 Aggregated time in service (10e6 hours) No of demands 





Failure mode No of 
failures 
Failure rate (per 10e6 hours) Active rep. 
hrs. 
Manhours 
Lower Mean Upper SD n/t  Mean Max Mean Max 
Critical   
          
VIB           
Degraded           
ELP           
Incipient           
AIR           
Unknown            
ELU           





while A-Figure 8 presents the relationship between these. Both are consistent identifying 
that leakage and abnormal instrumentation behavior have a considerable effect on the 
pump’s failures. 
Failure rates are available for these main failure modes for centrifugal pumps used 
in cooling systems, which is the taxonomic classification most similar to the cryogenic 
pump installed in the LH2 system (1.3.1.3). As the cryogenic pump operates under demand, 




















































A-Table 8: Top failure mode and mechanisms - Centrifugal pumps. 
Failure Modes Contribution, % Failure Mechanisms Contribution, % 
INL 4.06 Vibration 4.72 
VIB 5.02 Blockage/plugged 5.36 
OTH 5.25 Inst. General 5.46 
ELU 12.81 Faulty signal 9.07 
AIR 19.44 Mechanical failure 10.89 
ELP 23.82 Leakage 27.12 
Total 70.40 Total 62.62 
 
A-Table 9: Failure rates for Centrifugal Pump in Cooling Systems. 
Severity Class Failure Mode Mean SD n/t Time 
Critical All 5.69 2.84 5.69 * 
6.15 3.07 6.15 † 
VIB 2.84 2.01 2.84 * 
3.07 2.17 3.07 † 
Degraded All 12.8 4.27 12.8 * 
13.8 4.61 13.8 † 
AIR 1.42 1.42 1.42 * 
1.54 1.54 1.54 † 
ELP 7.11 3.18 7.11 * 
7.68 3.44 7.68 † 
ELU 1.42 1.42 1.42 * 
1.54 1.54 1.54 † 
Incipient All 22.8 5.69 22.8 * 
24.6 6.15 24.6 † 
AIR 7.11 3.18 7.11 * 
7.68 3.44 7.68 † 
ELU 1.42 1.42 1.42 * 
1.54 1.54 1.54 † 
INL 2.84 2.01 2.84 * 
3.07 2.17 3.07 † 
OTH 2.84 2.01 2.84 * 
3.07 2.17 3.07 † 
Unknown All 1.42 1.42 1.42 * 
1.54 1.54 1.54 † 
ELU 1.42 1.42 1.42 * 
1.54 1.54 1.54 † 
All modes All 42.7 7.79 42.7 * 
46.1 8.42 46.1 † 




D.2.2.  Electric Motor for Centrifugal Pump 
This equipment type is divided into five subdivisions: motor, control and 
monitoring, lubrication system, cooling system, and miscellaneous elements. Failure to 
start (FTS), vibrations (VIB) and structural deficiencies (STD) are the most common 
failure modes. A-Table 10 lists the failure modes and mechanisms with higher relative 
contributions to the total failure rate, while A-Figure 9 presents the relationship between 
these. Both are consistent identifying that electrical failures and abnormal vibrations have 
a considerable effect on the motor’s failures. 
Failure rates are available for these main failure modes for electric motors powering 
centrifugal pumps used in cooling systems, which is the taxonomic classification most 
similar to the cryogenic pump installed in the LH2 system (2.2.2.4). Other failure modes 
identified as relevant in general applications of electric motors in centrifugal pumps (2.2.2) 
are also presented. As the cryogenic pump operates under demand, the failure rates 





A-Table 10: Top failure mode and mechanisms - Electric motors. 
Failure Modes Contribution, % Failure Mechanisms Contribution, % 
BRD 6.37 Faulty power 4.55 
OHE 6.37 Breakage 4.55 
UST 6.37 Inst. General 6.37 
ELU 7.27 Control failure 6.37 
PDE 7.27 Leakage 7.27 
STD 10.01 Vibration 10.00 
VIB 10.91 Mechanical failure 14.55 
FTS 20.01 Electrical failure 23.64 
Total 74.58 Total 77.30 
 
 























D.2.3.  Valves 
This equipment type is divided into four subdivisions: valves, actuator, control and 
monitoring, and miscellaneous elements. Prevalent failure modes differ between different 
types of valves. Relief and shut-off valves are of interest for this analysis. 
(1) Relief Valves 
In the case of relief valves, most common failures have undetermined causes, 
followed by leakage (ELP) and delays in operation (DOP). A-Table 12 lists the failure 
modes and mechanisms with higher relative contributions to the total failure rate, while A-
Figure 10 presents the relationship between these. 
Failure rates are available for the listed failure modes for conventional pressure 
relief valves (PSV), which is the taxonomic classification most similar the PSV present in 
the LH2 storage tank in the system (4.4.12.3). As the PSV operates under demand, the 
failure rates estimated in operational time presented in A-Table 13 are considered more 
representative values. 
A-Table 11:Failure rates for Electric Motors in Centrifugal Pump-Cooling Systems. 







Critical All 17.44 8.72 17.44 * 
17.44 8.72 17.44 † 
FTS 17.44 8.72 17.44 * 
17.44 8.72 17.44 † 
Degraded All 8.72 6.17 8.72 * 
8.72 6.17 8.72 † 
PDE 4.36 4.36 4.36 * 
4.36 4.36 4.36 † 
STD 4.36 4.36 4.36 * 
4.36 4.36 4.36 † 
All modes All 26.16 10.68 26.16 * 





Critical ELU 3.47 7.91 1.52 * 
3.68 9.01 1.74 † 
NOI 0.69 0.51 0.87 * 
0.83 0.51 0.99 † 
OHE 0.95 0.77 1.3 * 
1.16 0.77 1.49 † 
VIB 0.48 0.88 0.22 * 
0.55 0.95 0.25 † 
Degraded ELU 1.00 1.79 0.22 * 
1.13 2.02 0.25 † 
NOI 0.72 1.09 0.65 * 
1.25 2.27 0.74 † 










A-Table 12: Top failure mode and mechanisms - Relief valves. 
Failure Modes Contribution, % Failure Mechanisms Contribution, % 
FTO 7.40 Wear 7.410 
STD 7.40 Corrosion 11.10 
DOP 14.81 Leakage 14.81 
ELP 14.81 Other 18.52 
OTH 33.33 Unknown 29.61 
Total 77.75 Total 81.45 
 
 


















A-Table 13: Failure rates for Conventional PSV Relief Valves. 
Severity Class Failure Mode Mean SD n/t Time 
Critical All 1.02 1.15 1.15 * 
1.03 1.17 1.17 † 
FTO 1.02 1.15 1.15 * 
1.03 1.17 1.17 † 
Incipient All 5.11 4.29 5.75 * 
5.17 4.29 5.83 † 
STD 1.50 1.83 1.15 * 
1.51 1.81 1.17 † 
OTH 4.07 2.3 4.6 * 
4.12 2.33 4.67 † 
All modes All 5.93 5.08 6.9 * 
6 5.08 7 † 




(2) Shut-off Valves 
In the case of shut-off valves, failure modes have not been described in detail. Most 
common failures are related to service issues (SER) and leakage when closed (LCP), both 
related to materials and mechanical failures. A-Table 14 lists the failure modes and 
mechanisms with higher relative contributions to the total failure rate, while A-Figure 11 
presents the relationship between these. 
Failure rates are available for the listed failure modes for ball and gate shut-off 
valves, both taxonomic classifications most similar to the ones present in the system 
(4.4.13.1 and 4.4.13.3, respectively). As these valves operate under demand, the failure 
rates estimated in operational time presented in A-Table 15 and A-Table 16 are considered 






A-Table 14: Top failure mode and mechanisms - Shut-off valves. 
Failure Modes Contribution, % Failure Mechanisms Contribution, % 
INL 11.11 Leakage 22.22 
ELU  22.22 Mechanical failure 22.22 
LCP 33.33 Corrosion 22.22 
SER 33.33 Material failure 33.33 
Total 100.00 Total 100.00 
 
 















A-Table 15: Failure rates for Shut-off valves. To be continued. 
Type Severity Class Failure Mode Mean SD n/t Time 
Shut-off, 
Ball 
Critical All 24.74 24.74 24.74 * 
24.76 24.76 24.76 † 
ELU 24.74 24.74 24.74 * 
24.76 24.76 24.76 † 





D.2.4.  Input Devices 
This equipment refers to transmitters, transducers, and switch-type components. As 
this covers a wide range of different devices, this category is divided into two general 
subdivisions: control and monitoring and miscellaneous elements. Most common failures 
are related to service issues (SER) and failure to function on-demand (FTF), mostly related 
to leakage failures. A-Table 17 lists the failure modes and mechanisms with higher relative 
contributions to the total failure rate, while A-Figure 12 presents the relationship between 
these. This data mostly implies that instrumentation is damaged through leakage events 
and other undetermined reasons. 
 
 
(3) Pressure Sensors 
Pressure sensor devices mostly present the same failure modes and mechanisms as 
general input devices. These differ in the relative contribution of service issues (SER) and 
failure to function on-demand (FTF) to the overall failure rate, as shown in A-Table 18. A-
Figure 13 presents the relationship between the failure modes and mechanisms. Similarly, 
this data implies that instrumentation is damaged through leakage events and other 
undetermined reasons. 
Failure rates are available for these general failure modes for various input devices. 
Failure data referring to temperature (4.2.4) and pressure sensors (4.2.3) are shown in A-
Table 19. The latter is discussed more in depth in the following section. In this case, 
calendar time should represent more accurately the monitoring process of the system. 
A-Table 16: Failure rates for Shut-off valves. Continued 
Type Severity Class Failure Mode Mean SD n/t Time 
Shut-off, 
Ball 
Degraded All 24.74 24.74 24.74 * 
24.76 24.76 24.76 † 
ELU 24.74 24.74 24.74 * 
24.76 24.76 24.76 † 
All modes All 5.93 5.08 6.9 * 
6 5.08 7 † 
Shut-off, 
Gate 
All modes All 4.03 5.7 - * 
4.03 5.7 - † 
Note: All failure rates are given in (10−6 hrs.) 
 
A-Table 17: Top failure mode and mechanisms - Input devices. 
Failure Modes Contribution, % Failure Mechanisms Contribution, % 
UNK 4.55 Faulty signal 9.09 
AOL 13.64 Mechanical Failure 9.10 
FTF 18.19 Unknown  13.64 
OTH 22.74 Inst. General 18.20 
SER 40.92 Leakage 40.91 




























A-Table 18: Top failure mode and mechanisms - Pressure input devices. 
Failure Modes Contribution, % Failure Mechanisms Contribution, % 
FTF 14.28 Inst. General 7.14 
OTH 35.71 Contamination 7.14 
SER 50.00 Earth/isolation fault 7.14 
  Mechanical Failure 14.28 
  Leakage 64.29 
Total 100.00 Total 100.00 
 
 

















D.2.5.  Fire & Gas Detectors 
This equipment refers to fire and gas detectors. As this covers a wide range of 
different devices, this category is divided into three general subdivisions: sensors, interface 
unit and miscellaneous elements. Most common failures are related to anomalous high and 
erratic outputs (HIO, ERO), as well as failure to function on-demand (FTF). A-Table 20 
lists the failure modes and mechanisms with higher relative contributions to the total failure 
A-Table 19: Failure rates for various input devices. 
Type Severity Class Failure Mode Mean SD n/t Time 
Input devices, 
general  
Critical  All 2.15 2.32 0.52 * 
2.16 2.23 0.65 † 
FTF 1.73 2.11 0.29 * 
1.72 2.08 0.37 † 
Degraded All 3.66 5.04 0.59 * 
3.66 5.02 0.74 † 
AOL 0.65 1.02 0.07 * 
0.65 1.01 0.09 † 
All modes All 9.98 11.95 1.62 * 
10.00 11.88 2.04 † 
Temperature, 
general 
All modes All 3.63 5.13 - * 
3.63 5.14 - † 
Temperature, 
resistance 
All modes All 2.22 3.14 - * 
2.22 3.14 - † 
Pressure, general Critical All 1.05 1.48 1.05 * 
 1.09 1.37 1.09 † 
SER 0.51 1.90 0.51 * 
 0.51 1.71 0.51 † 
OTH 0.51 1.54 0.51 * 
 0.45 1.15 0.45 † 
Degraded All 2.45 5.42 0.45 * 
 2.48 5.41 0.58 † 
SER 1.67 3.59 0.30 * 
 1.70 3.57 0.38 † 
OTH 0.88 1.76 0.15 * 
 0.90 1.74 0.19 † 
Incipient All 2.08 2.35 0.23 * 
 2.09 2.32 0.29 † 
SER 2.08 2.35 0.23 * 
 2.09 2.32 0.29 † 
All modes All 5.93 5.08 6.90 * 
 6.00 5.08 7.00 † 




rate, while A-Figure 14 presents the relationship between these. This data mostly implies 
that instrumentation is damaged through contamination events and calibration issues. 
Failure rates are available for general failure modes for various detectors devices. 
Failure data referring generic fire and gas detectors (4.1) are shown in A-Table 21 and A-
Table 22. In this case, calendar time should represent more accurately the monitoring 







A-Table 20: Top failure mode and mechanisms - Fire & gas detectors. 
Failure Modes Contribution, % Failure Mechanisms Contribution, % 
UNK 8.75 Faulty signal 10.00 
NOO 10.00 Inst. General 11.25 
FTF 17.50 Unknown 17.50 
ERO 20.00 Out of adjustment 20.00 
HIO 23.75 Contamination 27.50 
Total 80.00 Total 86.25 
 
 















A-Table 21: Failure rates for Fire & gas detectors. To be continued. 
Severity Class Failure Mode Mean SD n/t Time 
Critical All 2.30 1.61 2.52 * 
2.31 1.64 2.53 † 
FTF 1.02 1.83 1.22 * 
1.04 1.86 1.22 † 
HIO 0.08 0.15 0.09 * 
0.08 0.15 0.09 † 
NOO 0.63 1.11 0.69 * 
0.63 1.12 0.70 † 






D.2.6.  Control Logic Devices 
Failure data on control logic devices (CLU) is not described in depth in OREDA. 
A-Table 23 lists the identified failure modes and mechanisms relevant to general CLU 
components. The data implies that failures refer to unstable functionality, such as spurious 
operation (SPO), failure to function on-demand (FTF) and erratic output (ERO). As A-
Figure 15 indicates, the failure modes are directly related to specific failure mechanisms, 
i.e., electrical and software failures. 
Failure rates are available for the generic failure modes for CLU components (4.3) 
in A-Table 24. In this case, calendar time should represent more accurately the 
participation of the CLU in the control and monitoring processes of the system. 
 
A-Table 22: Failure rates for Fire & gas detectors. Continued 
Severity Class Failure Mode Mean SD n/t Time 
Degraded All 3.25 4.67 3.91 * 
3.27 4.73 3.92 † 
ERO 1.33 2.25 1.30 * 
1.34 2.25 1.31 † 
HIO 0.91 3.24 1.56 * 
0.92 3.29 1.57 † 
UNK 0.26 0.53 0.35 * 
0.26 0.54 0.35 † 
Incipient All 0.42 0.19 0.43 * 
0.43 0.19 0.44 † 
ERO 0.08 0.15 0.09 * 
0.08 0.15 0.09 † 
UNK 0.14 0.29 0.17 * 
0.14 0.30 0.17 † 
Unknown All 0.09 0.10 0.09 * 
0.09 0.09 0.09 † 
All modes All 5.96 6.74 6.95 * 
6.00 6.83 6.97 † 
Note: All failure rates are given in (10−6 hrs.) 
 
A-Table 23: Top failure mode and mechanisms – CLUs. 
Failure Modes Contribution, % Failure Mechanisms Contribution, % 
ERO 25.00 Electrical failure 25.00 
FTF 25.00 Software failure 25.00 
SPO 50.00 Earth/isolation fault 50.00 








D.2.7.  Heat Exchangers 
This equipment type refers to several different designs of heat exchangers. In 
general, this equipment is divided into four subdivisions: external unit, internal unit, control 
and monitoring, and miscellaneous elements. Abnormal instrument readings (AIR) and 
leakage (ELP, ELU) are the most common failure modes. More detail es necessary on the 
evaporator’s characteristics to select relevant failure modes for analysis. A-Table 25 lists 
the general failure modes and mechanisms with higher relative contributions to the total 
failure rate, while A-Figure 16 presents the relationship between these. Both are consistent 
identifying that leakage and abnormal instrumentation readings have a considerable effect 
on the components’ failures. 
Failure rates are available for general failure modes for heat exchangers (3.1). Other 
failure modes are described for various types of heat exchangers and could be more 
appropriate. However, as e means of simplifying the data collected, A-Table 26 and A-
 











A-Table 24: Failure rates for CLUs. 
Severity Class Failure Mode Mean SD n/t Time 
Degraded All 17.37 23.82 11.40 * 
17.40 64.69 11.42 † 
SPO 17.37 23.82 11.40 * 
17.40 23.85 11.42 † 
Incipient All 9.90 11.52 11.40 * 
9.91 11.53 11.42 † 
ERO 5.22 5.77 5.71 * 
5.21 5.76 5.70 † 
FTF 5.21 5.76 5.70 * 
5.22 5.77 5.71 † 
All modes All 24.68 15.35 22.80 * 
24.71 15.38 22.83 † 




Table 27 present this generic failure data for heat exchangers. As this component operates 






A-Table 25: Top failure mode and mechanisms - Heat exchangers. 
Failure Modes Contribution, % Failure Mechanisms Contribution, % 
STD 11.84 Mechanical failure 7.89 
OTH 11.85 Corrosion 7.90 
ELP 14.48 Control failure 10.53 
ELU 14.48 Unknown 14.48 
AIR 23.70 Leakage 19.74 
Total 96.10 Total 73.70 
 
 



















A-Table 26: Failure rates for Heat Exchangers. To be continued. 
Severity Class Failure Mode Mean SD n/t Time 
Critical All 16.36 17.43 25.99 * 
17.31 19.49 28.15 † 
AIR 6.64 4.87 8.00 * 
7.11 5.34 8.66 † 
ELP 1.30 0.94 1.33 * 
1.41 1.02 1.44 † 
ELU 3.53 1.95 4.00 * 
3.74 2.31 4.33 † 
STD 2.20 2.15 2.67 * 
2.36 2.36 289.00 † 
OTH 2.46 1.62 2.67 * 
2.65 1.78 2.89 † 





D.2.8.  Vessels 
The data presented in the OREDA databases under the taxonomy of ‘vessels’ is not 
directly applicable to the storage vessels present in the LH2 storage system. However, they 
do allow the quantification of the reliability of the system in an initial estimation process. 
As seen in A-Table 28, most common issues are related to instrumentation (AIR) and 
leakage (ELP), which can be extended to storage vessels. Failure mechanisms, as shown 
in A-Figure 17 however, are mostly focused on process control, which does not apply to 
the studied system. 
Failure rates are available for the general failure modes in vessels (3.2). Other 
sources for relevant failure modes could be required for an appropriate quantification of 
the reliability of the system. Currently, the failure data presented in A-Table 29 and A-
Table 30 for calendar time-based failure estimations are considered for the analysis. 
 
A-Table 27: Failure rates for Heat Exchangers. Continued. 
Severity Class Failure Mode Mean SD n/t Time 
Degraded All 27.51 24.42 18.66 * 
28.27 24.92 20.21 † 
AIR 3.21 4.55 3.33 * 
3.42 4.88 3.61 † 
ELP 2.10 5.88 2.00 * 
2.25 2.05 2.17 † 
ELU 3.03 1.49 3.33 * 
3.28 1.61 3.61 † 
STD 3.66 3.34 2.67 * 
3.81 3.39 2.89 † 
OTH 3.19 2.51 3.33 * 
3.42 2.72 3.61 † 
Incipient All 5.31 7.27 6.00 * 
5.65 7.80 6.50 † 
AIR 0.61 0.67 0.67 * 
0.66 0.72 0.72 † 
ELP 3.70 5.79 4.00 * 
3.93 6.21 4.33 † 
STD 0.70 0.85 0.67 * 
0.75 0.92 0.72 † 
All modes All 50.25 12.22 50.66 * 
53.89 12.14 54.86 † 








A-Table 28: Top failure mode and mechanisms – Vessels. 
Failure Modes Contribution, % Failure Mechanisms Contribution, % 
STD 9.53 No signal 7.05 
OTH 9.92 Out of adjustment 7.88 
PDE 12.44 Control failure 14.51 
ELP 16.58 Unknown 14.52 
AIR 41.05 Faulty signal 17.43 
Total 89.52 Total 61.39 
 
 


















A-Table 29: Failure rates for Vessels. To be continued. 
Severity Class Failure Mode Mean SD n/t Time 
Critical All 27.02 48.00 38.78 * 
30.13 53.95 43.78 † 
AIR 13.32 21.20 19.60 * 
14.97 23.80 22.13 † 
ELP 2.86 3.73 2.98 * 
3.19 3.74 3.37 † 
PDE 7.84 19.88 10.23 * 
8.80 22.40 11.55 † 
OTH 1.90 2.00 2.13 * 
2.15 2.24 2.41 † 





D.3.  Purple Book Loss of Containment Frequency Data 
The Purple Book collects a variety of LOC frequency data relevant to the 
construction of ETAs and FTAs in the context of QRAs. Although this information refers 
to generic industry data, detailed breakdowns for some components by application and type 
allow a better characterization than using other databases. LOC data refer the occurrence 
of random events, estimated through observed failed and operational components in 
industrial settings. In this document, individual and societal risk are defined as: 
a) Individual Risk: Frequency of an individual dying due to LOCs. The individual is 
assumed to be unprotected and to be present during the total exposure time. 
A-Table 30: Failure rates for Vessels. Continued. 
Severity Class Failure Mode Mean SD n/t Time 
Degraded All 39.89 27.75 41.33 * 
43.43 28.53 46.66 † 
AIR 13.95 15.67 18.32 * 
15.29 17.13 20.68 † 
ELP 2.59 3.91 4.26 * 
2.93 4.36 4.81 † 
PDE 9.47 11.76 2.56 * 
10.03 12.52 2.89 † 
STD 5.96 2.07 6.39 * 
6.81 2.16 7.22 † 
OTH 4.98 9.66 6.39 * 
5.60 10.87 7.22 † 
Incipient All 14.97 11.97 20.88 * 
17.00 13.15 23.57 † 
AIR 2.73 2.30 3.41 * 
3.09 2.57 3.85 † 
ELP 5.46 9.15 9.37 * 
6.35 10.31 10.58 † 
STD 3.88 4.36 3.41 * 
4.23 4.54 3.85 † 
Unknown All 1.28 1.48 1.70 * 
1.45 1.66 1.92 † 
AIR 0.71 0.74 0.85 * 
0.81 0.83 0.96 † 
ELP 0.37 0.43 0.43 * 
0.42 0.48 0.48 † 
All modes All 82.73 51.08 102.70 * 
91.58 54.72 115.93 † 




b) Societal Risk: Frequency of having an accident with N ore more people being killed 
simultaneously. The people involved are assumed to have some means of 
protection. 
As per instructed in The Purple Book guideline for constructing relevant QRAs, 
only LOC that contribute to individual or societal risk should be included under two 
conditions: 
1) The frequency of occurrence is equal to or greater than 10−8 per year. 
2) Lethal damage (1% probability) occurs outside the establishment’s boundary or the 
transport route. 
It is stated that criterion (1) corresponds with present-day practice. A threshold of 
10−8 per year for including LOCs is considered reasonable since generic LOCs leading to 
the release of the complete inventory have failure frequencies in the range 10−5 to 10−7 
per year. In the following sections, relevant LOCs for the analysis of the LH2 storage 
system are documented [33]. These primarily refer to the LH2 storage tank. LOC data is 
also reported for pipelines, pumps, heat exchangers and pressure relief devices. Further, 
specific indications are suggested to consider the consequences of the reported releases, as 
shown in A-Table 31. 
 
 
D.3.1.  Pressure and Atmospheric Tanks 
The LOC frequency data collected for pressurized and atmospheric tanks or vessels 
cover failures directly related to the structural integrity of the vessel wall and the welded 
stumps, mounting plates these and of the associated instrumentation pipework. 
Additionally, the failure frequencies recorded are default failure frequencies excluding 
effects such as corrosion, fatigue due to vibrations, operating errors, and external impacts. 
Several types of pressurized stationary tanks as well as pressure, process and reactor 
vessels can be distinguished. These are defined as: 
• Pressure vessel: A pressure vessel is a storage vessel in which the pressure is 
(substantially) more than 1 bar absolute. 
• Process vessel: In a process vessel a change in the physical properties of the 
substance occurs, e.g., temperature or phase. Examples of process vessels are 
A-Table 31: Consequence modeling for storage and piping LOC events. 
LOC Installation To model as: 
Instantaneous  Tanks and vessels Totally ruptured vessel. Gas: no air entrainment 
during expansion. Liquid: spreading pool 
Continuous release Tanks and vessels Hole in vessel wall (sharp orifice) 
Full bore rupture Process pipes Full bore ruptured pipeline 
Leak  Process pipes Outflow through small leak (sharp orifice)  
Pressure relief valve All Hole in vessel wall (rounded orifice) 
Pool evaporation  Tanks and vessels Pool evaporation  




distillation columns, condensers, and filters. Vessels where only the level of liquid 
changes can be considered as pressure vessels. 
Depending on the application, some storage tanks may have been pressurized to 
just above 1 bar (abs.). In this case, these can be considered as atmospheric tanks for LOC 
purposes. This applies, for instance, to cryogenic tanks and atmospheric storage tanks with 
nitrogen blanketing. 
Based on the previous definitions, data for two types of releases are available: 
a) Directly to the atmosphere. This refers to single-walled storage tanks. 
b) From primary container to unimpaired secondary container or outer shell. This 
refers to double-walled storage tanks, such as the ones used to store liquid 
hydrogen. 
Data for three distinct failure modes are presented: 
1. G1: Instantaneous release of complete inventory. 
2. G2: Continuous release of the complete inventory in 10 min at a constant rate of 
release. 
3. G3: Continuous release from a hole with an effective diameter of 10 mm. 
Further differentiation is needed between the particular configurations of these 
tanks resulting in different release scenarios. These types are defined as: 
• Single-containment atmospheric tank: Consists of a primary container for the 
liquid. An outer shell is either present, or not, but when present, primarily intended 
for the retention and protection of insulation. It is not designed to contain liquid in 
the event of the primary container’s failure. 
• Atmospheric tank with a protective outer shell: Consists of a primary container for 
the liquid and a protective outer shell. The outer shell is designed to contain the 
liquid in the event of failure of the primary container but is not designed to contain 
any vapor. The outer shell is not designed to withstand all possible loads, e.g., 
explosion (static pressure load of 0.3 bar during 300 ms), penetrating fragments and 
cold (thermal) load. 
• Double-containment atmospheric tank: Consists of a primary container for the 
liquid and a secondary container. The secondary container is designed to contain 
the liquid in the event of failure of the primary container and to withstand all 
possible loads, like explosion (static pressure load of 0.3 bar during 300 ms), 
penetrating fragments and cold (thermal) load. The secondary container is not 
designed to hold any kind of vapor. 
• Full-containment atmospheric tank: Consists of a primary container for the liquid 
and a secondary container. The secondary container is designed to contain both the 
liquid and vapor in the event of failure of the primary container, and to withstand 
all possible loads, like explosion (static pressure load of 0.3 bar during 300 ms), 
penetrating fragments and cold. The outer roof is supported by the secondary 
containment and designed to withstand loads e.g., explosion. 
Hence, the relevant LOC are extracted from the atmospheric tank section, shown 
in A-Table 32. It must be noted that failure frequencies for atmospheric vessels are 
considered to be higher than for pressurized tanks by a factor of 10, to include potential 
hazardous exposure of the stored substance. Further, for specific failure scenarios, in which 
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external impact or operating errors cannot be excluded, the given values for LOC G1 and 
G2 should consider adding 5 × 10−6 per year. 
 
 
D.3.2.  Pipelines 
LOC data for pipelines cover all types of process pipes and inter-unit pipelines 
above ground of the studied system and are summarized in A-Table 33 based on their 
nominal diameters. This considers that the pipeline is operating in an environment with no 
excessive vibration, corrosion, erosion, or thermal cycling stresses. The minimum length 
of a pipeline is 10 m to included flange failures in the estimations. 
 
Data for two distinct failure modes are presented: 
1. G1: Full-bore rupture. outflow is from both sides of the full-bore rupture. 
2. G2: Leak. outflow is from a leak with effective diameter of 10% of the nominal 
diameter, with a maximum of 50 mm. 
 
 




G1 G2 G3 
a b a b a b 
Pressure vessel 5 × 10−7  5 × 10−7  1 × 10−5  
Process vessel  5 × 10−6  5 × 10−6  




Atmospheric tank 5 × 10
−6  5 × 10−6  






5 × 10−7 5 × 10−7 5 × 10−7 5 × 10−7  1 × 10−4 
Double-
containment 
atmospheric tank  
1.25
× 10−8 5 × 10
−8 1.25× 10−8 5 × 10
−8  1 × 10−4 
Full-containment 
atmospheric tank 1 × 10
−8      
 




Nominal diameter < 75 mm 1 × 10−6 5 × 10−6 
Nominal diameter (75>, <150) mm 3 × 10−7 5 × 10−6 




D.3.3.  Pumps 
LOC data for pumps are summarized here based on structural characteristics of the 
installation, such as the casing, as a release mitigation measure. The failure frequencies 
presented in A-Table 34 are averages encompassing pump, drive and sealing type as well 
as rpm speed, among others. 
 
Data for two distinct failure modes are presented: 
1. G1: Catastrophic failure. full-bore rupture of the largest connecting pipeline. 
2. G2: Leak. outflow is from a leak with effective diameter of 10% of the nominal 




D.3.4.  Heat Exchangers 
LOC data for heat exchangers are summarized in A-Table 35 based on the inner or 
outer fluid properties, pressure, and structural characteristics of the installation. These 
consider tube and pipe heat exchanger designs. These estimations are based on expert 
judgment. 
 
Data for three types of designs are available: 
a) Dangerous substance outside pipes. 
b) Dangerous substance inside pipes. The design pressure of the outer shell is less than 
the pressure of dangerous substance. 
c) Dangerous substance inside pipes. The design pressure of the outer shell is equal or 
higher than the pressure of dangerous substance. 
 
Data for six distinct failure modes are presented: 
1. G1: Instantaneous release of complete inventory. 
2. G2: Continuous release of the complete inventory in 10 min at a constant rate of 
release. 
3. G3: Continuous release from a hole with an effective diameter of 10 mm. 
4. G4: Full-bore rupture of ten pipes simultaneously. outflow from both sides of the 
full-bore rupture 
5. G5: Full-bore rupture of one of the pipes. outflow from both sides of the full-bore 
rupture 







1 × 10−4 5 × 10−4 
Pumps with a wrought 
steel containment  
5 × 10−5 2.5 × 10−4 







6. G6: Leak. outflow from a leak with effective diameter of 10% of the nominal 
diameter, with a maximum of 50 mm. 
For heat exchangers with the dangerous substance inside the pipes, a rupture of ten 
pipes is assumed to always go simultaneously with failure of the outer shell, resulting in a 




D.3.5.  Pressure Relief Devices 
LOC data for pressure relief devices (PRD) are summarized in A-Table 36. It must 
be noted that the opening of a pressure relief valve results in an emission only if the device 
is in direct contact with the substance and discharges directly to the atmosphere. These 
estimations are based on expert judgment. 
 
Data for one distinct failure modes are presented: 
1. G1: Discharge of a pressure relief device with maximum discharge rate. 
 
  




G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 
Dangerous substance 
outside pipes.  5 × 10
−5 5 × 10−5 1 × 10−3    
Dangerous substance 
inside pipes. Outer 
pressure is lower. 
   1 × 10−5 1 × 10−3 1 × 10−2 
Dangerous substance 
inside pipes. Outer 
pressure is higher. 
   1 × 10−6   
 









Appendix E. Extended QRA Results 
E.1.  FMEA Full Results 
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